## INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of "sectioning" the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is contilued again-beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.

Fuller, Howard Lamar

THE IMPACT OF THE MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM'S DESEGREGATION PLAN ON BLACK STUDENTS AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY (1976 - 1982)

## University Microfilms <br> International 300 N. Zees Rooad, Ann Arbor, M. M88106

## PLEASE NOTE:

In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible way from the available copy. Problems encountered with this document have been identified here with a check mark $\qquad$ .

1. Glossy photographs or pages $\qquad$
2. Colored illustrations, paper or print $\qquad$
3. Photographs with dark background $\qquad$
4. Illustrations are poor copy $\qquad$
5. Pages with black marks, not original copy $\qquad$
6. Print shows through as there is text on both sides of page $\qquad$
7. Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages $\qquad$
8. Print exceeds margin requirements $\qquad$
9. Tightly bound copy with print lost in spine $\qquad$
10. Computer printout pages with indistinct print $\qquad$
11. Page (s) $\qquad$ lacking when material received, and not available from school or author. .
$\qquad$ seem to be missing in numbering only as text follows.
12. Pages)
13. Two pages numbered $\qquad$ . Text follows.
14. Curling and wrinkled pages $\qquad$
15. Dissertation contains pages with print at a slant, filmed as received $\qquad$
16. Other $\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
University Microfilms International

THE IMPACT OF THE MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM'S desegregation plan on black students and THE BLACK COMMUNITY (1976 - 1982)
by

Howard L. Fuller, B.S., M.S.A.

# A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education 

Milwaukee, Wisconsin May, 1985

This dissertation has been approved by the following committee:


## DEDICATION

```
This dissertation is dedicated to:
    My children, Kelli, Malcolm, and Kumba;
    My late grandmother, Pearl Wagner, whom I know is somewhere
    watching over me;
    A true "Blise Devil", the late Mary Ann Love (Yes, Mary Ann,
we're still pushing);
    A courageous person, Ms. Myrtle Lacy, with the hopes that
    one day justice will be done;
    and All of the Black chiidren who have endured the practices
    of MPS over the years.
```


## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of a dissertation normally represents the culmination of years of hard work and perseverance, and in my case, that is exactly what has happened! But, this accomplishment is not mine alone. There are literally hundreds of people who have had a role in the development and completion of this study. Although it is not possible for me to acknowledge all of them, I am going to mention as many of them as possible given the limitations of my memory and the amount of space available.

I want to begin with the students and the faculty at North Division High School who had the courage to stand and fight when the Milwaukee Public School System attempted to convert North to a city wide specialty school. It was their "Blue Devil" spirit and determination that led to the formation of the Coalition to Save North Division High School (CSND).

It was the Coalition with its slogan, "Enough is Enough", that started me on the road to understanding how desegregation can become just as discriminatory as segregation. I want to thank all of the staunch fighters from the Coalition for their spiritual guidance in beginning this project. So, thanks to:


#### Abstract

Ann Avington, LaRonda Bearden, Gisela Benning, Sandra Brown, Hubert Canfield, Sheila Cargile, Delta Ceasar, Elsie Ceasar, Michael Cummings, Cassie Downer, Christine Faltz, Betty Glosson, Fred Gordon, Sarah Grant (Aunt Em), Doris Green, Saron Henry, John Irish, Doris Jackson, Veronica Jackson, Fran Johnson, Kathryn Jones, John LaFave, David Levine, Greg Lewis, Marion McDowell, Pauline McKay, the late Savannah McKenzie, Rev. Joseph McNeil, Al Nichols, Ellen $0^{\prime}$ Brien, Sharon Payne, Grace Pearson, Charles Reese, Helen Robertson, Mary Rogers, Tazzalean Rogers, Joan Smith, Lisa Smith, Anita Spencer, Mamie Troutman, Therese VanThull, Brian Verdin, Dwaine Washington, Evelyn Williams, LaWanda Williams, Ralph Williams, Regina Williams, and Alban Williamson.


There is now another group of people, the Concerned Citizens for Quality Education for Black Children, carrying on the battle started by the CSND. Some of the fighters from the Coalition are in this one too, but there are some dirferent people-individuals who deserve to be mentioned here. My thanks go out to: Cloyce Burns, Gladys Burns, Pat Flood, Beverly, Griffin, Reuben Harpole, Janice Jackson, Naomi Jackson, Rev. James Lathan, Rahman Malik, Gloria Mason, Clarence Nichols, Bob Peterson, Mohammad Sabir, Mike Smith. Paul Spraggins, and Rev. Willie Walker.

To Larry Harwell and all of the people involved in "Two Way
or No Way", thanks For raising the questions. We are where we are in this battle today because you dared to go against the tide and demand equity for our people.

Thanks go out to the Interreligious Foundation for Communty Organization (IFCO), and the Center for Constitutional Rights. Your support at key points in the CSND struggle was critical to our ability to continue moving forward. I can mever zepay the friendship and support that has been given me all of these years by Rev. Lu Walker, Marilyn Clement, and Victor McTeer.

This work is being completed at Marquette University so it is only appropriate that $I$ express my deep gratitude to some very special people at Marquette: Dr. Arnold Mitchem (Mitch) for hiring me to work for the Educational Opportunity Program (EOP), thereby giving me a chance to regain my sense of commitment to the human struggle for a better quality of life; Dr. Albert Jache for supporting me and believing in me while $I$ was at Marquette; George Lowery for remaining a true fixend through the years; Dr. James Green for giving me the chance, in spite of what the test scores seemed to indicate; all of my sisters in EOP-Sande Robinson, Kathy Cade, Debbie Hendricks, LaVerne JacksonHarvey, and Ethel Woods; my good brother Art Mayberry and finally my comrade in struggle, Bob Lowe (thanks for the constructive criticism at a critical point in this effort).

Thanks also to Lois Quinn, who withcut her knowing it, spurred me on to do research on MPS, Mr. Wesley Scott and the late Dr. Robert Starms, who served as my mentors during an important period of my life.

I wish to thank Governor Tony Earl for giving me the opportunity to serve in his cabinet, thereby giving me access to information that otherwise would not have been possible for me to obtain. To my staff at the Wisconsin Department of Employment Relations, thanks for carrying me during the last few weeks of this project. In particular, my gratitude goes out to Eric Stanchfield, Peggy Howard, Dave Hendricks, Laura Vinje and Barbara Horton (I needed those prayers!).

Thanks to my new colleagues in Madison, especially Nate Harris, Kirbie Mack, Dennis Dresang, Debby Laurel , Euriel Jordan, Fred Reed, and Pickens Winters, for their help and support at crucial moments.

Thanks also to my sisters and brothers in the Black Political Network, especially Martha Love, Veronica Dorsey, Anthony. Bradford, James Mosley, Pat McManus, Kevin Ingram, Phil Anderson, Wyman Winston, Paula Dorsey, Spencer Coggs, RoseMarie McDowell and Danae Davis-Gordon for carrying on with the work of the BPN during my absence to finish this project.

To Derrick Bell, thanks for your drive, determination, and
the courage you have shown to pursue a new path in the light of new information and a better understanding of what we face as black people.
To my dear friend Maureen McCormack-Larkin, thanks for
forcing me to think, and for turning me on to the effective
school literature. Thanks too for pushing me to finish this
study.
Thanks to Melodie and Dick Yates, Howard Stanback, Gene
Locke, Walter and Barbara Aaron, Viola plummer, and Abdul
Akalimat for their encouragement and moral support over the
years.

Thanks to Lawrence and Mackie Knox and Delores and Bill Bell for helping me grow and develop. Not everyone is lucky enough to have surrogate parents like you.

Finally, let me express my deepest appreciation to my committee members: Dr. David Buckholdt, Dr. Adrian DuPuis, Dr. Daniel Maguire, Dr. Albert Thompson, and Dr. Thomas Martin. In particular, I want to thank $D r$. DuPuis for his efforts as my initial chairperson, and Dr. Buckholdt for his help as my chairperson during the writing of this dissertation. These two men gave me all the support I needed.


#### Abstract

In addition to the people I mentioned in the acknowledgment, there are four people who desurve special mention, because without them this dissertation would never have been completed.

First, my mother, Juanita Smith, who has always been there during the various passages of my life. She has always been there to lend a helping hand and to encourage me to push on. I am in many ways a difficult son, but she has always been a beautiful Mother.

Second, my dear friend Dotty Holman. It was Dotty who helped me think through a way to do this research. It was her work in the CSND struggle that served as the backdrop for this dissertation. Her boundless energy, her enthusiasm, and her unwaivering demand for equity for black children has been a continuing source of inspiration to me.

Third, Tony Milanowski who had the vision and the knowledge to create the format for the tables that are a major part of this study. His willingness first to help me understand the type of data that was needed, and then to help me conceptualize the manner in which to present the data was invaluable. I can never thank him enough for the hours and hours he spent after work and


on weekends developing the program for the computers, inputting the data, and printing the tables over and over again until we got it right! A huge piece of this dissertation has Tony's signature written all over it.

Finally, Claudetta Wright-Fuller, my wife, who served as my typist, editor and proofreader. Claudetta's willingness to sit at times for as long as 18 hours at the computer typing and editing this dissertation was the major reason this work is complete. In spite of the normal tensions of marriage, the additional tensions that exist because I'm her husband, and the ones that are inherent to any effort to complete a dissertation, she stuck with me. No matter how angry we got at each other, the dissertation work went forward. Claudetta sacrificed some of her own work towards her Master's Degree in Public Administration (which she will receive in May of 1985) to help me. Thank you for your support. I love you.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..... i
SPECIAL MENTION. ..... vi
LIST OF TABLES ..... xi
Chapter 1: Introduction. ..... 1
Purpose of the Study ..... 3
Definitions. ..... 4
Summary of the Brown decision. ..... 11
Limitations of the Study ..... 13
Chapter 2: Review of Selected Related Literature ..... 15
School Closings ..... 15
Specialty Schools [iiagnet Schools] ..... 22
Busing ..... 29
Neighborhood Schools ..... 49
Chapter 3: Design of the Study ..... 66
Definitions. ..... 66
Sources of Information ..... 73
Chapter 4: Presentation and Interpretation of Data ..... 82
Background Information ..... 83
The Research Questions ..... 98
Question 1 ..... 98
Question 2 ..... 100
Dispersal of Students from TheirAttendance Area116
The Role of Specialty Schools ..... 123
Question 3 ..... 135
Question 4 ..... 140
Summary ..... 143

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Chapter 5: Conclusions. ..... 145
Review and Reassessment of the Literature ..... 154
School Closings. ..... 160
Specialty Schools [Magnet Schools] ..... 161
Busing ..... 164
Neighborhood Schools . . . . . ..... 165
Suggestions for Additional Research. ..... 169
Fooćnotes ..... 171
Appendix A: Tables of MPS Raw Data

1. Elementary Schools 1979 ..... 173
2. Elementary Schools 1980. ..... 179
3. Elementary Schools 1981 ..... 183
4. Elementary Schools 1982 ..... 187
5. Elementary Specialty Schools and Special Program Schools 1979-1982 ..... 193
6. Middle Schools 1979. ..... 197
7. Middle Schools 1980. ..... 199
8. Middle Schools 1981. ..... 201
9. Middle Schools 1982. ..... 203
10. High Schools 1979. ..... 205
11. High Schools 1980. ..... 206
12. High Schools 1981. ..... 207
13. High Schools 1982 ..... 208
14. High School Specialty Schools and Special Program Schools 1979-1982 ..... 209

## TABLES OF CONTENTS (continued)

15. Number of Elementary School Students Sent to Specialty Schools 1979-1982 ..... 213
16. Number of Middle School Students Sent to Specialty Schools 1979-1982. . . . . . . 225
17. Number of High School Students Sent to Specialty Schools 1979-1982 . . . . . . . 230
Appendix B: North Division and the Plan to Turn it into a Medical Specialty School. . . . . . . . . 233
18. Student Population in the Attendance Areas of the Milwaukee Public School System (1979-1982). ..... 86
19. Number and Average Size of Elementary School
Attendance Areas (1979-1982) ..... 89
20. Number and Average Size or Middle SchoolAttendance Areas (1979-1982)90
21. Number and Average Size of High School
Attendance Areas (1979-1982) ..... 91
22. Comparison of the Number and Percentage of Black,Desegregated, and White Elementary SchoolAttendance Areas (1979-1982)95
23. Comparison of the Number and Fercentage of Black,Desegregated, and White Middle School AttendanceAreas (1979-1982)96
24. Comparison of the Number and Percentage of Black Desegregated, and White High School Attendance Areas (1979-1982) ..... 97
25. Comparison of the Percentage of Black $v$ White Students Attending Schools in Their Own Attendance Area (1979-1982) ..... 99
26. Ratios of Black to White Elementary Sciool Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1979) ..... 102
27. Ratios of Black to White Elementary School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1980) ..... 103
28. Ratios of Black to White Elementary School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1981) ..... 104
29. Ratios of Black to White Elementary School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1982) ..... 105
30. Ratios of Black to White Middle School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1979) ..... 107
31. Ratios of Black to White Middle School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1980). ..... 108
32. Ratios of Black to White Middle School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1981) ..... 109
33. Ratios of Black to White Middle School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1982). ..... 110
34. Ratios of Black to White High School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1979) ..... 112
35. Ratios of Black to White High School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1980). ..... 113
36. Ratios of Black to White High School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1981) ..... 114
37. Ratios of Black to White High School Students Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1982) ..... 115
38. Average Number of Elementary Schools That Students in Black, Integrated, White and Hispanic Attendance Areas Were Sent to, Per 100 Students (1979-1982) ..... 118
39. Comparison of the Dispersal of Black and White Students from Black and White Attendance Areas with Comparable Black and White Student Enrollments (1982) ..... 121

## LIST OF TABLES (continued)

23. Dispersal of Students from Black Attendance Areas to Other MPS Schools (1982). . . . . . . . . . . 123
24. Movemeui of White Students to Specialty Schools (1979) ..... 126
25. Movement of White Students to Specialty Schools (1980) ..... 127
26. Movement of White Students to Specialty
Schools (1981) ..... 128
27. Movement of White Students to Specialty Schools (1982) ..... 129
28. Movement of Black Students to Specialty Schools (1979) ..... 130
29. Movement of Black Students to Specialty Schools (1980) ..... 131
30. Movement of Black Students to Specialty
Schools (1981) ..... 132
31. Movement of Black Students to Specialty
Schools (1982) ..... 133
32. Black Attendance Area Elementary Schools
Converted to Specialty Schools ..... 137
33. White Attendance Area Elementary Schools Converted to Specialty Schools ..... 138
34. Middle and High Schools Converted to Specialty
Schools ..... 139
35. Black and White Elementary School Closings ..... 141(1977-1979)
36. Integrated Elementary Schools Closed. ..... 142
37. Integrated Middle Schools Closed ..... 143
38. Four-Year Comparison of Black and White Movement at the Elementary Level out of Their Respective Attendance Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

## CHAPTER 1

## Introduction

May 16, 1984 was the 30 th anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al ${ }^{1}$ (hereafter to be referred to as the Brown decision). To many people, this decision marked a critical turning point for racial relations in this country. Lightfoot (1980) spoke of the decision in the following manner:
When the Brown decision was handed down in
1954 . - I was ten years old. The memory of that
moment the news reached our house is still vivid. The
evering news reported the uncompromising, strong words
of the Supreme Court justices that segregation in
schools was illegal, unjust and wrong. Through a
child's eyes, I could see the veil of oppression lift
from my parents' shoulders. It seamed they were
standing taller. And for the first time in my life, I
saw tears in my father's eyes. 'This is a great and
important day,' he said reverently to his children.
And although we had not lived the pain and struggle of
his life, nor did we understand the meaning of his
words, the emotion and the drama of that moment still
survives ini my soul today. (p.3)
It seemed to her father, and indeed to many people, that finally the United States was on the way to developing a society where discrimination based on race was unacceptable. Many Americans saw in this crucial first step in the educational field, the beginning of the end of the whole evil system of segregation and racial oppression.

The Brown decision has indeed accomplished a great deal. There is little question but that it was a spark that helped light the flame of the Civil Rights Movement in the late 50's and the $60^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$. It gave hope to millions of black and white people who moved forward with courage and determination to transform American society. Yet today some of the same people who were filled with such hope now find themselves filled with sorrow. Lightfoot (1980) talked about an atmosphere of hate and bewilderment. She felt this reversal of attitude from 1954 was inevitable "because the solutions proposed for desegregation of schools were simplistic and unrealistic arrangements designed for failure. . ." (p. 4).

The cynicism and pessimism that Lightfoot discussed is very much in evidence in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Over the past several years, dissatisfaction and disillusionment with Milwaukee's school desegregation plan have increased. In particular, many more black people have expressed their displeasure with what they perceive to be a disproportionate burden on their children to make desegregation work.

## Purpose of the Study

```
The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not Milwaukee's desegregation efforts between 1976 and 1982 were carried out in a manner that was in fact discriminatory against black students.
Specifically, this study was designed to answer the following questions:
1. Did the desegregation program of MPS result in (a) a disproportionate number of black students being denied educational access to their neighborhood schools; and (b) a disproportionate number of black students being bused out of their neighborhoods to attend school?
2. Did the Milwaukee Public School System (MPS) use (a) a pattern of school closings, and (b) make decisions about the locations of specialty schools, in a manner that resulted in a disproportionate burden of dislocations being placed on black students?
```

```
Answers to the above questions will be helpful in making a definitive judgment on the possible discriminatory nature of Milwaukee's school desegregation efforts.
```


## Definitions

There are a number of key definitions that must be understood in order to follow the general and specific observations made in this study. Several of these definitions are taken from The School Desegregation/Integration Notebook (1978):

1. De facto Segregation - "Segregation which exists in fact but which cannot be traced to or said to result from legal action" (p. 6).
2. De jure Segregation - "Segregation which exists as a result of legal action--for example by statute, ordinance, or school board practices" (p. 6).
3. Freedom of Choice - "Desegregation plans which allowed students to attend the school of their choice" (p.7).
4. Magnet Schools (Specialty Schools)- "Schools designed to attract students from a wide geographic area by offering innovative programming or by supplementing activities which exist in traditional schools" (p.7).
5. Racial Balance - "When the black/white ratio in the school is identical to the black/white ratio in the population" (p. 9). For purposes of this study the population being referred to is the total school population in the Milwaukee Public School System.

Another key definition for this study is found in the Georgetown Law Journal (1972):

1. Tipping Point - "A widely accepted rule of thumb which says that when the percentage of black pupils in a given school reaches 40 , white exodus from that school is accelerated and becomes irreversible, thereby tipping the racial balance" (p. 1302).

The two concepts that are at the core of the study are defined by Pettigrew (1972):

1. Desegregated School - "refers only to its raciai composition. Desegregation, then, is the mere mix of bodies without reference to the quality of the interracial interaction. While it is a prerequisite for integration, it does not in itself guarantee equal educational opportunity" (p. 24).
2. Integrated School - "refers to an interracial facility which boasts a climate of interracial acceptance. Interracial acceptance is most easily generated in any institution, educational or otherwise, when the two groups share equal status in the situation and work for common goals" (p. 24).

## Overview of the Issue in Milwaukee

The genesis of this problem in Milwaukee can be found in the actions taken on June 18, 1965 by a black attorney, Lloyd Barbee. He filed a suit in Federal court against the Board of School

Directors of the City of Milwaukee (hereafter referred to as the "Board"). His complaint, filed on behalf of Craig Amos and Jeffrey Amos, et al, charged that the Milwaukee Public School System was systematically discriminating against blacks. He charged that the system was consciously maintaining all white schools, and all black schools, and in the process providing unequal educational opportunities for black students. Through the suit Attorney Barbee sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the actions of the Board. These actions were said by Barbee to be in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

This case, Craig Amos and Jeffrey Amos et al, v. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee (1963) signaled the beginning of a very long court fight over desegregation in Milwaukee. The plaintiffs were allowed to amend the complaint on March 28, 1969. The amended complaint cited two classes of students that were allegedly harmed by actions of the Board. These students, 30 of whom were black and 11 of whom were white, were said to be being deprived of equal educational opportunity because of the Board's failure to develop and maintain an integrated school system.

The actual trial on the suit began on September $10,1973$. It took U. S. District Judge John Reynolds until 1976 to reach a decision on the case. He ruled on January 19, 1976 that the Milwaukee Public School System did in fact discriminate against
blacks. In his decision he stated the following: The defendants (Milwaukee Board of School Directors) argued that they are under no duty to desegregate when segregation results from factors over which they have no control. I have accepted that as lew for the purposes of this discussion. I have concluded, however, that the segregation which exists in the Milwaukee System is directly attributable to acts of the defendants . . . .Segregation was the result of the cumulative effects of the various decisions made by school officials, and segregation that results from the actions of school authorities is illegal and unconstitutional when the actions are intended and made for that purpose . . . . The Court concludes that the defendants have knowingly carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting all of the city's students, teachers, and school facilities, and have intentionally brought about and maintained a dual school system. The Court therefore holds that the entire Milwauke Public School System is unconstitutionally segregated. (p. 820-821)

Judge Reynolds appointed a special master, Dr. John Gronowski, to "assist in the development and implementation of a school desegregation plan" (p. 823). Judge Reynolds made it clear that he intended to be flexible and would allow the special master and the Board to work out an acceptable plan. The
school system appealed and the Milwaukee Teacher Education Association acted as an Undesignated Intervenor on the issues related to faculty desegregation. Judge Reynolds, on June 11, 1976 in the Armstrong v. $0^{\prime}$ Connell case, issued the following ruling:
(2,3) The number of schools having a student
population between $25 \%$ and $45 \%$ black shall be deemed
indicative of the extent of school desegregation of the
school system. The plan which the defendants submit
should cause at least one-third of the schools in the
system to have student populations falling within the
foregoing range by September 30,1976 , at least an
additional one-third of the schools to have student
populations within that range by September 30,1977 .
And the remaining schools to have student populations
within that racial range by September 30,1978 .
(p. 1345-1346)

The Milwaukee Board of School Directors continued to appeal the decision and orders of Judge Reynolds. Finally, in 1979, after 14 years of motions, counter motions, appeals, etc., an agreement was reached by the plaintiffs and the defendants in the case. Through a consent decree a plan was approved by Judge Reynolds in May of 1979. This plan was set up to determine student movement for the $1979-80$ school year through the $1983-84$ school year.

The plan dictated that the following guidelines were to be met:


#### Abstract

1. At least $75 \%$ of students in Milwaukee Public Schools must attend desegregated schools. A desegregated school is defined as $25-60 \%$ black at the elementary and middle school levels and $20-60 \%$ black at the high school level. (The order exempted about 12,000 students from the desegregation order: kindergarten pupils, exceptional education students in special schools for the handicapped, and students in 4 schools with very high concentrations of Hispanic students).


2. As soon as the black student population exceeds $50 \%$ of the total student population, the percentage of students required to be in desegregated facilities will be reduced according to a mathematical formula.
3. Every elementary and middle school must have a minimum of $20 \%$ black student population, and each high school must have at least 20\% (or 250 black students) in attendance. (Schools with bilinqual education programs may have a $25 \%$ minority student population including at least $12.5 \%$ black and at least 12.5\% Hispanic student bodies).
4. Each student in the system must be notified annually of his/her right to attend a desegregated school and any student requesting that right was to be accommodated.

The decision was accepted by most sectors of the community, but there was a note of discord about the plan sounded by both blacks and whites. Anderson and 0lson (1981) stated that


The Brown decision was the foundation for the many desegregation suits that were filed in the $60^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$ and $70^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$. Some


#### Abstract

social sciencists, educators, and activists (black and white) had reached the conclusion that the Brown decision itself was based in part on racist assumptions. For this reason, it was believed that the Brown dacision actually promoted the proliferation of desegregation plans that were, with or without judicial intervention, discriminatory.

Although this study will be dealing with the desegregation efforts in Milwaukee, there must be some discussion of the Brown decision in order to get more complete view of the issues involved in the situation. 능 is necessary because of the relationship between Brown and all other desegregation litigation.


## Summary of the Brown Decision

On May 17, 1954 the United States Supreme Court decided Brown $v$ Board of Education (Brown I). This decision held that segregation of white and black children in state public schools, solely on the basis of race, denied to black children the equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said, "We conclude that in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" (p. 495). The Court went on to say that the separation of (black) children "of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race, generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way very unlikely to be undone" (p. 483).

On May 31, 1955 (over a full year after Brown I), Brown II, the implementation decision, was handed down. The Supreme Court, in calling for this implementation, in essence ordered the Federal District Courts to handle desegregation cases in a manner consistent with Brown I. They gave the lower courts some guidelines to follow in making their decisions. These guidelines included the following parameters:

1. Local school authorities were given primary responsibility for implementation.
2. The Federal Court was given the right to decide whether the local school board's response constituted good faith implementation.
3. The district court was to be guided by equitable principles "characterized by practical flexibility" (p. 294) in shaping remedies. In this respect the Court cautioned that the principle of equal educational opportunity espoused in Brown I was not to be yielded simply because of disagreement with that principle.
4. Although the district court was to take into account the practical problems of implementation, they were to make sure that the local school authorities were making a "prompt and reasonable start" (p. 295).

The Court went further to say that, "The judgments below,


#### Abstract

except that in the Delaware Case, are accordingly reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially non-discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed to parties to these cases" (p. 301).

In summary, the Brown decision and the court cases that followed served as the historical backdrop for the various developments that occurred in the Milwaukee situation. The legacy of Brown will be a constant reference point throughout the remainder of the study.


## Limitations of the Study

This study encompasses the years 1976 through 1982 but because of the lack of data, and some of the changes that were made in the way that data was collected, much of the analysis will involve only the years 1979 through 1982. It is reasonable to assume that if data were available for the years 1976 through 1979 in the same format, the findings of the study might have been altered. However, there was sufficient data available for a four-year period, which the writer feels is an adequate length of time for (a) trends to develop and be identified and (b) to make the findings of this study valid.

The investigator purposefully limited the data base for the study to written records and documents dealing with the period
covered by the study. This method was chosen to assure the most objective analysis of the problem, especially given the investigator's bias concerning this issue.

Finally, this study and any implications arising there from may be pertinent only to the Milwaukee situation. It may not be advisable or appropriate for these findings to be applied in analyzing any other school desegregation erforts in this country.

## CHAPTER 2

## Review of Selected Related Literature

The effort to critically analyze the issues emanating from the questions being researched in this study led the writer to focus on four areas in the review of the literature concerning school desegregation. Those areas are the following: (1) school closings, (2) the use of specialty schools [magnet schools], (3) busing and (4) neighborhood schools.

## School Cl.osings

Articles about school closings began to appear in various journals and other publications in the late $60^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$ and continued throughout the $70^{\prime}$ s. Most of the articles centered on the decline in population that was expected to take place between 1975 and 1982. These studies appeared during a time when school boards and school administrators had just witnessed an expansive period for both the economy and the school population. Diane Divoky explained the problem this way:

For a long time, everything in American education went
up: enrollment, buildings, budgets, expectations,
public support. In the fifties, when we couldn't put up classrooms or train teachers fast enough for the babyboom kids who were our entries in the brain race against the Russians, we groused about it but loved it. All that growth, all that enterprise, all that bigness. It seemed that it would go on forever. It didn't, of course. Public school enrollment declined by half a million between 1971 and 1972, the beginning of a loss of five million students--11\%--over the following decade. It was the end of the era of expansion and the beginning of the era of retrenchment . . . (p. 87)

Educators reacted in different ways to the problem. Initially, some tried to pretend it was not happening, but others recognized it and began to deal with it. The American Association of School Administrators was one group that offered solutions to this growing problem. They published a guide in their Executive Handbook Series that was designed for school superintendents, school board members, and other school administrators. This guide book discussed techniques to forecast enrollment trends, suggested ways and means of dealing with all sectors of the community that were to be affected by school closings, and outlined public relations practices needed to bring the community through this difficult process (Eisenberger and Keough, 1974). Some studies concentrated on the leadership qualities needed by school administrators to deal with the "politics and related human problems" brought on by school


#### Abstract

closings (Thomas, 1980). There were very vehement reactions against school closings in various communities throughout the United States. A number of studies were undertaken in an effort to find out why communities were protesting school closings. Berger (1983) undertook one such study. In his study he stated that there were four major theories being put forth to explain the variation of community opposition to school closings. They were: (a) the lack of comprehensive planning, (b) the lack of participation of the Feople who are affected by the decisions, (c) the sense of loss that a community feels because the school represents an entity that binds the community together (community maintenance), and (d) the impact of the social environment (contextual factors).

Some of Berger's observations based on his study were quite surprising. He concluded, for example, that comprehensive planning tended to actually increase the amount of community opposition rather than reduce it. He also stated that the community opposition was lessened in those situations where the superintendent had the same view on closings as the board, irrespective of the relationship between the superintendent and the community. Finally, he found that the greater the involvement on the part of the teachers the less the community opposition.


Not all of the literature accepted the idea that school closings was the best method to deal with declining enrollment
and increased costs. Shakeshaft and Gardner (1983) suggested that school closings were, in fact, the worse thing to do in a community. They stated, ". . . closing schools disrupts the stability of the educational system. It threatens administrators' job security, jeopardizes school board zontinuity, mobilizes community interest groups in opposition to school officials, weakens confidence in the educational system, reduces per-pupil costs only by a small amount . . . and satisfies no one" (p. 493-494).

They suggested that school systems must first understand their educational mission, and understand that decline creates the opportunity to reassess existing programs with an eye towards eliminating those which are not consistent with that mission. They discussed the possibility of private sector funding, shared space arrangements with private industry, and increased state funding.

As the various discussions concerning the problems brought on by closings continued, the changing character of school districts' racial composition became more and more of an issue. Colton and Frelich (1979) in their study of school closings in St. Louis made the point that:

Race based politics enter the school-closing issue in a variety of ways. Some voices argue that desegregation could be furthered by transporting blacks from overcrowded schools to underutilized (usually old) white schools. Others argue that new schools in

```
    abandoned neighborhoods could become sites for
    integrated programs. Still others assert that whites
    will not go into such neighborhoods and that blacks who
    have fled from them will not go either. Permeating the
    entire dialog are implicit agendas reflecting varying
    shades and intensities of racial feeling, views of the
    quality of urban education, housing aspirations and
    political advantages. (p. 401)
    There were some educators who believed that declines in
enrollment and school closings were potentially a positive factor
for school desegregation. Cronin (1977) was one of the
supporters of the notion that creative use of school closings
could be very valuable to the school desegregation effort. He
described how various cities in Illinois used the closure of old
school buildings to help foster desegregation. He did, however,
add the following caution:
    The canons of fair play and the principles of racial
    justice demand that:
            1. The community early and often be informed
fully of enrollment trends and the need to close down
certain facilities in the future on a racially just
basis.
            2. The schools closed be those with inferior
    educationa?. facilities or expensive maintenance or
    rehabilitation costs.
```


#### Abstract

3. The burden of closing be shared equally by families of both races, avoiding the injustice of black students bearing a disproportionate share of any dislocation or new transportation required. (p. 10) Iannaccone (1979) in his analysis of the Colton and Frelich study made the point that declining enrollment problems really seemed to exacerbate already existing political problems in the community. Iannaconne found that "the political nerve hit by declining enrollment problems everywhere --one of its universal political aspects -- is the somewhat hidden political tension already present in the local political system" (p. 426).

While it is certainly true that school closings have raised controversies in communities throughout this country irrespective of whether or not school desegregation was involved, Iannocone's point is still well taken when school desegregation is a factor. That is to say, the unresolved problem of the relationship between the races in this country is the underlying tension that has existed throughout the school desegregation effort. To the extent that school closings become a factor in the desegregation process, the general tensions brought on by school closings are exacerbated by the racial conflicts already existing in the society. This is an issue that will bear watching throughout the course of this study.

In summary, then, the school closings issue was initially discussed in the literature simply from the point of view of


```
declining enrollments. Articles were written to advise
administrators and school board members on how to handle the
public relations problems inherent in actions to close schools.
Some authors concentrated on analyzing the reasons why school
closings led to negative reactions by people affected by the
closings. The literature later began to touch on the race issue
and school closings, specifically, how school closings and
desegregation could be linked. So, the school closing question
has many ramifications in society, including it's link to school
desegregation and the broader race relations problems in the
United States.
```

Specialty schools (referred to in this section as magnet schools) have been a widely touted device for helping to bring about school desegregation. There is quite a vast and varied array of literature on this subject. Through all of this literature there is a relatively clear consensus of what magnet schools are designed to do. Broh and Trent (1981) asserted that magnet schools have a greai dsal of appeal to both whites and non-whites because not only do they help desegregation but they mean a quality education for their children. They stated, "Often superior educational curricula in magnet schools serve to attract minorities and whites from several zones in the district" (p. 20).

While magnet schools have seemed to some to emerge as a very innovative institutional arrangement, they are not new to the American educational system. Robert Barr (1982), in an article entitled, "Magnet Schools An Attractive Alternative," made the point that magnet schools existed in places like New York and Boston in the 1920's and $30^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$. Among other things, these schools provided parents with an opportunity to choose where their children would attend school. He discussed the uniqueness of these schools and the requirements for entry into them. He said, "Although they drew students from throughout their district, these schools focused solely on elite or talented students and
used auditions or stiff entrance requirements to screen out all but the very best" (p. 38).

Broh and Trent (1981), in their study assessing school desegregation strategies, found that most of the qualitative literature about school desegregation generally supported magnet schools. Rossell (1978) concluded that magnet schools were positive because they: (1) helped to end racial isolation, (2) improved race relations, (3) improved academic achievement and (4) had generally positive but yet unspecified outcomes.

The educational literature was not the only place where support for magnet schools was found. There was also support from Federal judges in and out of the courtroom. One of those judges was William Taylor, a U. S. District Court Judge from Dallas. He made a speech called "The Dallas Story" at the first annual conference on magnet schools. In that speech, according to Estes and Waldrip (1979), he praised specialty schools as imaginative substitutions for massive busing. He stated, "they are not only legitimate and proven desegregation tools, but they also appear to be the wave of the future in terms of public education" (p. 129).

There are a number of special projects set up to deal with the problems associated with desegregation. Charles McMillan was the project director for the Bureau of Equal Educational Opportunity, Massachusetts Department of Education, and as a part of his work he was very involved with the magnet school effort in Boston. McMillan (1977) noted the fact that these schools were
very attractive to parents and students. He said his discussions with various people throughout the Boston community led him to the conclusion that they were attractive because they were "good" schools. He listed (in order of their importance) nine factors that appeared to have contributed to the attractiveness of magnet schools.

1. Most magnet schools are safe and secure in safe neighborhoods.
2. Most magnet schools provide a quality education.
3. Many magnet schools have aggressive and talented faculty and administration.
4. Many magnet schools are paired with universities, cultural agencies and/or businesses.
5. Many magnet schools are in new or renovated buildings with excellent facilities.
6. In some magnet schools parent involvement is encouraged.
7. Magnet schools are integrated and some Boston parents value an integrated education for their children.
8. Most magnet schools have attractive learning themes (i.e., science, language arts, vocational work/study).
9. A few magnet schools have teaching style themes (i.e., open space). (p. 159)

Magnet schools became a popular concept to study, review, or to write about in various journals, books, and newspapers around the country. In most of these writings there was support for
magnet schools, but there was also some criticisms of their impact on school desegregation.

Rice (1977), an education reporter from Syracuse, New York who had traveled all over the country looking at magnet programs, made the following analysis of the programs that he saw:

First of all, magnets as $I$ see them have not voluntarily desegregated any urban school system. With few exceptions, individual magnets have not attracted pupils voluntarily in numbers representative of any city's particular racial balance. Furthermore there is little evidence to indicate that they ever will. Secondly, although magnets have not succeeded in desegregating city schools systems, I think they have had a significant impact on urban education. The magnet schools that $I$ visited were filled with a real excitement, vitality, pride. I witnessed a turning back to the city. (p. 145)

Rice went on to say that magnet schools could only be a component of a desegregation program, but could not be seen as a substitute for a desegregation plan. In short, he saw no possibility of magnets being used for desegregation unless they were coupled with mandatory busing.

There were also researchers and educators who began to question the impact of magnet schools, particularly on desegregation. It was the view of Gary Orfield (1978) that decision makers preferred the magnet school approach because it
required no mandatory busing. He said, "The magnet school plan is often presented to the community, the press, and the courts as an effective method of ending segregation. The fact that no large urban district has ever been fully desegregated through the use of magnet schools is ignored" (p. 158).

Trombley (1977) quoted a three-judge panel from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals when it reversed a lower court's refusal to permit the NAACP to intervene in the St. Louis case:

The record reveals that since the consent decree (under which the magnet schools were established), the school district has broadened its magnet school program and achieved some degree of success in doing so . . . . However in view of the small percentage of students participating, the magnet school program must be recognized as only an adjunct to a plan of desegregation and it can not constitute the plan itself. (p. 99)

In addition to the fact that magnet schools, according to various experts, had a very limited impact on desegregating school systems, there were continuing questions about the lack of equity and equal opportunity for all students under the magnet school approach. Broh and Trent (1981) in their study assessing school desegregation strategies, talked about the difficulty of truly evaluating the effectiveness of magnet schools as a desegregation tool. They stated:


#### Abstract

A difficulty with magnet schools is that they do not produce much change in the racial balance of students throughout an entire school system. Furthermore, magnet schools often substitute class discrimination for racial discrimination since middle class minorities generally volunteer for magnet schools leaving a disproportionate share of poor minorities in neighborhood schools. [In addition, the propensity of magnet schools to improve race relations, achievement, and so forth, is difficult to evaluate since these schools tend to attract highly motivated students.] (p. 20-22)

Power (1979) and Bottomly (1977) both raised questions about the equity of magnet schools. Power said, "unless all schools become magnets -- seemingly a contradiction in terms -- some children will be unable to attend magnets. The system will be open to charges of inequity toward those children" (p. 70). Bottomly was very concerned about magnet schools being seen as "better" than other schools rather than just "different". He was also very critical of efforts to develop magnet schools that resulted in the closing of attendance area schools in black communities, transferring black students out, and then reopening the schools as specialty schools. He said these types of actions were "all right so long as black and white people -- minority and majority people -- are equally involved in the decision making so that it is not the white establishment imposing something on the


minority community" (p. 17).
Orfield (1978) made the point that "most magnet plans, particularly those in big cities, rely primarily on transfers of minority children to schools in white or transition arees" (p. 163). This was done, in his opinion, to minimize the fears of whites who did not want to go to schools in black communities.

St. Louis was one of the cities that relied yery heavily on magnet schools to achieve desegregation. But Trombley (1977), however, found a number of criticisms about these schools, not the least of which was a concern about "brain drain" of the teaching staff. He stated, "Another complaint about magnet schools in St. Louis and elsewhere, is that they attract the best teachers in the system, thereby lowering the quality of instruction in traditional schools" (p. 98).

In summary, it is clear that magnet schools have generated a lot of support as well as a lot of criticism. They are supported by those who see them as "good" schools, tools of desegregation, the wave of the future in public education, and the answer to mandatory busing. They are criticized for being elitist, ineffective tools for desegregation, mechanisms for placing the burden of desegregation on minorities, and not equitable for all children.

## Busing

At one time in American society，the school bus supposedly represented one of the good things about America．Pictures of buses filled with school children was a normal part of the image of the tranquil American scene．But something happened to all of tinat when the school bus became the tool for school desegregation．Those images became the reflection of a dream torn asunder．Busing became an issue of great emotion and tremendous controversy．

The U．S．Commission on Civil Rights（1972）published a pamphlet called Your Child and Busing，and in this pamphlet they cited the change in the attitudes of Americans about busing．The Commission noted that busing had historically been well received by parents and in fact any protest about busing was for more，rot less．They also pointed out that the busing of gifted children， handicapped children，and children in rural areas，was continuing without any negative reactions．They asserted that＂only in the context of school desegregation has busing been an issue of emotion and contriv゙こごj．For this purpose alone，the familiar school bus has aroused passionate objections ．．．and has generated acts of violence＂（p．3）．

The literature is extensive and varied on the issue of busing．The arguments for and against busing cover a tremendous number of viewpoints and concerns．

Most of the literature agrees that the landmark Supreme Court decision that set the stage for the busing controversy was Swann et al v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education et al (1971). Chief Justice Berger in delivering the opinion of the court stated:

The importance of bus transportation as a normal and accepted tool of educational policy is readily discernible in this and the companion case, Davis supra • . The District Court's conclusion that assignment of children to the school nearest their home serving their grade would not produce an effective dismantling of the dual system is supported by the record . . . . - . We find no basis for holding that the local school authorities may not be required to employ bus transportation as one tool of school desegregation. Desegregation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in
school. (p. 29-30)
In making this critical decision the Court was very careful to cite the fact that the decision did not apply to de facto segregation; it applied only to de jure segregation. The court stated:

```
. . . in the absence of showing that either the school
authorities or some other agency of the state has
deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic
```

patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court
should not be necessary. (p. 30)
Those persons who supported busing as a tool to bring about school desegregation had a two-pronged argument that guided their views. First, they believed that school desegregation was necessary because it was one (or some combination of) the following: (a) the law; (b) important for overall race relations in the U. S.; and/or (c) necessary to improve the achievement level of black children. Second, they asserted that given the level of housing segregation in America there was no way for school desegregation to take place without busing.

In support of the view that school desegregation was the law, the busing supporters simply cited the Brown decision and all of the court cases that supported the basic proposition that "separate but equal in public education" had no place in American society. The Court stated, "we have now announced that such segregation [in public education] is a denial of the equal protections of the laws" (p. 692).

Pettigrew (1972), Green, Smith, and Schweitzer (1972) all wrote articles suggesting that school desegregation was important for overall race relations in America. Pettigrew said, "I believe it is not an exaggeration to maintain that integrated education is essential for the future viability and harmony of our country" (p. 250). Green, et al stated, "No child, black or white, can be prepared for a multiracial world if brought up in
segregated schools. . . . The racial isolation of different segments of our society has serious detrimental effects on our understanding and acceptance of each other" (p. 543).

The belief that school desegregation was important to the achievement level of black students probably received its greatest impetus from the infamous Coleman Report. This report which was officially entitled Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966) was called for by the Civil Rights Act of 1964:

Sec. 402. The Commissioner (U. S. Commissioner of Education) shall conduct a survey and make a report to the President and the Congress, within two years of the enactment of this letter, concerning the lack or availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions at all levels in the United States, its territories and possessions, and the District of Columbia. (p. iii) One of the issues discussed in the report was the relationship between student achievement and the types of schools they attend. The study came to the following conclusions: . . . it appears that a pupil's achievement is strongly related to the educational backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in the school. . . if a white pupil from a home that is strongly and effectively supportive of education is put in a school where most

```
pupils do not come from such homes, his achievement will be little different than if he were in a school composed of others like himself. But if a minority pupil from a home without much educational strength is put with schoolmates with strong educational backgrounds, his achievement is likely to increase. (p. 22)
[This analysis] suggests that in the long run, integration should be expected to have a positive effect on Negro achievement. (p. 28)
```

A White House Panel on Education (1965) discussing the problem of segregation and academic achievement noted that "there is clear documentary evidence of a direct relationship between segregated schools and inferior education, and of cumulative academic retardation among children in negro ghettos. There is evidence also that this waste is remediable, hence the greater tragedy" (p. 17)

Weinberg (1975) believed there was a positive relationship between the achievement of black children and school desegregation. Based on an analysis of a variety of studies relating to desegregation and achievement; he concluded that, "Under desegregation . . . academic achievement rises as the minority child learns more while the advantaged majority child continues to learn at his accustomed rate. Thus the achievement gap narrows" (p. 327)

There were a number of people who believed busing was the
only way to bring about school desegregation. Kriss (1972) was one such proponent. He recognized that busing caused problems, particularly when it involved transporting students long distances. But given the type of segregated housing existing in America, he saw busing as the only effective tool to be used to foster desegregation.

The Supreme Court, in its decision in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education (1971), made it clear that busing had to be used to bring about desegregation. The Court pointed out:

- Many attempts have been made to find a way to
desegregate effectively without busing, but with the
tightly segregated neighborhoods that exist in American
communities, desegregation is simply not possible in
many localities without busing. The Courts and many
superintendents and school boards have had to conclude,
therefore, that busing is, if not the only answer, an
answer that cannot be ignored. (p. 52)

Another aspect of the busing controversy was the interrelated issues of racial balance and the tipping point. Ellis (1971) made reference to these issues when he discussed the $50 \%$ rule. This rule became the point of reference for deciding if a city could or could not be desegregated. This rule put forth the idea that a city of more than $50 \%$ black could not be desegregated because whites would be in the minority. He cited
the work of Berelson and Steiner (1964) as proof that such a rule made sense. They made the point that whites would be more accepting of integration if, "the minority [group of pupils] is relatively small, constituting at the very most not more than 25 per cent of the school population . . ." (p. 513). They went on to say that the majority population would reject policies that placed them in the minority.

The literature also contains a wide spectrum of articles by people who were opposed to busing as a means of bringing about desegregation. The educators, researchers, politicians, etc., who were against busing comprised at least three groups of people: (a) those who were against busing because they were opposed to any form of school desegregation; (b) those who were for desegregation but felt busing was an inappropriate method to achieve it; and (c) those who were for desegregation and busing but felt the manner in which busing was being carried out placed a disproportionate burden on blacks.

The opposition to busing that was essentially opposition to school desegregation, came from both the white community and the black community but for very different reasons.

Some of the opposition in the white community stemmed from racism in its rawest form. A white parent, Patricia Derian (1972), cited her views on why whites opposed desegregation in Jackson, Mississippi. She said, "most white parents believed that great harm would befall their children at the hands of black teachers and pupils. Poor and working class whites thought, and
said, that their children would catch syphilis from sharing toilets with black children" (p. 22). James (1972), discussing a confrontation between blacks and whites in the Canarise borough of Brooklyn, quoted a white man ${ }^{2}$ giving his reasons to a black man for being against desegregation:

Look, let's let's not doubt this this fact. You you people are criminal by nature. I mean $I$ mean there's evidence all all over to support this. Look at Harlem and Bedford Stuy Stuy Stuyvesant. All that that crime in the streets. All those those robberies and murders and dope. All those jails crammed with with black people, you you see what I mean? I mean we don't don't want to see the area turned into a dope scene. And blacks beating up whites. You see? I'm not saying all all you people are criminals, but but the percentage is is so high you can't really blame us, you see what I mean? (p. 241)

Whites were not the only ones opposed to desegregation; there were blacks who were opposed as well. These blacks, however, saw forced desegregation simply as another form of racism. A resolution promoted by the South Carolina/Florida delegation at the National Black Political Convention in Gary, Indiana (1972) reflected this view. The resolution stated the following:

We condemn forced racial integration of schools as a
bankrupt, suicidal method of desegregating schools, based on the false notion that Black children are unable to learn unless they are in the same setting with white children . . . we demand quality education in the Black community through community controlled state school districts and a guaranteed equal share of all educational money. (p. 41)

This resolution reflected a view in the black community that school desegregation was going to destroy black sciools. There were sectors of the black community which believed that all-black schools were necessary in order to maintain some sense of black pride and culture. It was felt these two elements were critical in providing blacks with the psychological strength to survive in America, given that America's very foundation was racist. W.E.B. Du Bois (1935), writing on this problem over thirty years before the Gary Convention discussed this same issue. He stated: The question which $I$ am discussing is: Are these separate schools and institutions needed? And the answer, to my mind, is perfectly clear. They are needed just so far as they are necessary for the proper education of the Negro race. The proper education of any people includes sympathetic touch between teacher and pupil; knowledge on the part of the teacher, not simply of the individual taught, but of his surroundings and background, and the history of his


#### Abstract

class and group; such contact between pupils, and between teacher and pupil, on the basis of perfect social equality, as will increase this sympathy and knowledge, facilities for education in equipment and housing, and the promotion of such extracurricular activities as will tend to induct the child into life. If this is true, and if we recognize the present attitude of white America toward black America, then the Negro not only needs the vast majority of these schools, but it is. a grave question if, in the near future, he will not need more such schools, both to take care of his natural increase, and to defend him against the growing animosity of the whites . . . (p. 278)


Those people, white and black, who supported integration but were against busing were a difficult group to actually pin down in the literature. It was difficult because there were certainly some people (particularly whites) who used the busing issue itself to rally around, but in reality the busing issue was for them just a pretext for opposition to school desegregation in particular and/or opposition to the development of a multiracial society in general. Wasserman (1972), Pettigrew (1972), and Green, et al (1972) were some of the supporters of this position. Wasserman said busing was not the real issue; rather it was "school racism, oppression and a crisis which is beginning to affect all members, even the most privileged, of our school
population and which arises out of the social functions which schools in America perform. Pettigrew said, "the real issue is the quality of our public schools. . . . It is no secret that many hard-core segregationists have seized on busing and neighborhood schools as a more respectable means than naked racism to fight racial integration" (p. 25). Green, et al believed the issue was "being used as an excuse to avoid facing the real issue, that is, the development of a multiracial society" (p. 543).

Newsweek (1972), in an article about the busing controversy, discussed the views of people who saw themselves as being antibusing. The article talked of the difficulty of clearly being able to say that people opposed to busing were racist. A section of the article contained the following analysis:

```
The anti-busers' arguments cover a broad spectrum.
Some parents talk of the difficulty of making their way
cross-town if Johnny should fall ill at school. Many
pitch their protest on educational grounds; they have
worked hard to move to an area with a good school, they
say, and they don't want that achievement suddenly
erased by a busing plan. Some object that children,
unfairly they think, have been ordered to bear the
brunt of the task of integrating American society . . .
and others resent the social engineering implied in
formulas for racial mixing and court orders dictating
where they must send their children to school . . . .
```

```
Many of these complaints are doubtless masks for racism, but it would be both groundless and presumptuous to pretend that all of them are. Busing touches upon a number of deep-seated nerves that have nothing to do with racism -- a parent's concern for his child's safety, his hopes for his child's future; these alone would account for the vast emotional pressure that has built up behind the anti-busing drive. (p. 22)
```

Another group that provided a very interesting perspective on the busing issue were those people who voiced support for school desegregation but for a variety of reasons opposed forced busing.

Armor (1972), a sociologist from Boston, was one such person. He issued the findings of studies he and others conducted on various desegregation efforts around the country. He reached two conclusions about busing:

One is that massive mandatory busing for the purposes of improving student achievement and interracial harmony is not effective and should not be adopted at this time. The other is that voluntary integration programs such as METCO, ABC, or Project Concern should be continued and positively encouraged by substantial federal and state grants. Such voluntary programs should be encouraged so that those parents and


#### Abstract

communities who believe in the symbolic and potential (but so far unconfirmed) long-run benefits of induced integration will have ample opportunity to send their children to integrated schools. (p. 115-116)


This article led to a series of charges and counter charges about the evidence used by Armor to reach his conclusions. In spite of the criticism, Armor held to his views, and he was often quoted by anti-busing proponents in and out of Congress. Orfield (1979) was particularly critical of the impact of Armor's assertions. He felt that Armor's prior work with the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights and his status as a professor at Harvard gave him tremendous access to the media, and as a result, his findings had a great impact on policymakers. To support his point, Orfield cited the fact that Rep. Veysey of Ohio used Armor's finding to support his own efforts to pass legislation that would bring au end to forced busing.

Glazer (1972), a professor of education and social structure, spoke out against busing. Among other things, Glazer saw busing as a denial of freedom of choice and actually a denial of "equal protection of laws" for white children. In discussing the impact of remedies mandated by Brown and other court cases such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, he stated:

Inevitably, however, the resulting increase in the freedom of black children--the freedom to attend the schools they wished--entailed a restriction on the
freedom of others. In 'freedom of choice', the freedom of white children was in no way limited. In geographical zoning to achieve integration, it was limited, but no more than that of black children. But in busing to distant schools, white children were in effect being conscripted to create an environment which, it had been decided, was required to provide equality of educational opportunity for black children. It was perhaps one thing to do this when the whites in question were the children or grandchildren of those who deprived black children of their freedom in the past. But when a district judge in San Francisco ruled that not only white children but Chinese children and Spanish-speaking children must be constricted to create an environment which, he believed, would provide equality of educational opportunity for black children, there was good reason for wondering whether 'equal protection of the laws' was once again being violated, this time from the other side. (p. 45)

James Coleman, who was famous for giving leadership to the study on educational opportunity that was cited earlier, also became a critic of busing. His anti-busing position was made all the more critical because in some quarters he was given credit for being the "Scholar Who Inspired Busing" (June 7, 1975 headine of the National Observer) and the "Sociologist Who

Started it All" (June 1, 1975 headline of the Lansing, Michigan State Journal). Pettigrew and Green (1976) pointed out the fallacious nature of such views. They pointed out that people such as Charles Houston who was the chief counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the $1930^{\circ} \mathrm{s}$, was really the person who began the schooi desegregation effort. They also cited the fact that, "the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its historic public schooldesegregation ruling in 1954, a dozen years before the appearance of the Coleman Report" (p. 2).

Coleman, Kelly and Moore (1975) developed a paper that was read by Coleman at the American Educational Research Association's 1975 convention. The paper represented Coleman's entry into the school busing/school desegregation controversy. The writers made several conclusions. Those that are key for this particular part of the study are the following:

```
- . In the large cities (among the largest 22 central
city school districts) there is a sizeable loss of whites (students) \({ }^{3}\) when desegregation takes place. The effect of desegregation on white loss has been widely different among different cities where desegregation has taken place . . Because, insofar as we can estimate, the loss of whites upon desegregation is a one-time loss, the long term impact of desegregation is considerably less than that of other continuing factors. The continuing white losses produce an
```

```
extensive erosion of the interracial contact that desegregation of city schools brings about. (p. 78-79)
This report did not cause too much of a stir. But, several weeks later Coleman granted an interview to the Boston Globe in which he directly attacked court-ordered busing to enforce school desegregation. He argued that, "a whole generation of young talent thinks it can transform the society by winning court cases. That's enormously subversive of the whole political process in the United States" (p. 8). Coleman later told the Los Angeles Times, "When the imposition of school integration occurs, and doesn't flow out of the will of the community, then the response on the part of whites, if they have the income to leave, is to leave" (p. 10).
Coleman began to be attacked by educators, and activists. According to Pettigrew and Green (1976):
These first a of Coleman's positions centered on three points. First they stressed the complexity of the socalled 'white flight' phenomenon and suggested the importance of variables that Coleman's work had not considered. Second, they questioned the scientific ethics of communicating opinions in the form of research results before any analysis was available for review by the social-science community. Third, they emphasized that even if Coleman's dire predictions of massive losses of white students were accurate, the
```

appropriate policy response would be extensive
metropolitan desegregation rather than the abandonment
of constitutional protections. (p. 11)
Coleman ${ }^{4}$, in responding to his critics, continued to give interviews. Walter Goodman writing for the New York Times in an article entitled, "Integration, Yes: Busing, No", reported on an interview with Coleman in which he stated, "What's wrong with compulsory busing is that it's a restriction of rights. We should be expanding people's rights, not restricting them" (p. 48).

After almost a year of interviews, numerous revisions of his initial paper and thousands of headlines and articles in newspapers around the country, Coleman backed off from his initial assertion about white flight. He stated, "What is not clear is whether desegregation itself induces an increased movement of whites from the desegregated district" (p. 45).

In spite of this denial of his initial thesis, for a period Coleman was a champion of anti-busing although he said he supported school desegregation. His opposition to busing was an important element in the white anti-busing fabric during the $1970^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$.

The final group to be discussed in this literature review are those persons who did not oppose desegregation or busing, but wanted both done in an equitable fashion. They were the persons who were concerned about a disproportionate burden being placed on blacks to bring about desegregation. Bell (1975) and Banks
(1972) felt the actions taken to implement desegregation were being done in a way that whites found acceptable irrespective of the consequences for blacks. Bell talked of vigorous protests by blacks when their schools were closed and their children bused out in disproportionate numbers. Yet nothing was done because the courts and the school boards were making "an effort to make school desegregation as palatable for whites as possible" (p. 37). Banks discussed the lack of evidence that one way desegregation was helping black students. He made the point that these discriminatory plans were "formulated [not] in response to evidence about the way to desegregate most effectively but in response to what the white community will accept" (p. 164). According to Broh and Trent (1981) in their study administered by the National Institute of Education:

Local and national experts were keenly aware of the disproportionate burden of transportation that minority students and their families usually experienced during desegregation . . . No particular strategy was offered as a remedy for this condition except that attorneys interviewed suggested that such burdens may not be legal. Generally, however, the burden was seen as both a practical and political problem . . . . Respondents (in the city of Delaware) said that blacks are dissatisfied with the disproportionate burden but understand the practical necessity of it. In other
instances respondents reported that the
disproportionality was the political solution to creating and maintaining some stability in desegregated
schools. (p. 12G-130)
Hugh Scott (1983) stated that plaintiffs in the Kelly v. Board of Education case in Nashville, Tennessee challenged that city's school desegregation program in 1979 because it, "imposed inequities and inequalities on black students, teachers, and administrators" (p. 237). Among the allegations cited by the plaintiffs were the following:
(1) School attendance zones as established by the school board imposed a disproportionately greater burden of the dislocations and disruptions on black students . . . .
(11) The systemwide racial ratio mixture of $15 \%: 35 \%$ black students as conceived treats black students inequitably and as implemented imposes a disproportionately higher burden of required dislocations and disruptions on black students. (p.237)

In Summary, the busing issue has many sides. By its supporters, it is seen as the only viable vehicle to bring about school desegregation. It is seen on the one hand as a "monster" infringing on the rights of the majority population and on the other hand as a tool for destroying black institutions. The busing issue has generated debate and discussion over a variety

```
of issues and concepts such as freedom of choice, tipping, racial
balance, de facto vs de jure segregation, etc. In the words of
Dr. Joseph Durham, (1973) "The question of busing to achieve
integration is an involved and complicated educational, legal and
constitutional matter with ardent supporters as well as ardent
at:ackers" (p. 335).
```


## Neighborhood Schools


to return to school for after school classes and programs.

Fourth, . . . educators want a close relationship between school and family. The neighborhood schooi should, and often does, serve as an invitation to parents to know, confide, and work with its staff. This offers a good chance for constructive community pressures on the central school administration and the political authorities for local school improvement. . . Stated from a different perspective: the neighborhood school is a reflection of the belief that education should be locally controlled. (p. 50)

These views about the role that neighborhood schools were playing became major points of contention when the neighborhood school concept came under attack during the move to desegregate schools. In America, because of residential segregation (particularly in the north), neighborhood schools for the most part meant one-race schools.

As with the busing issue, there were different groupings of people, black and white, who clustered around various beliefs about the validity of the neighborhood school concept as it pertained to desegregation. For purposes of this study, the review of the literature focused on four somewhat loosely defined categories of people: (1) those people, primarily whites, who were supporters of the neighborhood school concept because they opposed desegregation and reasoned that it was better to be for
neighborhood schools than against school desegregation; (2) those people (primarily blacks) who were most concerned about the disproportionate number of black neighborhood schools being closed; (3) those blacks who argued for the development of community controlled schools or more concentration on providing quality education within their own neighborhood schools, either of which was considered to be more important than integration; and (4) those persons who saw the neighborhood school concept as Dasically an outdated notion that essentially was being used in an effort to block school desegregation.

The tactic of supporting neighborhood schools rather than being against school desegregation was a mirror image of the position of being against busing rather than being against desegregation. Some writers discussed the neighborhood schools argument and the anti-busing sentiment in the same breath (Pettigrew, 1972).

Some of the anti-busing groups themselves made a connection between the busing issue and neighborhood schools. Daniel Zwerding (1976) discussed this tactic while describing the activities of the National Action Group (NAG), an anti-busing organization from Pontiac, Michigan. He stated, "NAG insists that its opposition to busing has nothing to do with race . . . NAG opposes the busing because it destroys the 'neighborhood school system which is the American way'. . ." (p. 15). According to $2 w e r d i n g$, this opposition against busing and
support for the neighborhood school concept existed although, "Pontiac schools have been busing some kids for years and many parents send their children to parochial schools." (p. 15)

The link between the anti bising argument and the desire for neighborhood schools was also made by Marty (1973). He discussed the tactic used by busing critics of lauding the virtues of neighborhood schools while they attacked judges who, according to them, "have exceeded their authority and have imposed on local school districts the necessity of carrying out actions that are unconstitutional, too costly, and detrimental to the health, welfare, and educational development of children they affect" (p. 753).

Featherstone (1976), discussing the Boston situation, made the point that the support for neighborhood schools was really a clash between both races and classes, not really about schools, but about overall relations between the different groups of people in the city. He stated, "Busing is scarcely new in Boston . . .' neighborhood schools' drawing on cohesive neighborhoods have for some time been the exception rather than the rule . . . . The fight in Boston involves a clash between various groups. . . .Besides being racial, it is also a cultural and class battle" (p. 14).

Jencks (1972) writing for the New York Times Magazine pointed out the fact that white officials of ten voiced their support for the neighborhood school concept supposedly because of its educational merits and its importance to the maintenance of

```
strong ties between the family and the school. But in reality,
their support for the concept rested in its capacity to maintain
segregation. Jencks claimed that Denver had long been changing
school boundaries to keep whites in their neighborhood schools.
He said, "If neighborhood schools did not have that effect, it
seems safe to predict the current Denver Board would find new
virtues in busing" (p. 121). There were a number of reasons
given to explain why most desegregation plans led to a
disproportionate number of black neighborhood schools being
closed. But, two interrelated reasons were most often given to
explain the problem. First, black children's motivation and
achievement levels would be improved in an "integrated"
environment. Second, in order for this integration to be done in
an effective manner, it had to be done outside of the black
community.
    On the issue of whether an integrated environment improved
the motivation and achievement of black children, the literature
has shown mixed results. Weinberg (1977) cited the findings of
the Coleman Report (1966) which showed a positive relationship
between achievement and integration. This report stated:
    1. . . . as the proportion white in a school
    increases, the achievement of students in each racial
    group increases.
        2. . . . This relationship increases as the grade
    in school increases.
```

[^0]reality of the whole issue was best stated by Dr. Nancy St. John. She surveyed various studies conducted during the decades of the 60's and $70^{\prime}$ s as they related to desegregation and achievement. In her findings she stated:

On the basis of this evidence, biracial schooling must be judged neither a demonstrated success nor a demonstrated failure . . . . As implemented to date, desegregation has not rapidly closed the black-white gap in academic achievement, though it has rarely lowered and sometimes raised the scores of black children. Improvement has been more often reported in the early grades, in arithmetic and in schools over 50 per cent white, but even here the gains have been mixed, intermittent, or nonsignificant. . . .Biracial schooling is apparently not detrimental to the academic performance of black children; but it may have
negative effects on their self-esteem. (p. 119)
In most cities it became the accepted practice to insist that blacks leave their neighborhood schools to implement school desegregations. Much of the rationale for this practice was at least indirectly supported by a theory that became known as "cultural deprivation", or the "culture of poverty".

This theory contended that the child's home or his or her neighborhood could not provide the stimulus that was needed for them to be successful in school. The neighborhood was said to be
a retardant on the development of their academic potential (Deutsch, 1967; Hunt, 1969).

Kenneth Clark (1963) was a critic of this theory, seeing it as a more refined version of the old biological or racial inferiority arguments. He felt this concept allowed proponents to side step attributing poor performance of black children to "inherent" deficiencies. Instead, this theory allowed for blame to be placed on "a complex of social and cultural deficits, burdens and problems in the general environment outside of the control of the school" (p. 4). These deficiencies, according to Clark (1972), that impaired learning were problems such as "neighborhood crime and delinquency . . . broken homes . . . no books in the home and other general conditions of poverty which send children to school without breakfast, without adequate clothing, and which prevent parents from providing quiet places for study" (p. 8). This environment that was being discussed was the black community. Most white parents simply refused to send their children into black communities which they considered drug ridden, crime ridden, and incapable of providing an atmosphere conducive to learning.

The other explanation offered for why blacks had to endure a disproportionate loss of access to their neighborhood schools was the unwillingness on the part of the whites to be in schools where there were too many black people. Nancy St. John (1975) said that whites would accept blacks in schools under certain conditions; namely, the percentage of blacks to whites had to


#### Abstract

remain small. She stated that as long as it remains small, "there is no reason for white pupils to experience stigma, relative deprivation, social threat, marginality, or a change in norms, standards, or the expectations of their significant others" (p. 92-93). Hamilton (1968) discussed this problem from another angle. He discussed the condescending attitude toward the black community's concern about the loss of neighborhood schools. The Board noted that black parents might react negatively to busing the children to white schools. The suggestion was made to do everything possible to get a favorable reaction from these parents, but if that proved to be impossible "the transfer program would have to proceed without a popular base. In the light of the dismal alternatives such a program perhaps proceed without consensus" (p. 673).

Hamilton saw this kind of statement as a continuation of the practice of telling the black community what is best for it, irrespective of its views and concerns. It is important to note that Hamilton's comments occurred during the upsurge of the Black Power Movement, a movement that emphasized the need for more black community control over education and sought to minimize the push for school integration. His criticism, however, represents a trend in black reaction to integration that started at the time of the Brown decision and continued through the period being covered by this study.


Some blacks began to discuss the importance of demanding

```
community controlled schools rather than continuing the effort to
bring about desegregation. Wilcox (1970) beli\epsilonved chat there was
a growing recognition by blacks of the need to control the
substance of their children's education. He said, "This
recognition is based on the effective lack of good intention and
the questionable availability of skiils within the white
community to educate Blacks humanely and meaningfully." (p. 24)
Wilcox went on to define the "Black Controlled Schools" as:
Schools located within the Black Community in which the
Black Community seeks to remove white racists from
control over the school in order to:
```

(a) modify and control the content, form, and style of the school
(b) mute the oppressive policies of the central board such as school suspension procedures, 'gentlemen's agreements' as they apply to the use of corporal punishment and staff promotion, the deAfricanization of the curriculum, the coercive use of the police system against kids to protect teachers who fail teach, the infantilization of parents, the regimentation of teachers, and feeble submission to union control.
(c) involve the community in acquiring the skills to hold the school accountable
(d) diminish the flow of public funds for school construction, the purchase of books and supplies,

```
employment purposes out of the community
    (e) ceatralize community planning, and
development around the community's most important
asset -- the future of its children, not just its
children. (p. 25-26)
Banks (1972) said that the practice of closing schools in
```

the black community:

```
. . . represents one of the most tragic recent
developments in American society. . . . These actions
reinforce the false and tenuous sense of racial
superiority held by whites, and develop within them an
insidious ethnocentrism which is inimical to the
creation and perpetuation of a humane society. . . .
We violate both the culture and integrity of a group
when we close its schools and take the power and unity
which these schools symbolize. . . . School districts
should send whites to predominantly black schools, as
well as blacks to white schools. But black schools
should not be closed. (p. 270-271)
Altevogt and Nusbaumer (1978) discussed the importance of neighborhood schools to the black community, They said, "A community needs the presence of basic institutions in order to be a stable and healthy community. Schools are one of those institutions." (p. 34)
```

Arnez (1978), in describing the various harmful effects of the process on black children, touched on some of the problems caused by their loss of access to neighborhood schools:
(1) . . . the loss of teaching and administrative jobs by Blacks through dismissals, demotions or displacement; (2) the loss of millions of dollars in projected earned income; (3) the loss of racial models, heroes, authority figures for Black children; (4) the loss of cherished school symbols, colors, emblems and names of schools by Black children when their schools were closed and they were shifted to white schools; (5) subjection to segregated classes and buses, and exclusion from extracuricular activities; (6) disproportionate numbers of Black students suspended, expelled, and pushed out of schools; (7) exposure of Black children to hostile attitudes and behavior of white teachers and parents; (8) victimization by forced one-way busing policies and the uprooting of Black children for placement in hostile school environments without any support systems; (9) victimization by misclassification in special education classes and track systems; (10) victimization by unfair discipline practices and arbitrary school rules and regulations; and (11) victimization by ignorance of their learning styles, culture and social, educational and psychological


#### Abstract

needs. (p. 29) One of the more interesting comments about the struggle by blacks to control the schools in their communities came from from Gunning (1972), a conservative Republican Assemblywoman from New York. She believed that there was growing support for the most militant blacks in the community because of their support for community control of schools. She felt that prior to this new source of leadership black people had no one to speak out against busing. She stated, "their [the militants] support in black communities has increased because they became the spokesmen against the children being sent out of their neighborhood and because they resent the condescension inherent in the theory that black children needed to be with whites to acquire 'quality education' . . . . " (p. 4). Ornstein (1971) described the struggle for community control by blacks in this way:

The fight for black-controlled schools is based on the premise that the community is a social entity and entitled to its own maintenance structures and norms. It is based on the belief that all ethnic and racial groups have a right to control their own institutions so that they can function on a more equal basis within the larger system. The fact that the white power structure now controls black schools means that they lack legitimacy; the schools must be turned over to the people--and the people in the ghetto are black. (p. 437) There were individuals in the black community who developed


serious reservations about the importance of desegregation when compared to the need to struggle for quality education. They did not push for community control, but they did see the need to concentrate on improving the quality of the education in black neighborhood schools.

Robert Carter (1980), one of the leading attorneys in the Brown litigation, was one such person. Carter said that given a change to litigate Brown again, he would have changed his strategy. He would not have used social scientists to substantiate his case. He would have instead asked educators to
 Carter's current belief, that the quality of the education being received by blacks is more critical than integration. Although he continues to support school integration, he now feels that for blacks, particularly poor blacks, their only chance for decent jobs "is to concentrate on having quality education delivered to schools where blacks are attending, and in all likelihood will be attending for at least another generation" (p. 28).

This issue of quality education was at the forefront of the thinking of other blacks. Edmonds (1980) believed that the issue of racial balance needed to be pushed to the background so that attention could be focused on efforts to develop effective education. He expressed his opposition to the notion that simply putting black children into an integrated school would assure them of getting a quality education. He said, "demographic
desegregation must take backstage to instructional reform. . . . Surely, it must now be clear that black pasents want effective schooling for their children and desegregation is useful to black parents if, and only if, it moves to that end" (p. 121)

Despite the big push for community controlled schools, there were blacks as well as whites who saw any form of struggle for neighborhood schools as, in essence, a move against desegregation. These individuals believed that school desegregation was the only way for blacks to get a quality education and at the same time prepare themselves to live in a multiracial society. Alvin Poussaint and Toye Brown Lewis (1976) represented this viewpoint. They were very strongly opposed to any effort that relaxed the push for school desegregation. They said:

Achievement of school desegregation and racial equality remains a critical problem. The emotional and psychological toll that resistance to it will have on black children and their families will be as great as the toll the struggle for integration and liberation has had on black families since slavery. Yet, blacks must pursue their constitutional rights. The strategies to achieve desegregation must be deliberately speedy. Any relaxation of these strategies will give aid to forces seeking a reversal of desegregation policies and the continued subjugation of blacks as institutionalized practices. (p. 335)

```
Clark (1972) spoke very strongly of the need for school desegregation in American society. He saw the effort as crucial to the development of a democratic society. He argued against allowing any emotional attachments to the neighborhood school philosophy to stand in the way of desegregation. He said, "Desegregation of public schools and its implications for social stability and democratic education are matters of profound importance . . . ." (p. 11)
The U. S. Commission on Civil Rights (1972) was extremely critical of the neighborhood school concept. They stated: - . . no parent has the absolute right to send his child to a school simply because it happens to be geographically nearest.
The educational trend in recent years has been away from the neighborhood school, whose facilities are necessarily limited by size, toward larger schools which can provide better facilities and a broader curriculum. The neighborhood school was not sacred in the days of segregation, and there is no reason why it should be today. To make the neighborhood school the cornerstone of American education would be to turn the clock back educationally as well as socially. (p. 12)
To summarize, the neighborhood school concept was seen as an integral part of the American dream by its supporters, and an
```

```
outdated, irrelevant relic by its detractors. Some blacks
supported the neighiornood school concept as a method for
achieving community control of schools. Others were concerned
about the disproportionate number of black neighborhood schools
that were being closed as the result of the implementation of
various desegregation plans. Some whites and blacks opposed any
attempt to keep the neighborhood school idea alive because they
viewed such action as an effort to deter school desegregation.
    Throughout the entire period of this study, the debate
between supporters and detractors of the neighborhood school
philosophy continued unabated.
```


## CHAPIER 3

## Design of the Study


#### Abstract

This dissertation was designed primarily to study and analyze the actual movement, for purposes of desegregation, of black and white elementary, midide, and high school students attending school in the Milwaukee Public School System during the school years 1979 through 1982. Essentially the study focuses on the movement of these students from their attendance area to attend either other attendance area schools, specialty schools or special program schools.

In addition to studying the movement of the students, both the legal framework established by the consent decree and the written policies developed by MPS that served as the guidelines for the movement of students throughout the system were analyzed.


## Definitions

Before proceeding to describe the two key sources of information for this study, it is necessary to define some of the critical terms that are used in the analysis of the data. Two of these terms are defined in an MPS document entitled, First Draft: Comprehensive Plan for Increasing Educational Opportunities and

Improving Racial Balance in the Milwaukee Public Schools
(December 8, 1976):

1. Attendance Area School -"schools (that) are determined by the residence of the student and his/her parent/guardian. Each student has an attendance area which becomes the attendance area feeder pattern for the student's residence; elementary school attendance area, middle school attendance area, and senior high school attendance area" (p. 88).
2. City Wide School (i.e., Specialty School) - "schools (that have) a unique program and do not have a designated attendance area for any section of the city" (p. 88).

The other definitions that are important to this study are the following:

1. Special Program Schools - These schools were set up for students who can not function in the regular educational program. For purposes of this study, there are two categories of schools covered under this definition: (a) those schools serving children with exceptional education needs (EEN). At the time MPS began its desegregation efforts, the Wisconsin Statutes, Section 115.76 (3) defined children and youth with EEN as: "any child who has a mental, physical, emotional or learning disability which, if the full potential of the child is to be attained, requires educational services to the child to supplement or replace regular education."; (b) those schools that were set up as alternative schools or continuation schools as MPS defined
them in a policy paper entitled, "An Array of Alternatives,"
(1975): "These (schools) tend to focus on students whose education has been or might be interrupted. They could serve actual or potential drop-outs." (p. 5). For purposes of this study, these schools were included in the data contained within the tables only where specifically noted. There are also population figures relating to these schools in the appendix.
2. K-8 Schools - There are several schools in Milwaukee that allow students to attend from kindergarten through eighth grade. The data used in this study does not include information on 7th and 8th grade students in these schools. The decision not to include these students was made on the basis of the limited number of students involved, and the fact that these schools do not fit the most common structural pattern of either an elementary or middle school in the Milwaukee Public School System.
3. Black School - Any school in which the number of black students enrolled is equal to 60 percent or more of the total student enrollment.
4. White School - Any school in which the number of white students enrolled is equal to 60 percent or more of the total student enrollment.
5. Hispanic School - Any school in which the number of Hispanic students enrolled is equal to 60 percent or more of the total student enrollment.
6. Black Attendance Area - Any attendance area in which
the black student population constitutes 60 percent or more of all students residing in the attendance area.
7. White Attendance Area - Any attendance area in which the white student population constitutes 60 percent or more of all students residing in the attendance area.
8. Hispanic Attendance Area - Any attendance area in which the Hispanic student population constitutes 60 percent or more of all all students residing in the attendance area.
9. Integrated Attendance Area - Any attendance area in which one race of students comprises more than 59.9 percent of all students residing in the attendance area.
10. Sideways Movement - (a) The movement of black students residing in a black attendance area to a school in another black attendance area; (b) The movement of white students residing in a white attendance area to a school in another white attendance area. In either of these two situations, school desegregation is not enhanced in any way.

The decision to use the 60 percent threshold to designate an attendance area school as being white, black, Hispanic or integrated was based on a recognition of the "tipping point" theory defined in Chapter 1. However, the writer decided to apply this conceptual framework to blacks as well as whites. In other words, if a 40 percent black population is considered the point at which white exodus becomes "irreversible", then it could certainly be "used" also as a "ceiling" for defining a white
attendance area. Since the writer believes that applying this principle to one group but not the other is racist, the decision was made to apply the concept to define a black attendance area as well. In taking this tact, the writer tried to remain cognizant of the advice given by Killian and Grigg (1965) concerning the "tipping point" concept. They said:

Negroes will need to remember that as illogical, vague and essentially racist as it may be, the phenomenon of the "tipping point" is real for both whites and negroes.

But the "tipping point" is no more precise or
magical than is the quota. To attempt to specify
either and make a precise figure the basis of a policy is to invite discrimination. What is required is the application of human intelligence to the use of these
concepts not as solutions to the problems of desegregation but as danger signals. (p. 273)

The way in which the 60 percent threshold is used in this study represents an effort to recognize that the "tipping point" concept is indeed "real". However, the writer's decision to apply this concept to whites as well as blacks reflects an effort to remove any disparity of treatment given the two groups.

It is also important to note that the definition of the "tipping point" concept given in Chapter 1 applied to the population of a city. For purposes of this study, however, the threshold is being used to designate the race dominance of an
attendance area school-not the population of the city of Milwaukee.

Because of the myriad of specialty schools, special program schools, and specialties within the traditional schools, the writer felt it would be helpful to provide more deteiled information about these programs in the various schools.

All of the attendance area high schools have a' "school within a school" specialty concept in addition to the regular educational program. This is to distinguish them from the city wide specialty programs. In citing individual high school population figures, it was not possible to distinguish between students in specialty programs and those in ${ }^{\prime}$. regular educational program as this breakdown was not so designa d in the School Enrollment by Receiving School. The schools and their "specialties" that were established during or prior to this study are as follows:

1. Bay View - visual and performing arts
2. Custer - applied technology
3. Hamilton - marketing and business communication
4. Madison - a and natural resources
5. Marshall - communications and media
6. North - medical, dental, and health
7. Pulaski - transportation
8. Riverside - goverament and community services
9. South - tourism, food service, and recreation
```
    10. Washington - computer data processing
    11. West - law, law enforcement, and protective services
    The city wide specialty schools and their programs that were
established prior to or during the time period covered by this
study are the following:
    Elementary
    1. 82nd St. - multi-language
    2. Elm - creative arts
    3. 55th. St. - multi-language
    4. Garfield - open education
    5. Hawley - environmental education
    6. Lloyd - multi-unit/individually guided education
    7. MacDowell - Montessori
    8. Meir - gifted and talented
    9. Townsend - continuous progress
    10. 21st St. - teacher pupil learning center
    11. 38th St. - open education
    Middle
    1. Robinson - open education
    2. 8th St. - individually guided education
    High
    1. King - college preparatory
    2. Juneau - finance and small business
    3. Milwaukee Tech - vocational/technical
    Special program schools that were established prior to or
during the period covered by this study are as follows:
```


## Elementary

1. Gaenslen - physically/multiply handicapped
2. Manitoba Orthopedic - physically/multiply handicapped
3. Neeskra-Hearing - deaf and hard of hearing
4. Oklahoma Binner - learning disabled/emotionally
disturbed/ mental retardation

## High

1. Craig - alternative exceptional education
2. Demmer - GED/alternate high school
3. Lincoln - business development and skills/vocational education and programming center
4. Liberty - emotionally disturbed
5. Lapham Park - GED/alternate high school
6. Kilmer - GED/alternate middle/high school
7. Lady Pitts - school age parents program
8. 68th St. - GED/alternate middle/high school
9. Pleasant View - mentally retarded and emotionally disturbed

## Sources of Information

This study was based on a systematic analysis of information contained within two Milwaukee Public School System data sources: School Enrollment by Receiving School (1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982) and School Enrollment by Sending Attendance Area (1979, 1980,

1981 and 1982). These documents are the System's record of the movement of students from an attendance area school to a receiving school that is either a specialty school, a school in another attendance area or what is being referred to in this study as a special program school.

The School Enrollment by Receiving School booklet contains data on the racial makeup of the student population actually in attendance at a given school. The document is divided into three sections: high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools. In each section, schools are categorized as receiving schools and attendance area schools. The receiving schools are the focus of the document, therefore the information is structured in such a way as to allow for the identification of the total number of students and the total number of students of each race enrolled at the receiving school. It is also possible to determine the total number of students and attendance areas from which the students originated.

The School Enrollment by Sending Attendance Area booklet contains data on the racial makeup of the student population in the student's attendance area. The booklet is divided into the same three sections as the receiving school booklet and uses the same categories: receiving schools and attendance area schools. However, since the focus is on the attendance area, the information is presented in a form that makes it possible to ascertain the total number of students and the total number of students of each race living in the attendance area prior to the


#### Abstract

movement of any of these students to other schools. Additionally, it is possible to locate the receiving schools to which attendance area students are sent and to determine the number of black and white students sent to each of these schools. To draw conclusions on the four research questions posed in Chapter 1, the following information was needed: 1. The total number of students in a given attendance area. 2. The total number of black students in a given attendance area.


3. The total number of white students in a given attendance area.
4. The percentage of the attendance area population that is black.
5. The number of attendance area blacks remaining in the attendance area.
6. The number of attendance area whites remaining in the attendance area.
7. The number of blacks sent out from the attendance area.
8. The number of whites sent out from the attendance area.
9. The number of different schools receiving blacks from a given attendance area.
10. The number of different schools receiving whites from a given attendance area.
11. The number of blacks received by a school other than their own attendance area school.
12. The number of whites received by a school other than their own attendance area school.
13. The total number of black students in attendance at each of the receiving schools.
14. The total number of white students in attendance at each of the receiving schools.
15. The total number of students enrolled at each of the receiving schools.
16. The percentage of blacks in attendance at each of the receiving schools.
17. The total number of blacks sent from their attendance area to a black attendance area school.
18. The total number of whites sent from their attendance area to a white attendance area school.

The only information cited above that can be obtained from the School Enrollment by Receiving School booklet and/or the School Enrollment by Sending Attendance Area booklet without any special calculations is the following:

1. The total number of students in each attendance area.
2. The total number of students of each race in each attendance area.
3. The total number of students attending school in a given receiving school.
4. The total number of students of each race attending each receiving school.

All other data was generated either through manual counting

```
(line by line e. g., to determine the total number of schools
receiving students from a given attendance area), calculations to
determine percentages or total numbers, or cross referencing
between the sending and receiving school data sources.
    An example of this process can be seen by tracing the steps
followed to gather information on Auer Avenue school for 1982:
    Step 1: Identify Auer Avenue as a black attendance
    area school.
            a. Refer to sending attendance area booklet to
    find that there are 1705 students enrolled, 1652 of
    whom are black, 25 of whom are white.
    b. Calculate percentage of blacks in total
    enrollment to be 96.89%
    Step 2: Determine number of attendance area blacks and
    whites who remained in attendance area.
            a. Gross reference to receiving school booklet
    where Auer Avenue is listed as a receiving school to
    learn that there are 531 blacks in attendance and 3
    whites.
            b. Subtract }531\mathrm{ remaining black students from the
    1652 in the attendance area to determine that 1121
    black Auer Avenue students were sent out. Similar
    calculation for Auer's white students shows 22 were
    sent out.
    Steps 1 and 2 listed above in this example were completed
for every elementary attendance school listed in the sending
```

attendance area booklet in 1982.
Step 3: Determine the number of blacks sent from Auer that were sent to black attendance area schools and the number of whites sent from Auer that were sent to white attendance area schools.
a. Cross reference data on receiving schools contained in the sending area booklet under Auer Avenue in order to tabulate which schools received white and black students from Auer.

Prior calculations in Steps 1 and 2 showed that LaFollette was a black attendance area school and Grantosa Drive was a white ȧtendance azea school. LaFollette received 4 black students from Auer; Grantosa received 1 white student from Auer.
b. A cross reference of the receiving school designation in the sending attendance area booklet reveals the following:

Black students from Auer sent to black attendance area schools: 52 of the 531 sent out

White students from Auer sent to white attendance area schools: 4 of the 22 sent out

Step 4: A count of the number of schools receiving the 1121 black students sent from Auer shows that they were dispersed to 94 different schools. The 22 white
students sent from Auer were dispersed to 12 different schools.

Step 5: Using the receiving school booklet determine the black and white student enrollment at Auer. The booklet shows:

Total Enrollment - 588<br>Black Enrollment - 569

White Enrollment - 6
Step 6: Calculate percentage of black students
attending Auer: $569 / 588=96.77 \%$.
Step 7: Cross reference to the number of black (531) and white (3) attendance area studeni remaining at Auer, subtract that figure from total black and white enrollment to arrive at the number of black and white students sent in to Auer:

Blacks Enrolled 569

- Blacks Remaining 531

Blacks Sent in 38

Whites Enrolled 6

- Whites Remaining 3

Whites Sent in 3

The example above shows how information contained in the appendix tables was used to analyze movement of students to and from a particular school, where that school was both an attendance area school and a receiving school. These appendix tables were used as the data base for the development of Tables 1 through 23 contained in Chapter 4. To facilitate the development of the information needed to generate both the appendix tables and the
tables in Chapter 4 (which had to be completed for each elementary, middle, and high school for each of the four years covered by this study) a spread sheet format computer program was developed to do most of the calculations of totals, averages, and percentages. As the writer progressed through the study, it became apparent that additional information was needed relating to the movement of black and white students to specialty schools. This led to the development of Table A-14 through A-16 in the appendix. The two additional categories contained in these tables show the number of black and white students sent to specialty schools from each attendance area. To get this information, the writer used a process similar to that utilized to determine the number of blacks and whites sent to black attendance area schools and white attendance area schools, respectively.

In addition to the two primary sources of information, other materials were utilized. Among them: official minutes of the Milwaukee Board of School Directors meetings; briefs and information memoranda pertaining to the original lawsuit; newspaper clippings during the years 1975 through 1982; reports and other documents developed by the MPS administration; reports and other documents developed by various citizens groups involved with the desegregation process; and official minutes of Milwaukee Board of School Directors sub-committee meetings. Most of the information sources cited in this paragraph were useful as background to give the writer a better sense of the myriad of
activities that were taking place as the desegregation plan wes being developed and implemented.

## CHAPTER 4

## Presentation and Interpretation of Data


#### Abstract

This chapter will present and interpret the data that have been gathered for this study in the foilowing manner: first, background information will be cited in preparation for a review of the data that is specific to each of several research questions; second, each research question will be specified and the data relevant to that particular question will be set forth and analyzed. First, the author will define the term disproportionate burden, which has been used earlier in this study and is key to the research questions that will be addressed in this chapter. For purposes of this study, disproportionality is measured by determining what percentage of all black and white students being bused is represented by each race, and comparing that percentage to the percentage of all black and white students in the MPS population represented by each race. For either race, if the percentage being bused exceeds the percentage in the population by $10 \%$ or more, that race is shouldering a disproportionate burden of the movement for desegregation purposes. This definition (with appropriate changes) also applies when determining whether there is a disproportionate burden of dislocations resulting from school closings or the conversion of attendance area schools to specialty schools.


For example, 1979 data shows that at the elementary school level a total of 13,452 black and white students were moved for desegregation purposes. Of that total, 10,548 or $78.4 \%$ were black and 2,904 or $21.6 \%$ were white. Because the percentage of blacks being bused exceeds their percentage in the population by 30 percent, this means that black students bore a disproportionate burden of the student movement for desegregation purposes.

## Background Information

The following information provides a description of the student population of MPS between 1979 and 1982. This data, while not specifically addressing any of the research questions, is essential for any analysis of MPS policies on school closings and student movement for desegregation purposes. It is being presented to give the reader some basic demographic data about the system, and also to present a different statistical possibility for defining a desegregated school. In both instances, the information being presented in this background section will be helpful to the reader's effort to understand and draw conclusions from the data presented in analyzing the research questions.

Table 1 presents the year-by-year totals and the four year averages of black, white and other student populations at the elementary, middle, and high school levels between 1979 and 1982.

Total enrollment deciined from a high of 90,549 in 1979 to 85,881 in 1982. Between 1979 and 1982, the MPS population declined by 5.15 percent, with the largest drop occurring between 1979 and 1980 ( 3.2 percent or 2901 students). At all three levels, the student population declined each year with the exception of a slight increase at the elementary and middle school levels between 1981 and 1982 (. $65 \%$ and $.61 \%$, respectively).

There were several notable changes in the racial composition of the student population during this four-year period. The most. significant changes were as follows:

1. The percentage of white students dropped from 47 percent in 1979 to 41 percent in 1982, reflecting a loss of almost 7,000 students.
2. The percentage of black students rose from 44 percent in 1979 to 48 percent in 1982, an increase of 971 students.
3. There was an increase in both the number and the percentage of students in the "other" category. For purposes of this section, unless otherwise designated; the "other" designation includes Hispanic, American Indian, and Asian students. It also includes students designated by MPS as "other". There was an almost 2 percent increase in their numbers which represented an increase of 1257 students.

Over the four-year period the proportion of the total student population represented by the middle school level remained relatively constant. However, at the elementary level
the proportion increased by 1.11 percent while the proportion at the high school level dec.reased by 1.01 percent.

Table 1

Student Population in the Attendance Areas of the
Milwaukee Public School System (1979-1982)

## Elementary

|  | Total <br> Number | Number <br> Black | \% Black | Number <br> White | \% White | Number <br> Other | \% Other |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

## Middle

| 1979 | 12182 | 5877 | 48.2 | 5491 | 45.1 | 814 | 6.7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 1980 | 11915 | 5660 | 47.5 | 4841 | 40.6 | 1414 | 11.9 |
| 1981 | 11397 | 5980 | 52.5 | 4526 | 39.7 | 891 | 7.8 |
| 1982 | 11466 | 6139 | 53.5 | 4319 | 37.7 | 1008 | 8.8 |
| 4 Yr. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg: | 11740 | 5914 | 50.4 | 4794 | 40.8 | 1032 | 8.8 |

High

| 1979 | 29240 | 10978 | 37.5 | 16543 | 56.6 | 1719 | 5.9 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1980 | 27654 | 10837 | 39.2 | 15024 | 54.3 | 1793 | 6.5 |
| 1981 | 27406 | 11244 | 41.0 | 14217 | 51.9 | 1945 | 7.1 |
| 1982 | 26867 | 11640 | 43.3 | 13182 | 49.1 | 2045 | 7.6 |
| 4 Y̌. | 27792 | 11175 | 40.2 | 14742 | 53.0 | 1876 | 6.7 |
| Avg: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

There are two other important statistical indicators that are useful as background information on MPS: (1) the number of attendance areas, and (2) the size of attendance areas. In reviewing this information it is important to note that at the elementary school level, the racial categories for attendance areas include black, white, integrated, and Hispanic. At the middle and high school levels, there are no Hispanic attendance areas. The analysis of the data contained within Tables 2 through 4 revealed the following:

1. At the elementary school level between 1979 and 1982 (a) the ratio, e.g. size relationship, of the number of white elementary attendance areas to all other attendance areas declined. For example, in 1979 the white to black ratio was 2.6:1, while in 1982 it was 2.5:1. The decline of white attendance area numbers in comparison to both integrated and Hispanic attendance areas was more substantial: from 9.9:1 and 23.0:1 in 1979 to $7.6: 1$ and $20.3: 1$ in 1982 , respectively; (b) during the same time period, the ratio of black, integrated, and Hispanic attendance area size increased in comparison to white attendance area size. Throughout the entire period covered by this study black attendance areas remained over twice as large as white attendance areas. In 1979, the size ratio was 2.7:1; by 1982 it was 2.9:1. For integrated and Hispanic attendance areas, for the same years, the increases in size relative to white attendance areas was $1.9: 1$ and $2.2: 1$ to $2.0: 1$ and 2.3:1, respectively.
2. At the middle school level (a) there were no changes
in the number of any category of attendance areas during the
four-year period; the ratio of the number of white attendance
areas to black attendance areas remained $2: 1$ and the ratio of the
number of white to integrated attendance areas was $10: 1 ;$ (b)
over the four-year period, the ratio of the size of integrated
attendance areas increased when compared to white attendance
areas from $1.3: 1$ to $1.4: 1 ;$ the ratio of the size of black
attendance areas to white remained stable at $2.5: 1$.
3. At the high school level (a) the ratio of the number of
white attendance areas to both black and integrated remained
unchanged at $2.3: 1$ and $3.5: 1$, respectively; (b) the ratio of the
size of black and integrated attendance areas increased
substantially when compared to white attendance areas. the
ratios moved from $1.64: 1$ and $1: 10: 1$ in 1979 to $1.95: 1$ and $1.25: 1$,
respectively, in 1982.

Table 2
Number and Average Size of Elementary School
Attendance Areas (1979-1982)

| Year | Attendance Area Type |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Overall | Black | Integrated | White | Hispanic |
| Number | 106 | 27 | 7 | 69 | 3 |
| 1979 Avg Size | 468 | 822 | 585 | 306 | 675 |
| Number | 98 | 24 | 9 | 62 | 3 |
| 1980 Avg. Size | 496 | 919 | 613 | 312 | 695 |
| Number | 97 | 23 | 10 | 61 | 3 |
| 1981 Avg. Size | 487 | 897 | 642 | 299 | 658 |
| Number | 97 | 24 | 8 | 61 | 3 |
| 1982 Avg. Size | 490 | 882 | 637 | 302 | 692 |
| Avg. Size |  |  |  |  |  |
| All 4 Yrs. | 485 | 880 | 619 | 305 | 680 |

Table 3
Number and Average Size of Middle Schcol
Attendance Areas (1979-1982)

| Year | Attendance Area Type |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Overall | Black | Integrated | White | Hispanic |
| Number | 16 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 0 |
| Avg. Size | 761 | 1282 | 650 | 512 | - |
| Number | 16 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 0 |
| 1980 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Size | 745 | 1281 | 626 | 470 | - |
| Number | 16 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 0 |
| 1981 Avg. Size | 712 | 1243 | 618 | 436 | - |
| Number | 16 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 0 |
| 1982 Avg. Size | 717 | 1077 | 615 | 439 | - |
| Avg. Size All 4 Yrs. | 734 | 1221 | 627 | 464 |  |

Table 4
Number and Average Size of High School
Attendance Areas (1979-1982)

| Year | Attendance Area Type |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Overall | Black | Integrated ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | White | Hispanic |
| Number | 12 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 0 |
| Avg. Size | 2437 | 3396 | 2290 | 2067 | - |
| Number | 12 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 0 |
| 1980 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Size | 2305 | 3280 | 2225 | 1090 | - |
| Number | 12 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 0 |
| 1981 Avg. Size | 2284 | 3327 | 2282 | 1837 | - |
| 1982 Number | 12 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 0 |
|  | 2239 | 3409 | 2188 | 1752 | - |
| Avg. Size |  |  |  |  |  |
| All 4 Yrs. | 2316 | 3353 | 2246 | 1687 |  |

[^1]The final component of the background data is found in Tables 5 through 7. These tables show the number and percentage of schools and attendance areas that would be designated as black, desegregated or white at the elementary, middle, and high school levels each year between 1979 and 1982 using two different definitions of desegregation.

This information is being presented in this manner for two reasons: (a) the writer believes that a valid measurement to be used for a school system's definition of desegregation is the population in the system rather than the population of the city. Consequently, it was felt that it might be useful to provide the reader with information to show the impact of this method of determining whether or not a school was desegregated; (b) this 40 percent minimum figure is consistent with the author's definition of a race-dominated attendance area, although in this instance the 40 percent minimum is used only as it applies to blacks.

An analysis of the tables using 1982 figures reveals the following facts:

1. For black schools, at each of the three levels, the number and percentage of schools and attendance areas remain unchanged using either definition. This results from the fact that the definition of desegregation is based on the percentage of black students enrolled in a given school. Therefore, irrespective of the change in definition, in order for a school
or attendance area to be considered black, at least 60 percent of its population must be black.
2. At the elementary level: (a) for desegregated schools, the use of the 40-60 percent definition results in a substantially lower percentage and number of both schools and attendance areas; the percentage of desegregated schools decreases from $76.4 \%$ under the $25-60 \%$ definition to only $50 \%$ under the 40-60\% definition and the number of attendance areas drops from 13 to 7 ; (b) in contrast, the numbers and percentages of schools and attendance areas that would be defined as white, increases under the 40-60\% definition; again, referring to 1982 figures, the percentage of white schools increases from 4.7 percent to 31.1 and the number of white attendance areas increases from 55 to 61.
3. At the middle school level: (a) for desegregated schools, the use of the $40-60 \%$ definition leads to a lower percentage and number of black schools and attendance areas; the school percentage is reduced from $82.4 \%$ to $76.5 \%$ when the $40-60 \%$ definition is used, while the number of attendance areas drops from 3 to 0 ; (b) the picture for white schools and attendance areas differs markedly from the other two categories; the percentages of schools rises from 0 to $5.9 \%$ under the $40-60 \%$ definition and the numbers of attendance areas increases from 7 to 10.
4. The most dramatic changes were seen at the high school level: (a) for desegregated schools, the use of the $40-60 \%$
definition substantially lowers the percentage and number of
schools; the percentage drops from $88.2 \%$ to $81.8 \%$ and the
number drops from 18 to 11 ; the percentage and numbers of
attendance areas decreases from 3 to $2 ;$ (b) for white schools,
the use of the $40-60 \%$ definition brings about significant
increases in the percentage and numbers of schools; the
percentage increases from $4.5 \%$ to $36.4 \%$ in schools which is an
increase from 1 to 8 schools; the percentage increases from 50
percent to $58.3 \%$ and the number of attendance areas increases
from 6 to 7.
Table 5
Comparison of the Number and Percentage of Black, Desegregated,
and White Elementary School Attendance Areas (1979 - 1982)

Note. Specialty Schools and Special Program Schools included.
Table 6
Comparison of the Number and Percentage of Black, Desegregated,
and White Middle School Attendance Areas (1979 - 1982)

|  | Definition of Desegregation (\% Black) | 1979 |  | 1980 |  | 1981 |  | 1982 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | \% | No. | \% | No. | \% | No. | \% | No. |
| School | 25-60\% | 17.6 | 3 | 17.6 | 3 | 17.6 | 3 | 17.6 | 3 |
|  | 40-60\% | 17.6 | 3 | 17.6 | 3 | 17.6 | 3 | 17.6 | 3 |
| Attendance | 25-60\% | 33.3 | 5 | 33.3 | 5 | 33.3 | 5 | 33.3 | 5 |
| Area | 40-60\% | 33.3 | 5 | 33.3 | 5 | 33.3 | 5 | 33.3 | 5 |
| School | 25-60\% | 82.4 | 14 | 82.4 | 14 | 82.4 | 14 | 82.4 | 14 |
|  | 40-60\% | 52.9 | 9 | 64.7 | 11 | 70.6 | 12 | 76.5 | 13 |
| Attendance Area | 25-60\% | 6.7 | 1 | 6.7 | 1 | 20.0 | 3 | 20.0 | 3 |
|  | 40-60\% | -0- | 0 | -0- | 2 | -0- | 0 | -0- | 0 |
| School | 25-60\% | -0- | 0 | -0- | 0 | -0- | 0 | -0- | 0 |
|  | 40-60\% | 29.4 | 5 | 17.6 | 3 | 11.8 | 2 | 5.9 | 1 |
| Attendance Area | 25-60\% | 60.0 | 9 | 60.0 | 9 | 46.7 | 7 | 46.7 | 7 |
|  | 40-60\% | 66.7 | 10 | 66.7 | 10 | 66.7 | 10 | 66.7 | 10 |

Note. Specialty Schools included, bit K-8 schools excluded.
Table 7
Comparison of the Number and Percentage of Black, Desegregated,


[^2]```
Having presented this background data, the discussion will now move to the specific research questions posed in this study.
```

The Research Questions

## Question 1: Did the desegregation program of hPS result in a disproportionate number of black students being denied educational access to their neighborhood schools?

The picture emerging from the data in Table 8 shows a vast difference in the percentage of black and white students attending schools in their own attendance areas between 1979 and 1982. Specifically, there is a 15 percent difference between the highest percentage of blacks attending in their own attendance areas in any of the four years covered in this study (49.71\% at the elementary level in in 1980) and the lowest percentage of whites attending in white attendance areas (64.8\% at the high school level in 1982).

Table 8
Comparison of the Percentage of Black v. White Students
Attending School in Their Own Attendance Area (1979-1982)

|  | Black |  | White | Black |  | White |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1979 |  |  | 1980 |  |
| Elementary Schools | 49.58 |  | 76.59 | 49.71 |  | 75.49 |
| Middle Schools | 37.06 |  | 83.88 | 40.62 |  | 85.83 |
| High School | 33.56 |  | 71.78 | 34.76 |  | 70.57 |
|  |  | 1981 |  |  | 1982 |  |
| Elementary Schools | 48.78 |  | 75.08 | 49.66 |  | 75.27 |
| Middle Schools | 37.94 |  | 82.37 | 37.68 |  | 81.78 |
| High Schools | 30.99 |  | 67.27 | 29.48 |  | 64.80 |

[^3]
## Question 2: Did the desegregation progran of $\mathcal{H P S}$ result in a disproportionate number of black students being bused out of their neighborhood schools?

There is obviously a close relationship between this question and the question that immediately preceded it. The data in Table 8 shows a wide disparity in the percentage of blacks and whites attending schools in their attendance areas. Given that data and the information that was presented earlier on the number and percentages of whites and blacks in the system, it is reasonable to assume that the answer to this research question is "yes". Although this might be an obvious response, the data presented in this section will demonstrate that there is additional factual information that supports this conclusion.

The data relating to this question is found in Tables 9 through 20. These tables show the comparisons of student movement out of attendance areas by race for each year between 1979 and 1982. Student movement which did not enhance desegregation (movement of students to attendance areas of the same race category as their home attendance area) is not included in these tables.

Tables 9 through 12 detail the movement of white and black elementary students. The information points to a similar disparity each year in the ratio blacks moved in comparison to whites, with the highest ratio being $3.86: 1$ in 1982 and the
lowest 3.61:1 in 1979. In addition, the data show that over the four-year period, the percentage of black students sent out of black attendance areas averaged 48.3 percent, which translated into an annual average of 9,423 students. By comparison, the figures show that over the same four-year period, the percentage of white students sent out of white attendance areas averaged a mere 11.8 percent, or 1,803 students. Stated another way, for every one white student sent out of white attendance areas, 5.23 black students were sent out of black attendance areas.
Table 9
Ratios of Black to White Elementary School Students

|  |  | Black Stu | ts |  | White Stud | nts |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved |
| Black Attendance Areas | 20033 | 9369 | 46.77 | 1289 | 479 | 37.16 |
| White Attendance Areas | 1976 | 493 | 24.95 | 17045 | 1988 | 11.66 |
| Integrated Attendance Areas | 1701 | 682 | 40.09 | 1661 | 322 | 19.39 |
| Hispanic Attendance Areas | 11 | 4 | 36.36 | 630 | 115 | 18.25 |
| A11 Attendance Areas | 23721 | 10548 | 44.47 | 20625 | 2904 | 14.08 |
| 1979 Ratio (No. Blacks Moved | Whit | Moved) $=3$ |  |  |  |  |
| Note. The number moved does | incl | those mov | to scho | ttenda | Areas of |  |

same racial category (sideways movement).
Table 10
Ratios of Black to White Elementary School Students


Table 11
Ratios of Black to White Elementary School Students
Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1981)

Table 12
Ratios of Black to White Elementary School Students
Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve Sch

Tables 13 through 16 show the movement of white and black
middle school students. The data reveal an even larger disparity
between black and white movement at the middle school level. The
highest ratio in the middle schools for black students moved in
comparison to whites was $9.03: 1$ in 1982 and the lowest was $7.24: 1$
in 1979 . Over the four-year period the data reveal that the
percentage of black students sent out of black attendance areas
averaged 62.9 percent, or 3,359 students annually compared to a
6.08 percent average or 228 white students sent of white
attendance areas annually. This means that for every one white
student sent of white attendance areas, 14.7 black students were
sent out of black attendance areas.
Table 13
Ratios of Black to White Middle School Students

|  | Black Students |  |  | White Students |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved |
| Black Attendance Areas | 5381 | 3304 | 61.40 | 813 | 178 | 21.89 |
| White Attendance Areas | 496 | 126 | 25.40 | 4304 | 279 | 6.48 |
| Integrated Attendance Areas ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 0 | 0 | -0- | 344 | 17 | 4.94 |
| All Attendance Areas | 5877 | 3430 | 58.36 | 5461 | 474 | 8.68 |
| 1979 Ratio (No. Blacks Moved/No. Whites Moved) $=7.24: 1$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Note. The number moved does not include those moved to schools in Attendance Areas of the |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| same racial category (sideways movement). |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 14
Ratios of Black to White Middle School Students

|  |  | Black Stu | nts |  | White Stuc |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved |
| Black Attendance Areas | 5047 | 3341 | 66.20 | 706 | 178 | 25.21 |
| White Attendance Areas | 555 | 143 | 25.77 | 3692 | 234 | 6.34 |
| Integrated Attendance Areas ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | 1 | 0 | -0- | 349 | 10 | 2.87 |
| All Attendance Areas | 5603 | 3484 | 62.18 | 4747 | 422 | 8.89 |
| 1980 Ratio (No. Blacks Moved/No. Whites Moved) $=8.26: 1$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Note. The number moved does not include those moved to schools in Attendance Areas of the |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| same racial category (sideways movement). |  |  |  |  |  |  |

a Integrated between white and Hispanic students.
Table 15
Ratios of Black to White Middle School Students

Table 16
Ratios of Black to White Middle School Students
Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1982)

|  |  | Black Stu | ts |  | White Stud | nts |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved |
| Black Attendance Areas | 5579 | 3482 | 62.41 | 614 | 189 | 30.78 |
| White Attendance Areas | 607 | 155 | 25.54 | 3412 | 194 | 5.69 |
| Integrated Attendance Areas ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 7 | 1 | 14.29 | 293 | 20 | 6.83 |
| All Attendance Areas | 6193 | 3638 | 58.74 | 4319 | 403 | 9.33 |
| 1982 Ratio (No. Blacks Moved/No. Whites Moved) $=9.03: 1$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Note. The number moved does not include those moved to schools in:Attendance Areas of the |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| same racial category (sideways movement). |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Tables 17 through 20 show the movement of black and white high school students. At this level, the highest black/white disparity shows a ratio of $2.09: 1$ in 1982 and the lowest, $1.73: 1$ in 1980. The information contained in the tables also indicate that the percentage of black students sent out of black attendance areas averaged 68.3 percent or 5,502 students per year compared to a $18.4 \%$ average or 2,029 white students sent out of white attendance areas. These percentages and numbers indicate that for every one white student sent out of white attendance areas, 2.7 black students were sent out of black attendance areas.
Table 17
Ratios of Black to White High School Students

same racial category (sideways movement).

## Table 18

Ratios of Black to White High School Students
Moved From Their Own Attendance Areas to Achieve School Desegregation (1980)

|  |  | Black Stu | ts |  | White Stud | ats |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved |
| Black Attendance Areas | 7856 | 5037 | 64.12 | 1637 | 939 | 57.36 |
| White Attendance Areas | 815 | 226 | 27.73 | 11335 | 1784 | 15.74 |
| Integrated Attendance Areas | 2166 | 1067 | 49.26 | 2052 | 935 | 45.57 |
| All Attendance Areas | 10837 | 6330 | 58.41 | 15024 | 3658 | 24.35 |
| 1980 Ratio (No. Blacks Moved/No. Whites Moved) $=1.73: 1$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Note. The number moved does not include those moved to schools in Attendance Areas of the |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 19
Ratios of Black to White High School Students

|  |  | Black Stu | ats |  | White Stud | nts |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved |
| Black Attendance Areas | 8015 | 5585 | 69.68 | 1519 | 985 | 64.85 |
| White Attendance Areas | 878 | 354 | 40.32 | 10731 | 2160 | 20.13 |
| Integrated Attendance Areas | 2351 | 1220 | 51.89 | 1967 | 503 | 25.57 |
| All Attendance Areas | 11244 | 7159 | 45.88 | 14217 | 3648 | 25.66 |
| 1981 Ratio (No. Blacks Moved | White | Moved) $=1$ | 6:1 |  |  |  |
| Note. The number moved does | inclu | those mov | to schoo | tendan | Areas of |  |

same racial category (sideways movement).
Table 20
Ratios of Black to White High School Students

|  | Black Students |  |  |  | White Students |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved | No. | No. Moved | \% Moved |
| Black Attendance Areas | 8295 | 5924 | 71.42 | 1420 | 976 | 68.73 |
| White Attendance Areas | 982 | 420 | 42.77 | 9998 | 2171 | 21.71 |
| Integrated Attendance Areas | 2363 | 1306 | 55.27 | 1764 | 517 | 29.31 |
| All Attendance Areas | 11640 | 7650 | 65.72 | 13182 | 3664 | 27.80 |
| 1982 Ratio (No. Blacks Moved/No. Whites Moved) $=2.09: 1$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Note. The number moved does not include those moved to schools in Attendance Areas of the |  |  |  |  |  |  |

In addition to the points raised above, an analysis of Tables 9 through 20 yield the following facts:

1. For all four years at the elementary level, there were more blacks sent out of non-black attendance areas than there were whites sent out of non-white attendance areas (see Tables 9 through 12).
2. At the middle school level during all four years there were more whites bused out of non-white attendance areas than there were blacks bused out of non-black attendance areas (see Tables 13 through 16).
3. At the high school level, in 1979 and 1980 there were more whites bused out of non-white attendance areas than there were blacks bused out of non-black attendance areas. But in 1981 and 1982 the pattern shifted so that more blacks were being bused out of non-black attendance areas than whites out of non-white attendance areas (see Tables 17 through 20).

## Dispersal of Students From Their Attendance Areas

For many blacks, another important issue is the number of schools to which black students are dispersed. Although not a major part of this study, this issue relates to the overall issue of whether or not there is a disproportionate burden on blacks in all phases or aspects of the student movement desegregation purposes. For this reason, some information on this topic will be presented in this section of the chapter.

The data contained within the appendix shows that, on the
average, black students from black attendance areas were
dispersed to a larger number of schools than were white students
from white attendance areas. One reason that has been given as
an explanation for the higher dispersal rates for blacks is that
black attendance areas are larger than white attendance areas.
The author contends that it is at the elementary school level
that this issue of dispersal is most salient, in large part
because of the number of schools involved. Consequently the
analysis of this problem is limited to the elementary level.
In analyzing the dispersal issue, $\quad$ ables 21 and 22 are
structured so that the affect of size on dispersal rate can be
scrutinized. Table 21 contains data based on the average number
of schools per 100 students to which black and white students
fromeach type of attendance area were sent.

Table 21
Average Number of Elementary Schools That Students in Black,

Integrated, White and Hispanic Attendance Areas Were Sent To,
Per 100 Students $(1979-1982)^{a}$

| Race of Student | Yeax | Attendance Area |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Black | Integrated | White | Hispanic | All |
| Black <br> Students | 1979 | 9.2 | 11.0 | 22.2 | 16.7 | 10.9 |
|  | 1980 | 8.7 | 12.2 | 15.4 | 32.5 | 13.9 |
|  | 1981 | 9.3 | 13.2 | 20.9 | 25.4 | 17.0 |
| 4 Yr. Average | 1982 | 9.3 | 13.4 | 20.3 | 13.5 | 16.2 |
|  |  | 9.1 | 12.5 | 19.7 | 22.0 | 14.5 |
| White <br> Students | 1979 | 27.6 | 10.4 | 7.8 | -- | 13.2 |
|  | 1980 | 32.9 | 10.0 | 7.4 | 12.7 | 13.9 |
|  | 1981 | 37.8 | 11.0 | 7.9 | 16.2 | 15.6 |
| 4 Yr. Average 1982 |  | 38.0 | 11.8 | 7.5 | 17.5 | 16.0 |
|  |  | 34.1 | 10.8 | 7.7 | 11.6 | 14.7 |

${ }^{a}$ Attendance Areas with no Blacks not included. Note that many Hispanic and some white Attendance Areas have very small numbers of Black students, so year to year fluctuations may be great.

The data in Table 21 reveals the following information:

1. The four-year average of the number of schools to which blacks from all attendance areas were sent (14.5) roughly equals
that of whites (14.7).
2. When analyzed by type of attendance area from which the student was sent, blacks from black attendance areas were dispersed to an average of 9.1 schools while whites from white attendance areas were dispersed to an average of 7.7 schools.
3. White students from black attendance areas were dispersed to more than four times as many different schools as whites from white attendance areas (34.1:7.7).
4. Black students from white attendance areas were dispersed to more than twice as many schools as blacks from black attendance areas (19.7:9.1).
5. Whites from black attendance areas were dispersed to an average of 34.1 different schools compared to only 19.7 for blacks from white attendance areas.

In addition to comparing the average number of schools that white and black students were sent to per 100 students, another way to consider the impact of attendance area size on the number of schools to which were dispersed is seen in Table 22. In this table the author matched five black attendance area schools with five white attendance area. schools. These schools were selected because for the year in question, the number of black students in the black attendance area school was nearly equal to the number of white students in the white attendance area school to which it is matched. Difference were no greater than six students. In each case, more black students were sent and they were dispersed

```
to more schools. For example, the 35th St. /Hayes comparison
shows that 206 (62 percent) of the 35th street black student
population was sent out as compared to only 96 (29 percent) of
Hayes' white student population and that black students were sent
to almost three times as many different schools.
```

Table 22
Comparison of the DIspersal of Black and Hhite Students from Black and Hhite
Attendance Areas with Comparable Black and White Student Enrollments (1982)

| black HHITE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AA | No. of Students in AA | No. of Black Students in AA | No. of Black Students Sent Out | No. of Schools Black Students Sent to | AA | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No. of } \\ & \text { Students } \\ & \text { in AA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No. of } \\ & \text { White } \\ & \text { Students } \\ & \text { in AA } \end{aligned}$ | No. of White Students Sent Out | $\qquad$ |
| Palincr | 649 | 528 | 179 | 52 | Mitchell | 739 | 534 | 124 | 39 |
| 24th St. | 434 | 354 | 81 | 39 | Oklahoma | 367 | 348 | 70 | 33 |
| Phillp ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 344 | 338 | 94 | 39 | Irving | 457 | 342 | 96 | 17 |
| 35 th St. | 538 | 329 | 206 | 52 | Hayes | 444 | 332 | 96 | 39 |
| S.spring ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | b 322 | 270 | 74 | 30 | Barton | 377 | 276 | 25 | 17 |
| a E. L. | Phillip |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| b sllver | r Spring |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

While size of attendance areas is obviously important to an analysis of the dispersal issue, it is also useful to examine this question without regard to size. Table 23 details the dispersal of students from 20 of the 25 elementary schools in black attendance areas in 1982. Fifteen of the schools had students dispersed to 70 or more schools and three had students populations dispersed to 91 or more different schools.

A review of the data contained within the appendix will reveal that of the five remaining schools, none had students dispersed to fewer than 30 schools. A review of that same data will show that of the 61 white attendance area elementary schools, only seven had students dispersed to 30 or more schools, with only one out of the seven having students dispersed to 40 different schools.

Table 23

Dispersal of Students from Black Attendance Areas
to Other MPS Schools (1982)

| Black Di <br> AA to <br> School St | Number of Different Schools to Which Black AA Students Were Sent | $\begin{array}{cc} \text { Black } & \text { Di } \\ \text { AA } & \text { tc } \\ \text { School } & \text { St } \end{array}$ | of <br> Schools <br> Black AA <br> Were Sent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Auer | 94 | LaFollette | 91 |
| Berger | 83 | Lee | 82 |
| Brown | 60 | 9th St. | 70 |
| Clark | 99 | Palmer | 52 |
| Franklin | 72 | Siefert | 75 |
| Garden Homes | 62 | 31st St. | 82 |
| Green Bay | 75 | 37 th St. | 75 |
| Holmes | 65 | 20th St. | 79 |
| Hopkins | 88 | 27 th St. | 86 |
| Keefe Ave. | 77 | 35 th St. | 52 |

## The Role of Specialty Schools

One of the more interesting patterns that was observed while reviewing the dispersal data was the movement of white students out of black attendance areas and conversely the movement of black students out of white attendance areas. The author elected to examine the impact of specialty


#### Abstract

schools on the dispersal configurations-- not just at the elementary level but at all levels. The question was as follows: were specialty schools serving a key role in drawing white students out of black attendance areas? Stated another way, were specialty schools a key to providing white students a way out of black attendance areas?

Tables 24 through 31 present data on the percentage of students at all three levels who were sent out of their attendance areas to specialty schools. An analysis of this data reveals the following information: 1. In 1979 (a) among black students, the highest percentage going to specialty schools were those enrolled at the high school level and who resided in integrated attendance areas (27.60\%); the lowest percentage of students being sent to specialty schools were also from integrated attendance areas but were enrolled at the elementary level (3.6\%); there were no elementary level students sent from Hispanic attendance areas sent to specialty schools; (b) for white students the highest percentage going to specialty schools came from black attendance areas and the lowest from Hispanic attendance areas, 81.47\% and 8.47, respectively. 2. In 1980 (a) for black students, the highest percentage of students attending specialty schools were high school students from white attendance areas (37.89\%), and the lowest were middle school students living in white attendance areas (6.16\%); (b)


for white students, the highest percentage of students attending specialty schools were high school students from black attendance areas (77.56\%) and the lowest were elementary school students sent from Hispanic attendance areas (14.29\%).
3. In 1981 (a) for black students, the highest percentage of students attending specialty schools were those enrolled at the high school level from white attendance areas (29.9\%) and the lowest was middle school students from white attendance areas (6.10\%); (b) among white students, the highest percentage of students attending specialty schools were enrolled at the high school level and were from integrated attendance areas (65.02\%) and the lowest was $15.92 \%$, elementary students from Hispanic attendance areas.
4. In 1982 (a) for black students the highest percentage of students attending specialty schools were elementary students from integrated attendance areas (30.77\%) and the lowest was middle school from white attendance areas (7.27\%); (b) for white students, the highest percentage of students attending specialty schools was high school students from black attendance areas (71.51\%) and the lowest was students enrolled at the elementary level who resided in Hispanic attendance areas (13.83\%).

Table 24
Movement of White Students to Specialty Schools (1979)

| Attendance Area | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No. Sent } \\ & \text { Out } \end{aligned}$ | No. Sent to Specialty Schools | \% Sent to Specialty Schools |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Elementary |  |
| Black | 595 | 148 | 24.87 |
| White | 3578 | 748 | 21.91 |
| Integrated | 495 | 98 | 19.80 |
| Hispanic | 177 | 15 | 8.47 |
| Total <br> Percent=21.57 | 4845 | 1045 |  |
|  |  | Middle |  |
| Black | 253 | 111 | 43.87 |
| White | 481 | 159 | 33.06 |
| Integrated | 61 | 13 | 21.31 |
| $\text { Percent }=35.60$ | 795 | 283 |  |
|  |  | High |  |
| Black | 1090 | 888 | 81.47 |
| White | 3024 | 1519 | 50.23 |
| Integrated | 561 | 400 | 71.30 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Total } \\ & \text { Percent }=60.04 \end{aligned}$ | 4675 | 2807 |  |
| Grand Total Overall Percen | $\begin{gathered} 10315 \\ \mathrm{n} t=40.09 \end{gathered}$ | 4135 |  |

Table 25

Movement of White Students to Specialty Schools (1980)

| Attendance <br> Area | No. Sent <br> Out | No. Sent to <br> Specialty Schools | \% Sent to <br> Specialty Schools |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |


|  |  | Elementary |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Black | 504 | 225 | 44.64 |
| White | 3221 | 1213 | 47.60 |
| Integrated | 789 | 415 | 52.60 |
| Hispanic | 168 | 24 | 14.29 |
| $\quad$Total <br> Percent=40.09 | 4682 | 1877 |  |


|  | Middle |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| Black | 249 | 104 | 41.77 |
| White | 449 | 127 | 28.29 |
| Integrated | 47 | 17 | 36.17 |
| Total   <br> Percent $=33.29$ 745 248 |  |  |  |



Table 26
Movement of White Students to Specialty Schools (1981)

| Atitendance <br> Area | No. Sent <br> Out | No. Sent to <br> Specialty Schools | \% Sent to <br> Specialty Schools |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Black | 427 | Elementary |  |
| White | 176 |  |  |
| Integrated | 2985 | 1155 | 41.22 |
| Hispanic | 987 | 177 | 1909 |

Table 27

Movement of White Students to Specialty Schools (1982)

| Attendance Area | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No. Sent } \\ & \text { Out } \end{aligned}$ | No. Sent to Specialty Schools | \% Sent to Specialty Schcols |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Elementary |  |
| Black | 590 | 244 | 41.36 |
| White | 2908 | 1129 | 38.82 |
| Integrated | 847 | 483 | 57.02 |
| Hispanic | 188 | 26 | 13.83 |
| Total <br> Percent=41. 52 | 4533 | 1882 |  |
|  |  | Middle |  |
| Black | 294 | 112 | 38.10 |
| White | 435 | 98 | 22.53 |
| Integrated | 58 | 17 | 29.31 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Total } \\ & \text { Percent }=28.84 \end{aligned}$ | 787 | 227 |  |


|  | High |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Black | 1102 | 788 | 71.51 |
| White | 2932 | 1414 | 48.23 |
| Integrated | 634 | 416 | 65.62 |
| Total | 4668 | 2618 |  |
| Percent=56.08 |  |  |  |
| Grand Total <br> Overall Percent=47.33 | 4727 |  |  |

Table 28
Movement of Black Students to Specialty Schools (1979)

| Attendance Area | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No. Sent } \\ & \text { Out } \end{aligned}$ | No. Sent to Specialty Schools | \% Sent to Specialty Schools |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Elementary |  |
| Black | 10716 | 775 | 7.23 |
| White | 520 | 47 | 9.04 |
| Integrated | 729 | 23 | 3.16 |
| Hispanic | 4 | -0- | -0- |
| Percent=7.06 | 11969 | 845 |  |
|  |  | Middle |  |
| Black | 3562 | 284 | 7.97 |
| White | 137 | 22 | 16.06 |
| Integrated | -0- | -0- | -0- |
| Total <br> Percent=8.27 | 3699 | 306 |  |

## High

| Black | 5830 | 1071 | 18.37 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| White | 339 | 74 | 21.83 |
| Integrated | 1123 | 310 | 27.60 |
| Total <br> Percent=19.95 | 7292 | 1455 |  |
| Grand Total 22960 <br> Overall Percent=11.35 | 2606 |  |  |

Table 29
Movement of Black Students to Specialty Schools (1980)

| Attendance <br> Area | No. Sent <br> Out | No. Sent to <br> Specialty Schools | \% Sent to <br> Specialty Schools |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Elementary

| Black | 10199 | 1447 | 14.19 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| White | 623 | 113 | 18.14 |
| Integrated | 1176 | 282 | 23.98 |
| Hispanic | 3 | $-0-$ | $-0-$ |
| Total <br> Percent=15.34 | 12001 | 1842 |  |


|  |  | Middle |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Black | 3605 | 349 | 9.68 |
| White | 146 | 9 | 6.16 |
| Integrated | -0- | -0- | -0- |
| Total <br> Percent $=9.54$ | 3751 | 358 |  |
|  |  | High |  |
| Black | 5470 | 1140 | 20.84 |
| White | 256 | 97 | 37.89 |
| Integrated | 1194 | 319 | 26.72 |
| Total <br> Percent=22.49 | 6920 | 1556 |  |
| Grand Total Overall Percen | $\begin{aligned} & 16946 \\ & t=22.16 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |

Table 30
Movement of Black Students to Specialty Schools (1981)

| Attendance Area | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No. Sent } \\ & \cdot \text { Out } \end{aligned}$ | No. Sent to Specialty Schools | \% Sent to Specialty Schools |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Elementary |  |
| Black | 10105 | 1565 | 15.49 |
| White | 519 | 104 | 20.04 |
| Integrated | 1485 | 370 | 24.92 |
| Hispanic | 4 | -0- | -0- |
| Percent=16.83 | 12113 | 2039 |  |
|  |  | Middle |  |
| Black | 3486 | 343 | 9.84 |
| White | 164 | 10 | 6.10 |
| Integrated | 1 | -0- | -0- |
| Total <br> Percent $=9.67$ | 3651 | 353 |  |

## High

| Black | 6024 | 1315 | 21.83 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| White | 377 | 109 | 28.91 |
| Integrated 1359 351 |  |  |  |
| Total <br> Percent=22.87 | 7760 | 1775 | 25.83 |
| Grand Total 23524 <br> Overall Percent=16.33 | 4167 |  |  |

Table 31
Movement of Black Students to Specialty Schools (1982)

| Attendance <br> Area | No. Sent <br> Out | No. Sent to <br> Specialty Schools | \% Sent to <br> Specialty Schools |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |


|  |  | Elementary |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Black | 10439 | 1601 | 15.34 |
| White | 520 | 110 | 21.15 |
| Integrated | 1001 | 308 | 30.77 |
| Hispanic | 5 | $-0-$ | $-0-$ |
| Total 11965 2019 |  |  |  |


|  | Middle |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Black | 3714 | 324 | 8.72 |
| White | 165 | 12 | 7.27 |
| Integrated | 1 | $-0-$ | $-0-$ |
| Total <br> Percent=8.66 | 3880 | 336 |  |


|  |  | High |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Black | 6340 | 1195 | 18.85 |
| White | 448 | 132 | 29.46 |
| Integrated | 1430 | 370 | 25.87 |
| Total <br> Percent $=20.65$ | 8218 | 1697 |  |
| Grand Total Overall Percen | $\begin{aligned} & 24063 \\ & t=16.84 \end{aligned}$ | 4052 |  |

If the examination of the tables is limited to comparing the differences between what happened to white students leaving black attendance areas and black students leaving white attendance areas to attend specialty schools, the following points can be made:

1. Tables 24 through 27 show an extremely high percentage of white students sent to specialty schools from black attendance areas at the high school level. The highest percentage (81.47\%) occurred in 1979 , and the lowest percentage ( $64.20 \%$ ) was recorded in 1981. With the exception of 1980 , the situation at the elementary and middle school levels was similar to that of the high schools.
2. The data in Tables 28 through 31 detail the movement of black students. Only in 1979 at the middle school level was there a $h$ gher percentage of black students being sent to specialty schools from black attendance areas than from white attendance areas. The highest percentage for these students occurred in 1980 at the high school level where $37.89 \%$ of the students sent out went to specialty schools. The lowest percentage was at the middle school level in 1981 (6.10\%).

In summary, the tables show that black students were sent out to specialty schools most often when they were residents of white attendance areas and white students were sent to specialty schools most often when they were being sent from black attendance areas. Comparing overall percentages for blacks and
whites sent to specialty schools from all categories of attendance areas, however, the following relationships emerge:

1. In 1979 the percentage of whites sent to specialty schools was 3.5 times as high as the percentage of blacks sent to specialty schools.
2. In 1980 the percentage of whites sent to specialty schools was 2.2 times as high as the percentage of blacks sent to specialty schools.
3. In 1981 and 1982 the percentage of whites sent to specialty schools was 2.8 times as high as the percentage of blacks sent to specialty schools.

The specialty school information presented above was extremely helpful to the author in tracing the movement of white students out of their attendance areas particularly those who lived in black attendance areas. It is clear from this information that far greater numbers of white students attended specialty schools than did black students.

This information on specialty schools leads directly to the next research question to be examined in this chapter:

```
Question 3: Did the Hilmaukee Public School System
make decisions about the locations of specialty
schools in a manner that resulted in a
disproportionate burden being placed on black
students?
```

Tables 32 through 34 show the impact of attendance area schools being converted to specialty schools. Tables 32 and 33 show that there were eight more black attendance area elementary schools closed than white elementary attendance area schools. A total of 3,358 black students were dislocated by these closings compared to only 1,114 white students -a ratio of 3.01:1. Table 34 shows that the total number of black middle and high school students displaced when their attendance area schools were converted to specialty schools was 2,434 . When compared to the 1,162 whites displaced, the result is a ratio of $2.09: 1$.

This information is important because is shows very clearly that the conversion of attendance area schools to specialty schools displaced significantly more black students, and as the information presented on student movement to specialty schools showed, a much lower percentage of blacks went to these schools. Blacks were disproportionately dislocated from their attendance area schools and yet benefited very little from these "new schools" located in their communities.

Table 32

Black Attendance Area Elementary Schools
Converted to Specialty Schools

| Year | School | Black Enrollment | Other Persons Enrolled ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1976 | 4th St. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | $181{ }^{\text {c }}$ | -0- |
| 1976 | Lloyd | $454{ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1 |
| 1977 | Elm | $434{ }^{\text {d }}$ | 45 |
| 1978 | MacDowell ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | $537{ }^{\text {d }}$ | 59 |
| 1978 | 21st St. | $435{ }^{\text {f }}$ | 13 |
| 1980 | Garfield | $205{ }^{\text {d }}$ | 81 |
| 1980 | Townsend | $376{ }^{\text {d }}$ | 122 |
| 1980 | 38th St. | $510^{\text {d }}$ | 282 |
| Total |  | 3132 | 603 |

Note. The years used to determine the impact of Attendance Area schools being changed to Specialty Schools on enrollment of black and white students varies from year to year. This variance is a reflection of the inconsistent methodology used by MPS to record enrollment changes due to these conversions.
a other persons is used as a category in this table because the document from which the information was taken did not use a category labeled "white". However, these "other persons" referred to all students who were not American Indian, Black, Asian American or Spanish-Surname Americans. Given these exceptions, for this study, "other persons" are considered white.
b Name changed to Golda Meir in 1979.
C Based on 1974 enrollment figures.
d Based on 1975 enrollment figures.
e Spelling is inconsistent in MPS documents; varies from McDowell to MacDowell.
£ Based on 1976 enrollment figures.

Table 33
White Attendance Area Elementary Schools
Converted to Specialty Schools

| Year | School | Black Enrollment | Other Persons <br> Enrolled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1978 | Hawley | $87^{\mathrm{b}}$ | 184 |
| 1980 | 55 th St. | $77^{\mathrm{c}}$ | $127^{\mathrm{d}}$ |
| 1980 | 82nd St. | $62^{\mathrm{e}}$ | 200 |
| Total |  | 226 | 511 |

Note. The years used to determine the impact of Attendance Area schools being changed to Specialty Schools on enrollment of black and white students varies from year to year. This variance is a reflection of the inconsistent methodology used by MPS to record enrollment changes due to these conversions.
a Other persons is used as a category in this table because the document from which the information was taken did not use a category labeled "white". However, these "other persons" referred to all students who were not American Indian, Black, Asian American or Spanish-Surname Americans. Given these exceptions, for this study, "other persons" are considered white.
b Based on 1976 enrollment figures.
C Based on 1978 enrollment figures.
d The document from which this information was taken used the heading "non-minority" rather than "other persons". Non-minority was defined as "white persons: (white) A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East. For the purpose of this study "non-minority" students are being characterized as "white".
e Based on 1975 enrollment figures.

Table 34
Middle and High Schools Converted to
Specialty Schools

| Year | School | Black Enrollment | Other Persons Enrolled ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1976 |  | Middle |  |
|  | Peckham ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | $716^{\text {c }}$ | 22 |
|  |  | High |  |
| 1977 | King | $1586{ }^{\text {d }}$ | 1 |
| 1978 | Juneau | $132{ }^{\text {e }}$ | 1139 |
| Totals: |  | 2434 | 1162 |

Note. The years used to determine the impact of Attendance Area schools being changed to Specialty Schools on enrollment of black and white students varies from year to year. This variance is a reflection of the inconsistent methodology used by MPS to record enrollment changes due to these conversions.
a Other persons is used as a category in this table because the document from which the information was taken did not use a category labeled "white". However, these "other persons" referred to all students who were not American Indian, Black, Asian American or Spanish-Surname Americans. Given these exceptions, for this study, "other persons" are considered white:
b Name later changed to Jackie Robinson.
C Based on 1974 enrollment figures.
d Based on 1975 enrollment figures.
e Based on 1976 enrollment figures.


#### Abstract

The conversion of attendance area schools to specialty schools was one reason for the dislocation of students from their attendance area. Another was the actual closing of attendance area schools. Therefore, the fourth and final research question pertains to the impact of school closings on student movement for desegregation purposes.


# Question 4: Did the Milwaukee Public School System use a pattern of school closings in a mamer that <br> resulted in a disproportionate burden of <br> dislocations being placed on black students? 

An examination of school closings between 1977 and 1979 disclosed the differential impact of those closings on black and white students. Tables 35 and 36 show that at the elementary school level 1,754 black students were affected while 1,209 whites were affected.

Table 35
Black and White Elementary School Closings (1977 - 1979)
$\left.\begin{array}{lccccc}\hline \text { Year } & \text { School } & \begin{array}{l}\text { Nc. Black } \\ \text { Eniolled }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { \% Black } \\ \text { Enrolled }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { No. White } \\ \text { Enrolled }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { \% White } \\ \text { Enrolled }\end{array} \\ \hline & \text { Black Elementary Schools }\end{array}\right]$.

White Elementary Schools

| 1977 | Wilson Park | 1 | .6 | 129 |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1978 | Warnimount | 24 | 29.6 | 54 |
| 1979 Mound St. | 45 | 18.5 | 155 | 66.5 |
| Total | 70 |  | 63.7 |  |
| Grand Total | 1024 |  | 350 |  |

Note. All of the enrollment figures are based on prior year attendance records.

Table 36

Integrated Elementary Schools Closed (1977 - 1979)

| Year | School | No. Black <br> Enrolled | \% Black <br> Enrolled | No. White <br> Enrolled | \% White <br> Enrolled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1978 | Carleton | 205 | 39.1 | 298 | 56.9 |
| 1978 | Jefferson | 141 | 47.4 | 122 | 41.0 |
| 1979 | Bartlett Av. | 136 | 49.4 | 120 | 43.6 |
| 1979 | Douglas Rd. | 55 | 36.6 | 85 | 56.5 |
| 1979 | Ludington | 59 | 40.6 | 83 | 57.6 |
| 1979 | $36 t h$ St. | 134 | 44.6 | 151 | 50.3 |
| Total | 730 |  | 859 |  |  |

Note. All of the enrollment figures are based on prior year attendance records.

MPS closed only one middle school (see Table 37) and no high schools during this period. Taking the one middle school closing with those at the elementary level, 1909 black'students and 1302 white students were affected by closings--a ratio of $1.46: 1$.

Table 37
Integrated Middle Schools Closed (1977-1979)

| Year | School | No. Black <br> Enrolled | \% Black <br> Enrolled | No. White <br> Enrolled | \% White <br> Enrolled |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1978 | Wells St. | 155 | 54.3 | 93 | 32.6 |

Note. All of the population figures are based on prior year attendance records.

By reviewing Tables 32 through 37 , it is possible to determine the combined impact of school closings and the conversion of attendance area schools to specialty schools on black and white students. The cumulative result of these two actions between 1977 and 1979 was the displacement/dislocation of 5,241 black students and 2,439 white students-a ratio of 2.15:1.

Summary
Although there is certainly more information available on this topic and there are other methods of presenting the data, the author believes that any objective analysis will reveal essentially the same results as this study.

The information presented in this chapter examined a variety of statistical indicators of the movement, for purposes of desegregation, of black and white students attending school in the Milwaukee Public School System. Included in this
presentation was information on the differences in the numbers and percentages of blacks and whites attending schools outside of their attendance area, including specific reference to those attending speciaty schools. Also presented were facts and figures on the differences in the number of schools to which students were dispersed once they left their attendance area. Finally, data was set forth concerning the number of black and white attendance area schools that were either closed or converted to specialty schools.

The presentation and analysis of this data will serve as the foundation for the conclusions to be drawn in the final chapter of this study.

## CHAPTER 5

Conclusions


#### Abstract

Judge John Reynolds' January 1976 decision declaring that Milwaukee's public school system was unconstitutionally segregated started the system down the road toward desegregation of its schools. By May of 1979, when the Judge approved an out-of-court settlement that ended a fourteen-year court battle, MPS was already two years into its desegregation effort. This settlement set new parameters for the percentages of black. students needed in each school in order for the school to be considered desegregated. It also dictated that by 1984,75 percent of all MES students be enrolled in schools that were desegregated. It is important to note here that the court's approval of the general settlement left to MPS a tremendous amount of discretion as to the process to be used in the implementation of the agreement.

As early as 1977, questions were raised about the disproportionate burden of dislocations on blacks to bring about desegregation. MPS itself initially acknowledged that there was indeed a disproportionate burden on black students but assured the community that as the program moved forward and was refined, the burden would become more equally shared between black and white communities.


The results of this study led the writer to conclude that rather than the "refinement" leading to a more equal sharing of the burden, it has, if anything, increased the burden shouldered by blacks. MPS has sytematically bused black students out of their attendance areas, closed schools in the black community, and converted other black attendance area schools to specialty schools to which neighborhood students had no attendance rights. These actions occurring prior to and during the period covered by this study, have made the maintenance of this disproportionate burden on blacks the system's modus operandi.

To understand what happened, when, and how, the reader should first recall that during the period covered by this study, the MPS black student population increased from 44 to 48 percent of the total population. During this same period the white student representation dropped from 47 to 41 percent of the total MPS population. According to Lois Quinn (1983), who has been involved in researching various practices of MPS for a number of years, this followed a trend which was evident even during the 1970 s. Quinn developed the table below which summarizes the change in the ethnic makeup of MPS's student population between 1970 and 1979.

## Summary of Ethnic Change: 1970-1979

|  | Total <br> Enrollment | White <br> Students | Black <br> Students | Hispanic <br> Students |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1970-71$ | 133,349 | 93,023 | 34,355 | 3,898 |
| $1979-80$ | 91,940 | 43,009 | 41,530 | 5,175 |
| Change | $-40,409$ | $-50,014$ | $+7,175$ | $+1,277$ |
| \%Change | $-30 \%$ | $-54 \%$ | $+21 \%$ | $+33 \%$. |

In that same paper, Quinin also states that of the 48 schools built in Milwaukee between 1950 and 1979, 38 were located in segregated white neighborhoods. This resulted in more and smaller white attendance areas and fewer and larger black attendance areas. To exacerbate this situation, MPS closed some schools in the black community and converted others to specialty schools. This further reduced the number of attendance area schools available to black students.

When the busing program was implemented, the MPS assignment guidelines contained within the Comprehensive Plan for Increasing Educational Opportunities and Improving Racial Balance in the Milwaukee Public Schools (1976) stated that each student would be assigned an attendance area and that ". . .preference will be given (to) the current residential population in attending an attendance area school when that population can be accommodated under racial balance requirements" (p. 25) These guidelines posed a double disadvantage for black students: (1) the fact
that black attendance areas were large in comparison with white attendance areas meant that it was not possible for all of the students to attend their attendance area school and, (2) since MPS would not bus adequate numbers of white students to black attendance area schools to achieve integration, most black students were left with no real choice. Their numbers mitigated against their meeting the accommodation criteria and since MPS would not bus many white students in, minimized their opportunities to attend racially balanced schools in their own attendance areas. For the vast majority of black students, chere was only one choice--to be bused to a school outside of their attendance area. MPS consistently took the position that black students were volunteering to leave. Harris (1983) referred to this type of voluntarism as characteristic of what came to be called "forced voluntary" desegregation plans. He wrote: In Milwaukee, blacks have had to bear the burden for desegregating the schools. School desegregation has relied upon a 'forced voluntary' plan that has closed down some older, black, inner-city schools. . .Because children in closed schools were forced to moved out of their neighborhood schools, but had some choice as to which new school they wanted to attend, this approach to desegregation became known as 'forced voluntary'. This . . . approach to desegregation can be contrasted to a 'voluntary' desegregation plan where pupils are

```
    not forced to move out of their neighborhood schools
    and can freely choose which school they wish to attend.
    (p. 427-428)
    For large numbers of white students the situation was
entirely different. They were allowed to remain in their
attendance area schools because their attendance areas were
smaller and black students were being bused in to promote
desegregation.
```

In 1977 Dave Bednarek, an education reporter for the Milwaukee Journal, raised the question of the burden on black students with Superintendent Lee McMurrin. McMurrin replied, "That whole concept of burden in Milwaukee is ridiculous. It is ridiculous to talk of burden when the parents and students are moving voluntarily. It would be very difficult for the court to object to black parents opting out of containment into a desegregated opportunity" (p. 36). At the heart of McMurrin's comment is an attempt to deny the manner in which black students have been parcelled out all over the city of Milwaukee in such a way that the guidelines of the court were being met and the wishes of whites not to be enrolled in black attendance area schools were being accommodated.

In the same planning document mentioned above, MPS stated its belief that providing for whites "the psychological guarantee of not having to attend a school that is predominantly minority will tend to stabilize the population in the city" (p. 97). This statement is a clear indication of the

Administration's intent from the very outset to emphasize first and foremost the concerns of whites. It is important to ask why MPS held such a belief. The writer believes that almost unknowingly, this statement reveals the kind of intolerant attitude about black people that existed throughout the MPS structure. That attitude was one that accepted the notion of the inherent cultural deficiency of the black community. Consequently, it was the "responsibility" of MPS to shield white students from exposure to this milieu. Unfortunately, far too many black people had also accepted this image as an accurate description of black community life.

It is with this understanding that we must return to the point that Harris made about choice. Given this overall perception of the black community, it was only natural that many blacks would "choose" to opt out of their "contained" environment for one that was desegregated. Because many black parents were aware that, in many instances, their children were not receiving a quality education, and given the belief that the lack of achievement on the part of their students was directly attributable to the social/cultural deficits of their community, black people were seduced by the plans developed by MPS that ultimately led to blacks bearing a disproportionate burden for desegregation. It was only later that the community realized that acceptance of this burden would not automatically result in a quality education for their children.

Earlier in this chapter specialty schools were mentioned in terms of their role in diminishing black students' options to attend schools in their own attendance area. In keeping with the MPS attitude about black people, specialty schools became another mechanism to accomplish two objectives: (1) the reinforcement of black inferiority and (2) the compounding of a disproportionate burden for desegregation on the black community.

To accomplish the first objective, it was standard MPS practice to take black attendance area schools that, while populated by poor black students, had been allowed to run down physically and deteriorate academically and to renovate them, change them from attendance area schools to specialty schools with innovative educational programs, and to bus whites and blacks from other attendance areas in to populate the school. At the same time rarious forms of administrative trickery were employed to discourage and, in some cases, even restrict the number of attendance area black students that could enroll in these schools.

To accomplish the second objective, specialty schools became another viable option for white students to avoid attending black attendance area schools while for blacks, specialty schools were an illusionary "choice". Table 38 documents the success of MPS in meeting these two objectives. Although the table provides data on the elementary level, a review of Appendix B shows that a similar situation exists at the other levels, particularly high school.

Table 38
Four-Year Comparison of Black and White Movement
at the Elementary Level Out of Their Respective Attendance Areas

| Year | Race | \% Moved to Desegregate | \% Move to Attend Specialty Schools | \% Moved Sideways |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1979 | Black | 80.2 | 7.2 | 12.6 |
|  | White | 34.7 | 20.9 | 44.4 |
| 1980 |  |  |  | $\cdots$ |
|  | Black | 78.0 | 14.2 | 7.8 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | White | 21.5 | 37.7 | 40.8 |
| 1981 | Black | 76.7 | 15.5 | 7.8 |
|  | White | 19.1 | 38.7 | 42.2 |
| 1982 | Black | 76.7 | 15.3 | 8.0 |
|  | White | 15.9 | 38.8 | 45.2 |

Note. Movement for desegregation is that which enhances racial balance.

Table 38 shows clearly that blacks, for the most part, were not enrolling in specialty schools in percentages comparable to whites nor were there substantial numbers or percentages of black students participating in sideways movement. On the other hand, more than $40 \%$ of all white students bused were bused sideways, and for the last three years covered in this study, another $40 \%$ were bused to specialty schools.

Clearly, the preponderance of the evidence presented in this study supports the writer's conclusion that, from 1979 until 1982, black students bore a disproportionate burden of dislocations to support school desegregation. Assurances were given by MPS in 1977 that the burden "would be made more equitable" in subsequent years of desegregation. The results of this study show that this simply has not occurred because, in essence, MPS has simply substituted a new form of discrimination, characterized by the disproportionate burden of dislocation of black students for the old form of discrimination, characterized by the containment or segregation of black students in black schools.

The Overview of the Issue in Milwaukee section of Chapter 1 and the Review of the Literature in Chapter 2 cite a number of authors for their contributions to various theoretical positions relating to issues dealt with in this study. In this section, the author will comment on some of these works. In some instances, assertions are upheld by the data collected during the course of the study. In other cases, the view of the various writers will be challenged in light of the data.

In the Overview of the Issue in Milwaukee section of the first chapter, an opinion was expressed that some blacks believed the Brown decision itself was based on racist assumptions and, as a result, it seemed to create a framework for a new form of discrimination. This view was one accepted and indeed espoused by this writer. It is now appropriate to examine this view in light of the material gathered and analyzed for this study.

One of the proponents of the idea that the Brown decision itself was racist is Nancy Arnez. Ms. Arnez (1978) argues that a problem developed because the Justices of the Supreme Court were misled by their reliance on certain social science literature that was cited in one of the footnotes ${ }^{5}$ to this decision. She claims that this literature was the key to the Justices' conclusion that segregation was only harmful to black children. She believes such an assumption was racist because "it purports
that there is no benefit that white children can gain from association with black children. Thus, basing their opinion on a racist assumption provided the impetus for the racist implementation of a national policy" (p. 29).

A critical examination of the literature cited in the footnote does not, in fact, support Ms. Arnez's contention. Even the Myrdal (1944) book which does contain some negative assertions about black culture and black community life, makes a point to support equality of educational opportunity. He stated, "the American nation will not have peace with its conscience until inequality is stamped out, and the principle of public education is realized universally" (p. 907). In all likelihood, the Justices used passages such as this from the book to support their decision.

The Deutschen and Chein (1948) study surveyed more than 800 social scientists (anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists). The result was an overwhelming condemnation of segregation even where supposedly "separate but equal facilities" existed. For example, one of the anthropologists stated that, "even if the facilities are equal, this can have no effect if the general atmosphere is one of discrimination" (p. 280).

The thrust of that part of Frazier's (1949) work cited in the decision was a condemnation of the forced separation of the races. He said, "the theory of separate but equal facilities has never worked out in practice. Separate education for Negroes has
always meant inferior schools and inferior teaching personnel for Negro children" (p. 674).

As noted earlier, the writer has been sympathetic with the opinion of authors such as Nancy Arnez. But after close examination of the Brown decision, and further research on the issue, the writer's opinion has changed. The facts clearly indicate that the two Brown decisions (Brown I and Brown II) taken as a whole, struck a blow against segregation. As Kluger (1976) suggested, "perhaps all the Supreme Court could do, short of risking massive insurrection, was to proclaim to the nation that the enforced separation of human beings by race was neither God's will nor the purpose of the constitution as amended after the Civil War" (p. 746).

It is the writer's view, therefore, that the Brown decisions were not, in tinemselves, based on racist tenets. On the contrary, these opinions were a direct attack against the racist practice of forced segregation of schools. As Kluger (1970) stated, "now the law says that, like them or not, white America may not humiliate colored Americans by setting them apart. Now the law says that black Americans must not be degraded by the state and their degradation used as an excuse to drive them further down" (p. 747).

It is crucial to recognize, however, that Arnez's point (1976) that desegregation has been implemented in a discriminatory fashion is valid. The writer now disagrees with the view that the Brown opinions, themselves, were racist, but
still concurs with the opinion of Arnez and others that the manner in which desegregation has been carried out in many cities throughout America is racist. In essence, a separation must be made here between Brown I and Brown II. Brown II left the implementation of desegregation to the various school boards throughout the country. And although parameters were established to help support the decline of desegregation, concepts like "good faith implementation" and "practical flexibility in shaping remedies", helped create an atmosphere that allowed for not only stalliag, but situations in which racist views that already existed became part of the fabric of the school desegregation efinort.

The point being made here speaks to the fact that racism was not ended by the Brown decision. The racist views that were a part of this society were retained and therefore reflected in the implementation of desegregation plans. They were used not only to circumvent or slow the dictums of Brown, but also to actually "stand the decision on its head".

One of the keys to implementing Brown in a discriminatory fashion was the allegation or assumption of the existence of cultural deprivation and pathological conditions in the black community. These "conditions" made it unwise, indeed unsafe, for white children to attend schools in the black community. Just as there was literature to support the decision to end forced segregation of schools, there was literature lending credence to
the idea of black inferiority. Interestingly enough, there is a passage in Myrdal's book that relates directly to this point. Myrdal stated:

In practically all its divergences, American Negro culture is not something independent of general American culture. It is a distorted development, or a pathological condition, of the general American culture. The instability of the Negro family, the inadequacy of educational facilities for Negroes, the emotionalism of the Negro church, the insufficiency and unwholesomeness of Negro recreational activity, the plethora of Negro sociable organizations, the narrowness of interests of the average Negros the provincialism of his political speculation, the high Negro crime rate, the cultivation of the arts to the neglect of other fields, superstition, personality difficulties, and other characteristics are mainly forms of social pathology which, for the most part, are
created by cast pressures" (p. 928-29).

David Ausubel (1963) talked of black people being damaged. He said, "the stigma of the (Negro child's) caste membership is inescapable and insurmountable. It is inherent in his skin color; permanently ingrained in his body images." (p. 37) There were other studies charging that poor kids, a disproportionate number of whom are black, lived in neighborhoods that retarded the development of their academic potential
(Deutsch, 1967; Hunt, 1969). This led to efforts to get these children out of their neighborhoods--out of the "pathological conditions" that surrounded them.

The kind of thinking represented by these authors helped foster the idea that the only way a black person could escape this "pathology" was to be removed from his or her own environment. Thus, only if blacks were put into a "really integrated school" could there be any hope of getting a quality education. A "really integrated school" was defined as one which was predominantly white (over 60 percent) or as close to 50-50 as possible. This idea that it was necessary to have a school at least 50 percent white to be considered integrated, was first written into educational policy in 1963 by the State Commission of Education for New York State. This policy made it clear that any school that was more than 50 percent black was racially imbalanced and therefore incapable of providing equal educational opportunity.

The stage was then set for "racial balance" methods of integration. These methods set clear quotas on the number of blacks that could be allowed in a given school at any one time. Normally, the "acceptable" range was 80 percent to 60 percent white and conversely 20 percent to 40 percent black. This also opened the way for one-way busing (blacks to white schools--but not vice versa) and the closing of schools in the black community, while moving to accommodate the wishes of whites to
remain in their neighborhood schools. Obviously, if black schools and communities were "culturally inferior", one could not ask a white student to go into such an environment and "suffer the problems that afflict the black student".

It is the writer's conclusion, then, that implicitly and sometimes explicitly, the idea of an inferior and "sick" black community did indeed play a significant role in determining the means used to desegregate schools in Milwaukee and probably in most other American cities.

This then represents the theoretical views that needed to be reassesed from the Overview of the Issue in Milwaukee portion of Chapter 1. The next part of the review and reassessment of the literature will concentrate on theoretical points relating to the research questions posed in this dissertation.

There were four areas in the literature that served as central points of emphasis for this study: (a) school closings, (b) specialty schools [or magnet schools], (c) busing, and (d) neighborhood schools.

## School Closings

The question of equity in the school closings process is an important consideration. One of the contentions of the black community is that more schools have been closed in the black community than in the white community. Cronin (1977) emphasized the importance of equity in the closing of schools. He cautioned against implementing a school closings program that was not shared equally by both races. In Milwaukee, during the period


#### Abstract

covered by this study, there was an "intellectual commitment" to equity, but as the integration process developed, the very dangers Cronin warned against became standard practice. Rather than equity, inequity resulted as the black community found itself bearing a disproportionate burden in the school closings process. This lack of equity along with other disproportionate burdens associated with desegregation, caused a change in attitude in the black community; where there was once strong support for desegregation, there is now increasing hostility. Unfortunately, the perspective raised in Cronin's article was not the operational framework for Milwaukee's desegregation program.


## Specialty Schools (Magnet Schools)

One of the crucial components of Milwaukee's desegregation program was the establishment of specialty schools. Rice (1977) made the point that in the cities that he visited, individual specialty schools did not voluntarily attract students in numbers representative of any city's particular racial balance. Milwaukee definitely deviated from this pattern, as some individual specialty schools did "attract" students from each race in numbers that closely approximated their percentage of the total student population in the system. (It is unclear whether Rice was using school system population or city population in his article). It is important to note here, however, that the Milwaukee experience with specialty schools clearly favored the white community. It is unclear, however, what proportions of the


#### Abstract

population in the various specialty schools were there on a "voluntary" basis. However, the results of this study would seem to call into question Rice's conclusion that individual specialty schools did not attract students in numbers roughly comparable to their percentage of the student population, as this did happen for some specialty schools in Milwaukee.

Bottomly (1977) cautioned against closing attendance area schools in black communities and then re-opening them as specialty schools, forcing black students from those attendance areas to attend schools elsewhere. He found this to be a particular problem when there was not equal involvement of blacks in decision making. In Milwaukee, the process in most cases proceeded in exactly the manner Bottomly cautioned against. A prime example of this problem was the case involving North Division High School (see Appendix B).

One of the problems associated with reassessing the point made by Bottomly, is determining when the decision-making can be characterized as "equal". In the North Division situation, for example, the three black board members voted for the plan, although the vast majority of the black community opposed it. MPS used the support of these three board members to justify its decision. Further, even if the black members had opposed the decision, it would still have been possible for white board members to out-vote them. The question must be asked, When can the decision making process be considered equal?

It is the writer's contention that each decision has to be


It is the writer's contention that each decision has to be viewed within che context of all of the decisions made during a desegregation effort. The issue is not so much "equal" decision making around where a specialty school will be placed as it is a question of making certain that a disproportionate burden for desegregation is not placed on any one racial group in the community (in almost all cases this group has been black). Furthermore, a process has to be established that involves the affected communities in a meaningful way in the decisions made about the establishment and placement of specialty schools.

Another important issue involving specialty schools was raised by Orfield (1978). He postulated that specialty schools in large cities were placed in white communities or transition communities because whites would not come into black communities to attend these schools. This was not the case in Milwaukee. In fact, the Milwaukee experience was the exact opposite, as most specialty schools were placed in black communities. In Milwaukee, Orfield's views were right on target for attendance area schools, but not specialty schools. There was, however, an interesting twist in Milwaukee's plan. In most instances, when a specialty school was placed in the black community, the school became off limits to the neighoorhood students.

The desegregation program in Milwaukee consisted largely of creating special education environments and then bringing whites and, in most cases, a new population of blacks (from outside of the original attendance area) in. Although the writer did not
research this issue, there is a suspicion that socio-economic or class status played a significant role in determining the make-up of the school's new student population. Thus, although Orfield's contention was not substantiated in the strictest sense, there seems to have been some effort to satisfy his basic premise-that most specialty school plans are designed to satisfy the concerns of whites.

## Busing

One of the most significant works discussed in the Busing section of the literature review in Chapter 2 was The Coleman Report. Some of the conclusions set forth in this study served as strong ammunition for proponents of desegregation programs which placed an emphasis on busing black students out of their communities. The rationale for supporting such a program was based on the alleged inability of the black community to maintain schools in which the atmosphere expected or encouraged high academic achievement on the part of students.

The report concluded that student achievement was enhanced when students were exposed to other students with strong educational backgrounds and high aspirations. In this writer's view, in Milwaukee it became accepted as "fact" that such backgrounds and aspirations did not exist in any significant degree among students from the black community. The supporters of this position believed that the only way to achieve desegregation and to achieve effective education was to bus black
children.

The writer vehemently disagrees with this philosophical view. Fortunately, there is a entirely new body of literature, the school effectiveness literature, that makes it very clear that irrespective of race or class, all children can learn. The proponents of the effective school movement believe that high academic achievement can take place in poor, minority communities provided that students attend schools that (a) exhibit strong educational leadership, particularly on the part of the school principal, (b) have a curriculum that emphasizes the acquisition of basic skills, (c) have caring and effective teachers, (d) an orderly school environment, and (e) have high expectations for its students. (There is a growing body of empirical evidence to support these contentions).

Throughout this country, poor black children attending schools in their local communities are learning. It is the position of this writer that proponents of "busing out" who continue to use the Coleman Report as a foundation for one-way busing programs are dead wrong!

Neighborhood Schools
In reviewing the literature on neighborhood schools, most of the evidence supports at least one of four perspectives (see pp. 50-51) on the topic. The writer will touch on some of the literature that relates to each of these perspectives taken separately or in some combination.

Many people in Milwaukee, black and white, probably share

Blackman's (1964) views about the objectives and benefits of neighborhood schools. Along with the fact that neighborhood schools mean safe, quick, and inexpensive accessibiiity for children (because the schools typically were within walking distance), they allow children to have classmates as after school playmates and they make it convenient for parents to return to school for after school activities. When the school is located close to home, it is easier and more likely that parents will be more involved in the schools thus helping to increase the bond between the community's values and the school's academic and social mission. From a cost-benefit perspective, these views make sense.

The question that arose in Milwaukee, however, was how to capitalize on these benefits and at the same time break up a system of school segregation brought about in part because of segregated housing patterns. The views espoused by Blackman became a rallying cry for those who wanted to keep neighborhood schools, even if it meant maintaining segregated schools.

Many of the participants in this debate took the same position as described by Zwerdling (1976) in his article on the National Action Group (NAG)--that their opposition to busing was in no way related to race; rather it was related to the importance of neighborhood schools for all of the reasons outlined by Blackman.

The writer found Blackman's article to be particularly
helpful in conceptualizing those ideas about the value of neighborhood schools that allow parents and community leaders to stand "for" neighborhood schools without having to stand "against" integration. This certainly was the case in Milwaukee. While it is unlikely that every white person who cited these facts did so to camouflage anti-integration sentiments, or every black to conceal separatists ideas, both black a white parents used the very same arguments in voicing their support for neighborhood schools.

As stated earlier, the clash came when the neighborhood school concept came up against the effort to end segregation in schools. This was not just a philosophical battle but one that spilled over into the judicial system of this country with the advent of the Brown decision and, in Milwaukee, with the Craig Amos et al decision discussed earlier in this study.

Many Milwaukee supporters of school desegregation, shared the same view on neighborhood schools as did the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights (1972). The Commission saw the neighborhood school concept as a relic standing in the way of the educational progress they believed possible through desegregation. The writer believes that the Commission's view was incorrect, although their reasons for making the assertion were rooted in progressive intentions. That is to say, the Commission was fighting against the popular idea that the neighborhood school concept could be used to block desegregation. Yet, to take the position that supporting neighborhood schools was the same as
"turning back the clock" on the desegregation movement was, for this writer, an extreme view.

There are good reasons for the existence of neighborhood schools. The problem is how to ensure that black and white students have equal access to neighborhood schools, and when it becomes necessary to dislocate students for desegregation purposes, to make sure that the burden of that dislocation is shared equally.

## Suggestions for Additional Research


#### Abstract

During the course of this study several issues surfaced that seem to warrant additional study. Listed below are recommendations for additional research in areas directly or indirectly related to the subject matter of the present study.


1. A study is needed of the role that Chapter $220^{6}$ has played in the movement of students within the city of Milwaukee during the four-year period covered by this study. Such an investigation would be an important addition to our understanding of the overall impact of Chapter 220 on the busing of black students as a part of Milwaukee's school desegregation process. A study of Chapter 220 should be a school-by-school analysis of which students, as a result of their being bused under Chapter 220, generated additional revenue for MPS from the state.
2. The writer is aware of at least one dissertation which has been done on equal opportunity and the politics of the Milwaukee School System. However, this study (Vorlop, 1970) was completed prior to 1976. It would be extremely valuable to have the same type of "political study" made of MPS covering the period 1974 through 1983. Such a study would shed additional light on the inner workings of the Board and the Administration during this period when the desegregation plan was initiated and subsequently implemented.
3. There is a study currently underway that is evaluating
the quality of the educational programs offered in the Milwaukee metropolitan area. If this study does not delve into the grades, suspensions, dropout rates, and achievement levels of each student, at each grade level, in each school broken down by race for the period covered by this study, then a study of this nature should be conducted. This type of information would give the Milwaukee community a better understanding of the impact desegregation has had on students' grades, achievement levels, and overall attitude about education.
4. A study of the impact of school closings in the black community and the conversion of black attendance area schools to specialty schools on black children's access to Head Start programs is needed. This is an important issue because lack of access to Head Start prevents black children from getting an early start in their formal education. Also it is through Head Start that many parents get their "feet wet" in dealing with the MPS bureaucracy.

## Footnotes

${ }^{1}$ The Brown decision was actually a ruling in four separate cases that had been brought to the Supreme Court. They were the Kansas case, Brown vs. Board of Education, the plaintiffs being black children of elementary school age residing in Topeka; the South Carolina case, Briggs vs. Elliott, the plaintiffs being black children of elementary school age living in Clarendon County; the Virginia case, Davis vs. County School Board, in which the plaintiffs were children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County; and the Delaware case, Gebhart Vs. Belton, the plaintiffs being black children of both elementary and high school age living in New Castle County.
${ }^{2}$ The wording here is correct. Evidently the man stuttered.
${ }^{3}$ Coleman and his colleagues made the point that one of the ways that white parents responded to desegregation was simply withdrawing their children from public schools. They called this process white flight. Pettigrew and Green (1976) referred to this use of white flight in their response to Coleman. They said, "There are two main forms of what is commonly called 'white flight' from the schools: (1) white students being withdrawn from public schools undergoing desegregation and being enrolled in private or religious schools; and (2) white students being withdrawn from public schools as they and their families move from cities undergoing school desegregation to cities or suburbs not undergoing school desegregation. In both cases 'white flight' implies that withdrawal is caused by school

[^4]

$00000000000000000-000000000000000000000000 \mathrm{N000}$

\# blacks
SENT OIIT
A AA WHITES
ATTDNG IN AA




AA
BLA




TOTAL
STUDEN
IN AA
* AA BLACKs
ATTDNG IN AA
Elementary School5-1979
ATTENDANCE
AREA

Table A-1












| $\stackrel{0}{0}$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| $\stackrel{5}{5}$ |  |  |  |




|  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |



Table A-1
Elementary Schools-1979 attendance GRANUILLE CT.
IRVING







| $\underset{\sim}{\text { ® }}$ | OMOMnNoma <br>  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 亩々 |  |





| ${ }_{2}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| - |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \frac{9}{4} \underset{\sim}{4} \\ & \times \underset{4}{4} \end{aligned}$ |  |


|  |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbb{T}_{3}$ |  |
| E |  |


|  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |



WHITES

Table A-1

(a) integrated white/his
$000000000000000000000000000000000000000-10000000000-$





$\stackrel{*}{4}$


| $\frac{7}{3}$ |
| ---: |
| -2 |
| -2 |
| 2 |



$\underset{*}{*}$


                TOTAL \#
    STUDENTS
IN AA

                ㄹ ..... STUDEN
    IN AA

##  <br> 


School.

at elact
atenting








保
$\qquad$



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


| Schom. |
| :---: |
|  |
| ghinton |
| HAFGY HILL. |
| GFOWNING |
| HAWTHOFNE |
| Stupy |
| Himpeton |
| cafleton |
| fritiney |
| hi mount elvd. |
| integrated ant |
| SHERMAN |
| rluge |
| WIS AVE. |
| pierce |
| OTH STREET |
| CONGFESS |
| STRD Street |
| joth streer |
| FDAEST HUME AV(a) |
| (a) INTEGRATED <br> (INHI TE/HISFANIC) |
|  |  |
|  |
| + ILEOURN |
| :27th Street |
| HOLMES |
| -1st street |
| Clemiens |
| PAL. P ER |
| $24 T H$ STREET |
| SILvefr SFiring |
| SIEFERT |
| CLAFit: |
| Brolun |
| EEFEGER |
| auer ave. |
| GFEEN EAY AVE. 20TH STFEET |
|  |  |
|  |
| garden homes |
| LfFOLLEtTE |
| Frant lin |
| 9th Street |
| E.L. FHillif |
| teefe ave. |
| HLFF INS |
|  |
| ALiEN: FIEID |
| - MEEL |
| VIECU |


| SCHODL | \# other sch fec Aá Elt's | * DTHEF SC.H REE GA WHTS | ELAChs SENT IN | WHITES <br> SENT IN | TTL STULENTS | TIL ELAGT. f.TTENDING | TTL WHITE ATtENDING | $\begin{aligned} & \because \text { ELACIK } \\ & \text { ATTENDING } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Stuart | - 4 | 9 | 108 | 27 | 317 | 149 | 158 | $47.00 \%$ |
| EARTON | 4 | 16 | 201 | 31 | 601 | 295 | $30 \%$ | 47.42\% |
| mafFy hill | 10 | 14 | 164 | 41 | 419 | 204 | 205 | 45.69\% |
| EROWNiNG | 9 | 15 | 125 | 124 | 496 | $19 \%$ | 280 | 38.31\% |
| hawthokne | 17 | 18 | 146 | 5 | 464 | 231 | 212 | 49.78\% |
| Stoky | 18 | 15 | 67 | 93 | 433 | 142 | 205 | 32.79\% |
| HAMPTON | 16 | 20 | 55 | 29 | 464 | 175 | 294 | 37.72\% |
| CARLETON | 25 | 24 | 70 | 12 | Siob | 181 | 207 | 35.77\% |
| fratney | 21 | 16 | 31 | 22 | 360 | 139 | 140 | 38.61\% |
| hi mount blvd. | 48 | 33 | 82 | 27 | 500 | 205 | 247 | 41.00\% |
| integrated an's |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sherman | 53 | 29 | 181 | 22 | 564 | 285 | 299 | 50.53\% |
| Kluge | 28 | 25 | 114 | 96 | 69.0) | 297 | 357 | 43.04\% |
| WIS AVE. | 23 | 13 | 49 | $6{ }^{6}$ | 510 | 18: | 120 | 35.29\% |
| Fiefice | 47 | 18 | 28 | 15 | 579 | 217 | 142 | 37.48\% |
| 37TH STFEET | 64 | 32 | 18 | 14 | 4819 | 227 | 173 | 47.29\% |
| CONGRESS | 32 | 19 | 36 | 56 | 445 | 198 | 23.4 | 44.49\% |
| 5.3kD Street | 42 | 17 | 119 | 22 | 35. | 189 | 161 | 53.54\% |
| 3STH STREET | 44 | 23 | $1{ }^{10}$ | 10 | 305 | 168 | 119 | 55.68\% |
| FDREST HOME AV(a) <br> (a) INTEGRATED | - | 30 | 125 | 53 | 575 | 129 | 247 | 22.43\% |
| (WHITE/HISFANIC) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Flact: AA'S |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.12 bourn | 23 | 17 | 48 | 2 | 467 | 231 | 15: | 56.76\% |
| 27 TH SIfEET | 82 | 27 | 40 | 3 | 618 | 285 | $1 \approx 6$ | 46.12\% |
| holmes | 54 | 11 | 45 | - | 700 | 404 | 20 | 66.29\% |
| 31 St Stieet | 75 | 18 | 21 | 79 | 475 | 227 | 149 | 47.99\% |
| CLEMENS | 31 | 16 | 34 | 5 | 197 | 176 | 18 | 89.34\% |
| FALmer | 48 | B | 日1 | 2 | 529 | 473 | 12 | 89.58\% |
| 24 TH STFEET | 44 | 8 | 38 | - | 381 | 34.2 | 37 | $87.47 \%$ |
| Silver sfring | 35 |  | 27 | 16 | 291 | 24. | 8 | 83.85\% |
| SIEFEFT | 76 | 12 | 38 | 2 | 48, | 471 | 11 | 96.52\% |
| Clati | 100 55 | 17 | 23 | 1 | . 447 | 4.4 | 10 | 97. $109 \%$ |
| EROWN | 55 |  | 68 | 3 | $9{ }^{\text {9\% }}$ | 3.9 .9 | 5 | 96.57\% |
| EERGEF Aluek ave. | 79 | 4 | 35 | 0 | 594 | 591 | 3 | 99.49\% |
| AUJER AVE, GREEN EAY AVE. | 95 67 | $1{ }^{10}$ | 48 | 0 | 550 | 54.5 | 3 | 99.09\% |
| 2OTH STREET | 67 82 | 2 | 31 45 | 47 | 58 | $57 \%$ | \% | 98.8\%\% |
| LeE | 84 |  | 65 | 2 | 5 | S2\% | 7 | $97.57 \%$ |
| GARDEN Hames | 67 |  | 32 | 5 | 425 | 422 | 9 | 97.40\% |
| LAFOLLETTE | 91 | 5 | 130 | \% | 685 | 679 | 2 | 99.12\% |
| FRANALIM | 79 | 4 | 56 | $\because$ | 75 | 220 | 0 | 99.31\% |
| 9th Street | 80 | $\stackrel{2}{9}$ | - | 37 | 421 | 426 | - | 97.76\% |
| keefe ave. | 79 | 1 | 48 | 3 | 624 | ¢ 20 | : | $82.52 \%$ $99.30 \%$ |
| HOPKins | 95 | 1 | 38 | \% | 701 | 695 | 2 | $98.80 \%$ |
| hispanic abs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Allen field | 1 | 31 | 30 | 39 | 9 e | -t | 710 | 3.67\% |
| ${ }_{\substack{\text { KAGEL } \\ \text { VIEAU }}}$ | 1 | 29 | $\bigcirc$ | 19 | 426 | 2 | 129 | 9.37\% |
| vieau | 1 | 8 | 22 | 49 | 041 | 23 | 96 | 3.59 |




 ..... 『『



$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Table } A-z \\
& \text { Elementary Schools-19E1 }
\end{aligned}
$$

            H OTHEF SCH
    REC AB ELKS


Table $A-3$
Table $A$ Elementary
SCHOOL

## LANCASTER <br> MAFLLE TREE 6STH STREE

STORY
GROINNING
Graluning
HAMFTON
CAFLETON
FFATNEY
FRATNEY
INTEGRATED AA＇S
HI MRUNT ELVD．

路 OTHER SCh fiec AA




可品

 － $\operatorname{ra}^{\text {a }}$ $-\mathrm{CH}_{2}$
 NOTHER SC
REC AA WHT









 WHITES
SENT INL
STUDENTS


|  |
| :---: |
| SCHOOL |
| LANCASTEK |
| mafrle tree |
| 6 STH STREET |
| STARY |
| EROINNING |
| hanthorine |
| HAMPTON |
| CAFLETON |
| fratney |
| INTEGRATED AA＇S |
| HI MLUNT ELVD． |
| Sherman |
| kluge |
| WIS AVt |
| F．1Eh ${ }^{\text {－}}$ E |
| CONGRESS |
| S3RD STREET |
| 37 TH STREET |
| 35TH STREET |
| FOREST HOME AV（a） <br> （a）INTEGRATED WHITE； |
|  |  |
|  |
|  |
| HOLIMES |
| ZJTH STREET |
|  |  |
|  |
| SIFFERT |
| CLFMENS |
| 24 TH STREET |
| SII UFEF SFFidug |
| Cl．ARt |
| EFKGEFF |
|  |
| FFiAN：I＿ 1 N |
| GAFIDEN HOMES |
| AUEF Pive． |
| POTH STREET |
|  |  |
|  |
| E．L．FHillif． |
| L．afollette |
| 9TH STREE 1 |
| teEEFE fiVE． HOEY INS |
|  |  |
|  |
| P＇AGEI |
| Aliten fiellj |
| vieall |










n

$\stackrel{5}{2}$


\# blacis
SENT OUT
AAG WHITES
ATTUNG IN AA
¢
告




$0000000000000000000000000000000000004+000-0000$
-
A

Schools-190
SCH

Table A-4










1able A-4
Elementar: Schools-1982

Table A-4
EROWMING HANTHOKNE
HAMFTON
CARLETON CAFILETON



| Table A-4 |
| :---: |
| Elementary Schools-1902 |
| SCHODL |
| thuriehu |
| Ifiving |
| HAFFY HIAL |
| BAFTON |
| Lancastef: |
| GSTH STREET |
| MAFLE TREE |
| Stokiy |
| EFiOWMING |
| HANTHOKNE |
| HAMP'TON |
| CAFLETON |
| FFATNE:Y |
| IWTEGRATED AA'S |
| Hi-molint Elvd. |
| SHEEMAN |
| FIEFCE |
| tluge |
| GJFil ETFiEET |
| WISCONSIN GVE. |
| CONGEESS |
| FOFEST HCMME A?(a) |
| (i) INTEGFATED WHIITE/ |
| HISFANIC |
| Elact AA'S |
| 3STH STREET |
| 37TH STREET |
| 1/IL LOUFN |
| H04.MES |
| 3157 STfiect |
| CLIEMEAS |
| 27th StFEET |
| giefert |
| FAL MEF |
| $24 T H$ StFitet |
| SILVEF SFFING |
| Cilfifi |
| HEFiSEH |
| Aljer ave. |
| EFiOW |
| GAFADEN HOMES |
| FFiANI I. IN |
| green eat ave. |
| LeE |
| lafollette |
| E.l. Fhitiof |
| 2OTH STFEET |



$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { H AF, ELA } \\
& \text { ETTDNG }
\end{aligned}
$$

|  | \# Elafles |  | \# WHITE5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| - Elacis | SENT TO | H WHITES | SENT T |
| SENT OUT | ELI: AA'S | SENT OUT | WHT AA'S |
| 813 | 09 | 5 | $\therefore$ |
| 285 | 81 | 2 | . |
| 279 | 47 | 2 | 2 |
| 3 | 1 | 105 | 42 |
| 1 | 0 | 71 | 20 |
| 1 | $\dot{\square}$ | 12 |  |

N艺

| Elementary Schools-1982 |
| :---: |
| SCHOOL |
| HOFIINS ST. 9TH STREET |
|  |  |
|  |
| HISFAINIC AA'S |
| Allien field |
| FiAGEL |
| vieau |


| TTL WHITE | $\%$ ELACI |
| ---: | ---: |
| ATTENDING ATTENDING |  |
| $z$ | $98.73 \%$ |
| 0 | $98.97 \%$ |
| 0 | $103.60 \%$ |
|  |  |
| 228 | $6.53 \%$ |
| 105 | $2.63 \%$ |
| 43 | $6.17 \%$ |

TTL ELACE：
ATTENDING
701
385
546

61
11
27

$0=0 \quad$ Mgo
WHITES
SENT IN
から领 $\hat{N}^{\circ}$
ELACR:S
SENT
MNN すG~M
H OTHER SC
REC AA WHT

Table A-4
Elementar: Schools-19日2
sChool
HOFYINS 5 T.
QTH STREET
YEEFE AVE.
HISFANIC GA'S
ALLEN FIELD
RAGEL
VAGEL
VIEAU
Table A-5

| Name of School | TTL <br> Students | TTL Black Attending | TTL White Attending | \% Black Attending |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Specialty Schools-1979 |  |  |  |
| Golda Meir | 232 | 88 | 134 | 37.93 |
| Lloyd | 469 | 201 | 234 | 42.86 |
| E1m | 379 | 136 | 223 | 35.88 |
| McDowell | 516 | 228 | 237 | 44.19 |
| 21st St. | 672 | 285 | 349 | 42.41 |
| Garfield | 281 | 136 | 114 | 48.40 |
| Townsend | 495 | 217 | 219 | 43.84 |
| 38 th St. | 466 | 233 | 167 | 50.00 |
| Hawley | 307 | 123 | 163 | 40.07 |
| 55th St. | 215 | 89 | 122 | 41.40 |
| 82nd St. | 277 | 148 | 122 | 53.42 |
| Special Program Schools-1979 |  |  |  |  |
| Gaenslen | 149 | 68 | 72 | 45.64 |
| Manitoba Orthopedic | 83 | 15 | 58 | 25.86 |
| Neeskra-Hearing | 44 | 9 | $34^{\circ}$ | 26.47 |
| Oklahoma Binner | 30 | 8 | 19 | 26.67 |

[^5]Table A-5
Elementary Specialty Schools


[^6]Table A-5


[^7]Table A-5

## Elementary Specialty School.s

and Special Program Schools (1979-1982)

| Name of School | TLL <br> Students | TTL Black Attending | TTL White Attending | \% Black Attending |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Specialty Schools-1982 |  |  |  |  |
| 21st St. | 642 | 331 | 253 | 51.56 |
| Golda Meir | 246 | 104 | 131 | 42.28 |
| 82nd St. | 370 | 142 | 205 | 38.38 |
| Hawley | 295 | 128 | 141 | 43.39 |
| Townsend St. | 514 | 259 | 219 | 50.39 |
| 55th St. | 238 | 89 | 116 | 37.39 |
| McDowell | 597 | 268 | 273 | 44.89 |
| Elm | 420 | 178 | 229. | 42.38 |
| 38th St: | 494 | 224 | 144 | 45.34 |
| Garfield Ave. | 260 | 143 | 76 | 55.00 |
| Special Program Schools-1982 |  |  |  |  |
| Gaenslen | 161 | 75 | 74 | 46.58 |
| Manitoba Orthopedic | 92 | 24 | 54 | 26.09 |

[^8]| $\stackrel{4}{5} \stackrel{0}{5}$ |  | $\pm$ | ががー |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\underset{y}{c}$ |  |  |  |
|  | $\because 6 こ れ こ 00080$ | $=$ | むむシミシ |







Table A-6
1979
able A-6

INTEGRATED AA•S
(WHITE/HISPANIC)
NOSCIUSZI:O
mack $A$ 's
FULITON
FAFI:MAN


Table A-b
Table A-O
Madde Schools, 1979


|  | $\stackrel{\sim}{\square}$ |
| :---: | :---: |

\# WHI
SENT



$\stackrel{\Phi}{\Phi}$

Table A-7


TOTAL
STUDEN

| Middie Sctiools. 198 |
| :---: |
| SCHOOL |
| WHITE AA'S |
| FFITSCHE |
| Alidugon |
| EEIL |
| WALkEf |
| SHDLES |
| EUFiFiROUGHS |
| MORSE |
| WFilGHT |
| WEESTEF |
| MUIF |
| INTEGKATED AA'S (WHITE/HISFANIC) |
| r.osciuszio |
| El.ACF: AA'S |
| EDISON |
| FAFikman |
| STEUEEN |
| FOOSE VELT |
| FII, TON |

[^9]






H OTHER SC
KEC AA WHT
\# OTHER SCH
REC AA BLKS

0
0
0
Table A-7
M1ddle School $S_{1}$
SCHOOL
WHITE AA'S

INTEGFATED AA'S
(WHITE/HISFANIC)
ELACR AA'S
 ATEUEEN
RODSEVELT SPECIALTY SCHOOLS
BTH STREET
ROEINGON BTH STKEET
ROEINSON

> Tatile A-B Table A－B
Middle Srhanles 1981
SCHOOL WHITE AA＇S GELLL
FRITSCHE
WALRER
ALDUBON
SHRLES
EURRFOUGH
MORSE
WEESTER
WFIIGHT
MUIR INTEGKATED AA＇S
（WHITE／HISFFANIC）
ROSCIUSZKO ELACE：AA＇S
STEUEEN


 IN





 \＃WHITES
SENT OUT
OEnNmmNo
$-\quad \begin{array}{r}\operatorname{an} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0\end{array}$ \＃BLACIS
SENT DUT A AÁ WHITES
ATTDNG IN AA


 \＃AA ELACKS
ATTDNG IN AA

空会
 TOT
STU
IN

 －Sosormin $\therefore$路
Table A-G
Modile schools. 1981
\# OTHEF SCh
FEC AA FLKS

| \# Othef SCh fec af flis | ( OTHEF SCH REC AA WHTS | ELACIS <br> SENT IN | whites sent in | Til students | TTL ELACK ATTENDING | TTL WHITE GTTENEING | \% ELACI: attending |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | 63.3 | 277 | 335 | 43.76\% |
| 0 | 5 | 277 | 81 | 785 | 331 | 418 | 92.17\% |
| 1 | 11 | 308 | 11 | 861 | 511 | $4{ }^{422}$ | 48.72\% |
| 1 | 7 | 322 | 45 | 663 | 323 234 | 329 | 36.11\% |
| 1 | 6 | $\frac{235}{353}$ | $\stackrel{25}{25}$ | ${ }^{648}$ | 414 | 445 | 47.21\% |
| 4 |  | 275 | 23 | 533 | 307 | 219 | 57.60\% |
| $\stackrel{4}{7}$ | 9 | 320 | 22 | 760 | 4697 | $3{ }^{3}$ | ${ }_{57}^{57.54 \%}$ |
| 12 | 6 | 282 | ${ }_{3}^{48}$ | 579 843 | 332 490 | 333 | 58.13\% |
| в | 8 | 346 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | 11 | 68 | 29 | 74 | 70 | 280 | 9.43\% |
|  |  |  |  | 892 | 507 | 302 | 5t. $80 \%$ |
| 17 | 12 | ${ }_{64}$ | 40 | 613 | 361 | 198 | 58.89\% |
| 16 17 | 12 | 36 | 2 | 414 | 388 397 | 3 |  |
| 17 | 5 | 80 | 0 | 404 47 | 472 | 0 | 99.70\% |
| 17 | 4 | 32 |  | 97. |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 371 | 1213 | $1 \equiv 1$ | $57.41 \%$ $46.27 \%$ |
|  |  | 149 | 149 | 322 | 2149 | 149 | 46.27\% |



| $\frac{4}{4}$ |  | T |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 准嗞奀 |  |  |  |
| $\stackrel{n}{3} C_{i}^{c}$ | 20000000m | $=$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| $\stackrel{\text { 出ち}}{\stackrel{\text { 号 }}{ }}$ |  | 思 |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Tis } \\ & =3 \\ & y \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |
| 号官 |  | － |  |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\stackrel{n}{n}$ |  |
| $\frac{e^{2}}{e^{2}}$ |  |  |  |
|  |  | s |  |
| 先足 |  |  |  |
| 苛这 |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\stackrel{\square}{\square}$ |  |
| ： |  |  |  |
|  |  <br>  | $\stackrel{1}{1}$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| 通 |  | － | ${ }^{2}$ |
| $\pm$ |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\cdots$ |  |

[^10]| － |  | $\stackrel{\text { A }}{ }$ |  | ＊＊＊ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\stackrel{\circ}{\circ}$ |  | 安 |
|  |  | $\stackrel{0}{4}$ | Nindomo | 㙖 |



 SHOLES WALTEE
AUDUEON
GUFFFOUGHS URFRE WERSTER S．$\forall 甘$ g3L＊ygヨlini OSCiuszko BLACR AA．S
STEUEEN DISON
DOSEVELT
ULTON
PARKMAN SFECIALTY
日TH STEEET
FOEINSON

Table A-10
H2gh Schnolf. 1974
WHITE AA'S HAY VIEW
FULASE I
SOUTH DIVISIGN MARSHALLL INTEGRATED AA'S USTEF

[^11]
Table A-11


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 思两 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 茼品 | $\underset{\sim}{n} \underset{\sim}{n} \underset{\sim}{n}$ |  |  |  | $\underset{G}{\infty} \underset{\sim}{n}$ |


|  |  | $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma}$ |  |  |  | ${ }_{4}^{4} \sqrt{4}$ | $\mathfrak{W}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\frac{2}{4}$ | $\stackrel{R}{i}_{0}^{\infty} 0$ |  |  | 答守 | $\frac{10}{4 \pi} \frac{0}{\pi}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \frac{\pi}{4} \frac{0}{4} \\ & \# \pi \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | 02 |  | －808080 | $\cos _{10}^{01}$ |

 WHITE
GENT



Table 4－12
Hagh sehooles 19日1
SCHOOL

[^12]SCHOOL

| $\frac{7}{0}$ |  | $\leq$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 9 | ¢ | 吕 |
| $\Omega$ | 㫛 |  |
|  | $\stackrel{\text { ¢ }}{ }$ |  |
|  | 突岛穹 |  |
|  | 屶岂 | 可甹的 |
|  | 上可年 | ¢ ¢ |
|  | 为司 | 可332 |


| $\frac{1}{5} \frac{1}{y}$ | $\stackrel{\cup}{4} \underset{\sim}{\sim}$ | $\cdots \mathrm{m}$ | 3i m＝ |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 空点荷采 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ごったがい | 昭 | 过遜品 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\infty_{0}^{\infty}$ | － $\mathrm{cos}_{0}$ |  |  <br> ジすがローの | なら | $M_{G}^{M} N N_{1}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & 05 \\ & \dot{4} 5 \\ & \frac{1}{4} 5 \\ & =0 \end{aligned}$ |  | 茳会 | $\left.\begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{array}\right]$ |  |  | $$ |  |
|  |  |  | $\stackrel{0}{0}_{0}^{0}{ }_{1}^{0}$ |  | Noryog <br>  | $\begin{gathered} M \pi \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{gathered}$ |  |
|  |  |  |  | $\underset{\sim}{n_{5}^{2}}$ | Nocion |  | $\stackrel{0}{0} \underset{N}{0} \underset{\sim}{0}$ |
|  | oのnow | 监 |  | $\frac{T}{3}$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | bmo |  | تN NGMMN | $\stackrel{0}{0}_{0}^{0}$ | $\underset{\sim}{\text { Na }}$ |
| － |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \frac{I}{4} \\ 6 \\ \hline \frac{1}{3} \end{gathered}$ | ワペロペロー | 「 | Mon |
| 寽垔 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\underset{\frac{\leftrightarrow}{3}}{\underset{\sim}{4}}$ |  | $\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\mathrm{B}} \underset{\sim}{\mathrm{~J}}$ | $\underset{\sim}{6}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 品岕 } \\ & \text { 品 } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |
| ${ }_{2}^{3} 2$ |  |  |  | 甹管 | －TNanNo | NN | NNM |
| $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{n}{4} \\ & \stackrel{4}{4} \\ & \underset{y}{4} \\ & z \end{aligned}$ |  | $-8 \underset{0}{0}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\frac{\sum_{n}^{n}}{z_{0}}$ |  | $\dot{G}$ |  |  |  |  |  |

[^13]SCHODL WHITE AA＇S
HAMILTGN GAY VIEN
FULASK I
SOUTHISION
MARSHALL
VINEENT VINCENT
MADISON INTEGRATED AA•S
IVERSIDE BLACK AA＇S

Table A-14
High School Specialty Schools

| and Special Program Schools (1979-1982) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Name of School | TTL <br> Students | TTL Black Attending | TTL White Attending | \% Black Attending |
| Specialty Schools-1979 |  |  |  |  |
| Milwaukee Tech | 2584 | 720 | 1721 | 27.86 |
| King | 984 | 425 | 519 | 43.19 |
| Juneau | 1050 | 412 | 601 | 39.24 |
| Special Program Schools-1979 |  |  |  |  |
| Liberty South | 31 | 16 | 12 | 51.61 |

[^14]Table A-14

| Name of School | TTL <br> Students | TTL Black Attending | TTL White Attending | \% Black Attending |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Specialty Schools-1980 |  |  |  |
| Milwaukee Tech | 2404 | 707 | 1555 | 29.41 |
| King | 1142 | 503 | 590 | 44.05 |
| Juneau | 973 | 346 | 578 | 35.56 |
| Special Program Schools-1980 |  |  |  |  |
| Liberty South | 44 | 24 | 19 | 54.55 |
| Pleasant View | 205 | 82 | 108 | 40.00 |

Note. Specialty Schools and Special Program Schools have no attendance
areas so the number of students sent in is equal to the total number attending.
Table A-14

| Name of School | TTL <br> Students | TTL Black Attending | TTL White Attending | \% Black Attending |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Specialty Schools-1981 |  |  |  |
| Milwaukee Tech | 2324 | 732 | 1421 | 31.50 |
| King | 1230 | 515 | 663 | 41.87 |
| Juneau | 1056 | 377 | 610 | 35.70 |
|  | Special Program Schools-1981 |  |  |  |
| Lincoln Dec. | 83 | 34 | 49 | 40.96 |
| Liberty South | 36 | 18 | 17 | 50.00 |
| Craig | 71 | 38 | 27 | 53.52 |
| Kilmer | 235 | 12 | 200 | 5.11 |
| Lapham Park | 92 | 83 | 6 | 90.22 |
| -Pleasant View | 233 | 93 | 122 | 39.91 |
| 68 th St. | 149 | 76 | 66 | 51.01 |
| Demmer JAC | 123 | 81 | 32 | 65.85 |
| Lady Pitts | 134 | 188 | 11 | 88.06 |

[^15]Table A-14
High Schoolspecialty Schools

| Name of School | TTL <br> Students | TTL <br> Black Attending | TTL White Attending | \% Black Attending |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Specialty Schools-1982 |  |  |  |
| Milwaukee Tech | 2289 | 734 | 1372 | 32.07 |
| King | 1288 | 544 | 687 | 42.24 |
| Juneau | 1108 | 421 | 616 | 38.00 |
|  | Special Program Schools-1982 |  |  |  |
| Lincoln Dec. | 152 | 90 | 52 | 59.21 |
| Liberty South | 35 | 18 | 16 | 51.43 |
| Craig | 68 | 35 | 28 | 51.47 |
| Kilmer | 221 | 9 | 197 | 4.07 |
| Lapham Park | 98 | 87 | 9 | 88.78 |
| Pleasant View | 244 | 1.03 | 120 | 42.21 |
| 68 th St. | 159 | 92 | 62 | 57.86 |
| Demmer JAC | 44 | 34 | 4 | 77.27 |
| Lady Pitts | 157 | 143 | 8 | 91.08 |

[^16]Table A-15
Sumore of Elementary Echoni SEudents innt or, EDecialtv Echools, 1970-198?
1970

| SCHOML | \# Bl_ADKS SENT OUT | \# BLACKS SENT ro SPECIALTY SEHOOLS | \# WHITES SENT DUT | \# WHITES GENT TO sPECIALTY SCHOOLS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WHITE AA'S |  |  |  |  |
| oklahoma ave. | 0 | 0 | 53 | 3 |
| ALCDTT | $1]$ | 0 | 15 | 4 |
| WHITMAN | 0 | 0 | $2 \cdot 7$ | 5 |
| BURDICK | 0 | 0 | 29 | $\bigcirc$ |
| :HSTH STREET | 0 | 0 | 42 | - |
| VICTORY | 0 | 0 | 33 | 5 |
| 67TH STREET | 0 | 0 | 35 | $J$ |
| morgandale | 0 | 0 | 31 | . 1 |
| 7ETH STREET | 0 | 0 | 21 | $\because$ |
| FAIRVIEW | 0 | $1]$ | . 34 | J |
| fiRANT | 0 | 0 | 5 | 13 |
| MANITOBA | 17 | 13 | 34 | 4 |
| FERNWSIOD | 0 | 0 | 39 | 7 |
| dlemernt ave. | 13 | 0 | 20 | 3 |
| DUEPFLER | 1 | : | 55 | 11 |
| MITCHEL. 1 | 1 | 1 | iS3 | 1.9 |
| GREETVFIELD | 1 | $\square$ | 07 | 10 |
| DIVER STREET | 0 | $1]$ | $14: 7$ | 47 |
| BUREANK | 1 | 3 | 27 | 7 |
| TRIWERIDGE | 0 | $1]$ | 4.7 | 7 |
| COUPER | 1 | 0 | 104 | 15 |
| HAYES | 1 | 1 | 75 | 12 |
| WHITTIER | 0 | 0 | te | 2 |
| KILMER | 0 | $1]$ | 15 | 2 |
| TIPPECANOE | 1 | 1 | 19 | 0 |
| RILEY | 0 | 13 | 24 | 4 |
| GARLAND | 3 | 7 | - | 14 |
| 1. IFHONL AVE. | 2 | $1]$ | 94 | 1.3 |
| CLAATPIE | 1 | I) | 97 | 31 |
| CORTIN | 0 | $1]$ | 4.4 | 1 |
| GTD STREET | 0 | 0 | 10 | 1 |
| lOWELL | 0 | 0 | 23 | 2 |
| LONGFELLOW | 5 | 0 | 132 | T2 |
| S5TH STREET | $i$ | : | $2 \cdot$ | 7 |
| 1ST STREET | 0 | 0 | $5 \%$ | 17 |
| -ASTH STREET | 1 | 7 | 1: | - |
| HUMBCILDT PARK | . | 0 | 40 | 1 |
| NIEEKRA | J | 3 | 100 | $10 \cdot 7$ |
| HARTFGRD AVE. | t | 1 | 16.4 | 87 |
| grantosa dr. | ? | ) | $\cdots 7$ | 1 |
| gOGDRICH | 5 | ? | 1.1 | $\because$ |
| PARKVIEW | 7 | - | -0 | 2 |
| CRAIE | - | $\theta$ | 3 | 2 |
| MARYLAND IVE. | i5: | 1 | 9 | $1:$ |
| BEYAIT | ! | 2 | 5 | $\cdots$ |


|  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1977 |  |  |  |
| SCHOML | \＃BLADKS | \＃BLACKS SENT TO | \％WHITES | \＃WHITES SENT TO |
|  | SENT DUT | SPECIALTY | SENT GUT | SPECIALTY |
|  |  | SCHOML |  | Schoincs |
| GRAMD VIEW | 2 | 0 | 23 | 4 |
| BRUCE | 1 | 0 | 22 | 1 |
| ENGIEEBURG | 13 | 2 | 37 | J |
| GRANVILLE OT． | 11 | 1 | 35 | 10 |
| IRVING | 6 | 0 | 45 | 1 |
| CASS | 3 | 1 | 47 | 17 |
| OSTH STREET | $\cdots$ | 0 | 52 | Ј |
| HAPPY HILL | 14 | 5 | 3 | － |
| STUART | 5 | 0 | 12 | 1 |
| BARTON | 13 | 15 | 21 | 11 |
| MAPLE TREE | 13 | 2 | 4 Ј | 7 |
| LANCASTER | 12 | 0 | 55 | 5 |
| SHERMAN | 17 | 2 | 72 | 10 |
| THOREAU | 13 | 1 | 22 | 2 |
| EMERSON | 15 | 1 | ？ 5 | 2 |
| HI MOUNT BLVD． | 81 | 10 | 143 | 5.4 |
| SSRD STREET | 15 | 1.7 | J． | 16 |
| STGRY | 30 | 0 | 34 | 3 |
| HAWTHCIRNE | J5 | 3 | 50 | 12 |
| HAMPTON | 37 | 5 | 51 | 3 |
| FRATNEY | 29 | 0 | 41 | 15 |
| CARLETON | ：35 | 5 | 110 | 23 |
| BROWNING | 18 | 0 | 33 | 2 |
| Total： | 520 | 47 | 5．573 | 7：34 |
| Percent： |  | 9．04\％ |  | 21．31\％ |
| INTEGRATED AA＇S |  |  |  |  |
| KLUGE | 76 | 0 | 60 | 3 |
| WIS AVE． | 59 | 7 | 42 | 6 |
| CONGRESS | so | $!$ | 47 | $=$ |
| PTERCE | 205 | i］ | 78 | 13 |
| J7TH STREET | 191 | 12 | 107 | 20 |
| J．5TH STREET | 137 | 5 | 75 | 21 |
| FOREST HOME AVE． | $\square$ | 0 | 83 | 7 |
| Total： | 729 | ここ | 475 | 131 |
| Percent： |  | 3． |  | 1\％．80\％ |
| BLACK AA＇S |  |  |  |  |
| KILBOURN | 119 | 0 | 53 | 4 |
| 27 TH STREET | Sios | 71 | 72 | 14 |
| TOWNSEND | 377 | 22 | 46 | 14 |
| IIST STREET | 445 | 42 | 50 | 10 |
| CLEMENS | 50 | O | 23 | 10 |
| SGTH STREET | 30s | 53 | 109 | 46 |
| SATH STREET | 100 | 5 | 2 | 12 |
| HOLMES | いッ | S | $\therefore$－ | D |


| SCHOOL | 1.977 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | \＃Bl＿ACKS | \＃BLACKS SENT TO | \＃WHITES | \＃WHITES SENT TO |
|  | SENT GUT | SPECIALTY SCHOMLS | SENT QUT | SPECIALTY SCHOOLS |
| PALMER | 230 | ： | 14 | 2 |
| SILVER SPRING | 94 | 10 | 14 | 3 |
| SIEFERT | 542 | 70 | 51 | 13 |
| BROWN | 178 | 5 | 12 | 3 |
| BERGER | 513 | 25 | 14 | 5 |
| CLARK | 501 | 25 | 10 | 1 |
| GARDEN HOMES | 509 | 34 | 16 | 4 |
| LLOYD | 304 | 7 | 3 | 13 |
| 2OTH STREET | 424 | 22 | 2 | 0 |
| green bay ave． | 3 ac | 22 | 6 | 0 |
| lafollette | 600 | 3 | 5 | 1 |
| LEE | 291 | 22 | 4 | 0 |
| HOPKINS | 340 | 182 | 1 | 1 |
| AUER AVE． | 1053 | 35 | 16 | 4 |
| FRANKLIN | 35 | 16 | － | i |
| KEEFE AVE． | J22 | 13 | ？ | 13 |
| GARFIELD AVE． | 120 | 5 | 9 | 0 |
| － PTH STREET | 213 | 13 | 2 | $1]$ |
| E ．L．PHILLIP | 159 | － | － | 0 |
| Total： | 10716 | 775 | 5：75 | 14：3 |
| Percent．： |  | $7.23 \%$ |  | 24．37\％ |
| HISPANIC AA＇S O |  |  |  |  |
| AL．LEN FIELD | 4 | 0 | 36 | 3 |
| VIEAU | $1]$ | 1 | 寝 | 0 |
| kagel | 0 | 17 | 73 | 7 |
| rotal： | 4 | 0 | 177 | 15 |
| Percent ： |  | 「．00\％ |  | $3.47 \%$ |
| 「rand Total | 113か9 | 34.5 | 20185 | 104.5 |
| Overall Percent： |  | $7.00 \%$ |  | 21．57\％ |

Table A－i5
Mumber of Elementat：Schocl Stucents Sent in Snecialtw Schonis，1079－1902

|  |  | $1 \% 0$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ATTENDANCE AREA | \＃blacks | \＃BL．ACKS SENT TO SPECIALTY SCHOOLS | \＃WHITES SENT UUT | \＃WHITES SENT TO SPECIALTY SCHOOLS |
|  | SENT OUT |  |  |  |
| WHITE AA＇S JChools |  |  |  |  |
| DOERFLER | 0 | 0 | 70 | 17 |
| BURB ANK | 0 | 0 | 20 | 6 |
| COOPER | 0 | 0 | 36 | 7 |
| FAIRVIEW | 0 | $1]$ | 74 | 10 |
| VICTORY | 0 | 0 | 35 | 8 |
| TIPPECANOE | 0 | 0 | 14 | 1 |
| MANITOBA | 0 | 0 | 42 | 12 |
| GATH STREET | 0 | 0 | 42 | 12 |
| CLEMENT AVE． | 0 | 0 | 18 | 3 |
| WHI TMAN | 0 | 0 | 23 | 5 |
| OKLAHOMA AVE． | 0 | 0 | 53 | 15 |
| WHITTIER | 0 | 0 | cs | 0 |
| MITCHELL | 0 | 0 | 147 | 31 |
| GRANT | 0 | 0 | 51 | 15 |
| GREENFIELD | 1 | 0 | 94 | 10 |
| FERNWUOD | 0 | 0 | 35 | 10 |
| DOVER STREET | 0 | 0 | 114 | 46 |
| BURDICK | 1 | 0 | 17 | J |
| ALCOTT | $\square$ | 0 | 15 | 5 |
| LINCOLN AVE． | 1 | 0 | 71 | 27 |
| G7TH STREET | 0 | 0 | 29 | 3 |
| BLAINE | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | 813 | 34 |
| RILEY | 0 | 0 | $\checkmark 5$ | 9 |
| 7GTH STREET | 0 | 1 | 1.7 | 9 |
| GARLAND | 2 |  | フミ | 14 |
| $\cdots$ TTH STREET | 0 | 0 | 27 | 1.7 |
| O1ST STREET | 0 | 0 | 00 | 43 |
| TROWBRIDGE | 0 | 0 | 41 | 10 |
| HAYES | 2 | 0 | 55 | 19 |
| HUMBULDT PARK | 3 | 0 | 39 | 4 |
| CURTIN | 0 | 0 | 24 | 3 |
| LOWELL | 13 | 0 | 17 | 0 |
| LONGFELLOW | 5 | 0 | 155 | 38 |
| MORGANDALE | 2 | 0 | 22 | 5 |
| HARTFORD AVE． | 4 | 4 | 153 | 150 |
| PEEESKRA | 5 | 3 | 14：3 | 125 |
| GCODRICH | $\stackrel{ }{6}$ | 0 | 33 | 1 |
| PARKVIEW | 13 | 0 | 27 | 5 |
| BALJCE | 1 | 0 | 1.7 | 2 |
| BYRAMT | 7 | 0 | 51 | 15 |
| MARYLAND AVE． | 13 | E | 70 | 60 |
| GRANTOSA | E | 0 | こ | ： |
| ERAND VIEW ENGLEBURG | 3 | $\underline{1}$ | 22 | 4 |
| ENGLEBURG GRANVILLE CT． | 14 | ． | 31 | 12 |
| GMERSON | 10 | 1 | 3 | $\square$ |
| －．5TH STREET | 14 | 10 5 | 30 | 11 |
| CASS | 5 |  | 3 | 26 |
| IRVING | 13 | こ | 10 | 6 |
| THOREAU | 1.3 | \％ | 3 | S |
| MAPI．E TREE | $1 \rightarrow$ | 1 | 3 | $1 \%$ |


| ATTENDANCE | \# BLACKS | \# Blacks SENT TO | \# WHITES | F WHITES SENT TO |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AREA | sEnt dut | SPECIALTY | SEITT OUT | SPECIALTY |
|  |  | SCHOOLS |  | SCHCOLS |
| LANCASTER | 19 | 4 | 57 | 21 |
| STUART | 4 | 1 | 13 | 3 |
| BARTON | $\epsilon$ | 0 | 25 | 10 |
| HAPPY HILL | 22 | 3 | 35 | 12 |
| BROWNING | 12 | 3 | 23 | 10 |
| HAWTHORNE | 32 | 3 | 44 | 11 |
| STORY | 52 | 5 | 31 | 11 |
| HAMPTON | 37 | 5 | $4: 3$ | 10 |
| CARLETIN | 121 | 10 | 130 | 39 |
| FRATMEY | 30 | 4 | 44 | 24 |
| HI MOUNT ELVD. | 151 | 37 | 174 | 124 |
| Total: | 0.25 | 113 | 3221 | 1213 |
| Percerit: |  | 18.14\% |  | $37.06 \%$ |
| Integrated an's |  |  |  |  |
| SHERMAN | 227 | 72 | 206 | 167 |
| KLUGE | 54 | 2 | 81 | $1: 3$ |
| WIS AVE. | 52 | 12 | $\square 5$ | 3 |
| PIERCE | 131 | $\dot{\square}$ | $\stackrel{4}{4}$ | 17 |
| 37TH STREET | 191 | 19 | 107 | 45 |
| COWGRESS | 77 | 17 | 34 | 15 |
| 5JRD STREET | 250 | 12 J | 102 | 91 |
| 3.5TH STREET | 134 | 11 | 76 | 32 |
| FOREST HOME AVE. | $\bigcirc$ | 0 | 102 | こ2 |
| Total: | $117 \%$ | 232 | 739 | 415 |
| Percent: |  | $33.90 \%$ |  | 52. $50 \%$ |
| BLACK AA'S |  |  |  |  |
| KILBCIURN | 106 | 7 | 35 | 5 |
| 27TH STREET | :300 | 93 | 7.7 | 30 |
| HOLMES | 197 | 23 | 31 | 5 |
| SIST STREET | 42 | 53 | 41 | 14 |
| CLEMENS | 74 | 14 | 33 | 15 |
| PALMER | 216 | 25 | 13 | : |
| 2fTH STREET | \% | 9 | 20 | 15 |
| SILVER SPRING | 3 | 11 | 11 | 3 |
| SIEFERT | 501 | 101 | 5 | 13 |
| Clark | $154 \%$ | 253 | 19 | 31 |
| ? ROIWN | 255 | 0 | $\cdot 7$ | 2 |
| BERISER | 511 | 42 | 5 | . |
| auer ave. | 1150 | 140 | 30 | 17 |
| IIREEN BAY AVE. | 5-5 | 45 | 3 | 2 |
| ZOTH STREET | 401 | $\square$ | 3 | 0 |
| 1.EE | . 510 | 123 | 2 | 1 |
| garden homes | 502 | $\therefore$ - | 3 | 1 |
| LAFiollette | s.ss | 45 | : 2 | 1 |
| FRANKI_IN | 401 | こ5 | $\because$ | - |
| -TH STREET | 235 | 67 | 0 | 4 |
| E.L. PHILLIP | 127 | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| KEEFE AVE. | ? ${ }^{2}$ | 91 | 1 | 0 |
| HOPKINS | Sto | 176 | 1 | 2 |
| Foril: | (1) | 1447 | 30.4 | .25 |

Table i-i


|  | 1960 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | \# BLACKS |  | \# WHITES |
| ATTENDANCE | \# blacks | SENT TO | \# WHITES | SENT TO |
| AREA | SENT OUT | SPECIALTY | SENT OUT | SPECIALTY |
|  |  | SCHIJOLS |  | SCHOOLS |
| Percent: |  | $14.19 \%$ |  | $44.64 \%$ |
| HISPANIC AA'S |  |  |  |  |
| ALIEN FIELD | 1 | 0 | 38 | 10 |
| KAGEL | 1 | 0 | 69 | 13 |
| viEAU | 1 | 0 | 11 | 1 |
| Total: | 3 | 0 | 10.3 | 24 |
| Percent: |  | 0.00\% | . | 14.2\%\% |
| Grand Total: | 12001 | 1342 | 46.32 | 1877 |
| overall Percent: |  | 15.35\% |  | $40.0 \% \%$ |

```
    Table A-15
```

Number of Elementary School Students Sent to Specialtv Schools, 1979-1982

## 1931

| ATTENDANCE AREA | \# BLACKS SENT OUT | \# BLACKS SENT TO specialty SCHOOLS | \# WHITES <br> SENT UUT | \# WHITES SENT TO SPECIALTY SCHOMLS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WHITE AA'S |  |  |  |  |
| MANITOBA | 0 | 0 | 44 | 26 |
| burbank | 0 | 0 | 13 | 6 |
| Fairview | 0 | 0 | 61 | 45 |
| VICTORY | 0 | 0 | 30 | 9 |
| Whittien | 0 | 0 | 56 | 2 |
| WHITMAN | 0 | 0 | 24 | 6 |
| oklahoma ave. | 0 | 0 | 57 | 10 |
| CLEMENT AVE. | 0 | 0 | 24 | 1 |
| tippecanoe | 0 | 0 | 10 | 1 |
| COOPER | 0 | 0 | 29 | 2 |
| gsth Street | 0 | 0 | 36 | 6 |
| GREENFIELD | 0 | 0 | 73 | 22 |
| DUERFLER | 0 | 0 | 67 | 18 |
| MITCHELL | 1 | 0 | 16:3 | 39 |
| BLAINE | 0 | 0 | $\stackrel{\circ}{8}$ | 28 |
| jRant | 0 | 0 | 56 | 26 |
| alcott | 0 | 0 | 17 | $\bigcirc$ |
| FERNWOOD | 1 | 0 | 25 | 3 |
| DOVER STREET | 1 | 0 | 93 | 32 |
| BURDICK | 2 | 0 | 14 | 0 |
| ETTH STREET | 0 | 0 | 28 | 5 |
| Jith street | 0 | 0 | 12 | $5{ }_{5}^{1}$ |
| EIST STREET | 1 | 0 | 73 | 57 |
| Lincoln ave. | 2 | 1 | 91 | 31 |
| TROWRRIDGE | 2 | 0 | 42 | 14 |
| hayes | 0 | 0 | 107 | 20 |
| filley | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | 19 | 3 |
| CURTIN | 1 | 0 | 20 | 2 |
| EARLAND | 3 | 1 | E0 | 12 |
| -75TH STREET | 1 | 10 | 32 | 11 |
| humboldt park | 5 | 0 | 27 | 1 |
| LONGFELLOW | 3 | 1 | 14.7 | 52 |
| 1.0 WELL | 2 | 0 | 19 | 6 |
| hartagrd ave. | 3 | 1 | 174 | 160 |
| EOCDDRICH | 3 | 0 | 2 S | 5 |
| morgandale | 3 | 0 | 15 | 5 |
| maryland ave. | 10 | 5 | 172 | 58 |
| bruce | 1 | 1 | 12 | , |
| NEESKRA | 9 | 3 | 136 | 114 |
| BRYANT | 7 | 10 | 47 | 11 |
| grattoisa dr. | 5 | 0 | 33 | 11 |
| PARKVIEW | 5 | 1 |  |  |
| EMERSON | 2 | 1 | 29 | 13 |
| GRAND VIEW | $\stackrel{7}{7}$ | 2 | 37 | 10 |

Table $4-: 5$


| ATTENDANCE AREA | $\begin{aligned} & \text { \# BLACKS } \\ & \text { SEHT BUJT } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { \# ELACKS } \\ & \text { SENT TG } \\ & \text { SPEGIALTY } \\ & \text { SCHOMS } \end{aligned}$ | a WHITES SENT OUT | \＃WHITES SENT TO． SPECIALTY SCHOHLS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ENGLEAURG | 11 | 3 | こ7 | 万 |
| CASS | $\cdot 7$ | 2 | 39 | 14 |
| IRVING | 16 | $J$ | 34 | 5 |
| THITREAU | 10 | $\dagger$ | 13 | 5 |
| BARTON | 5 | 0 | 25 | 10 |
| STUART | 6 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| HAPPY HILL | 17 | 5 | \％\％ | 14 |
| ！－ANCASTER | 2 | 5 | 1 | 32 |
| MAPLE TREE | ？2 | 11 | 55 | 16 |
| ESTH STREET | ： 1 | $\cdot 7$ | 50 | 27 |
| STORY | 41 | $\square$ | ご | 10 |
| EROWNING | 13 | 门 | 55 | 14 |
| HAWTHISRNE | $2 ¢$ | 5 | －i | 18 |
| HAMPTIN | 43 | 7 | 5.3 | 17 |
| CARLETIN | $11 \%$ | 14 | 115 | 42 |
| FRATMEY | 47 | S | 50 | 31 |
| Total： | 515 | 104 | $2 \cdot 705$ | $\vdots 155$ |
| Pırc゙ent： |  | $20.17 .7 \%$ |  | 3\％ガ\％ |
| INTEGRATED AA＇S |  |  |  |  |
| HI MOUNT BLVD． | 157 | 37 | 183 | 130 |
| SIHERMAN | 210 | 17 | 215 | 1：2 |
| KLUGE | 77 | $a$ | 72 | 23 |
| WTS AVE． | 57 | 11 | 37 | 11 |
| PIERCE | 205 | 7 | $\cdots$ | 30 |
| CONGRESS | ：3 | 17 | 34 | 13 |
| SJRD STREET | 225 | $12 ?$ | 03 | 74 |
| SフTH STREET | 2174 | $4: 3$ | 100 | －7 |
| ЗSTH STREET | 1.71 | 13 | $\square 1$ | こ7 |
| FOREST HiME AVE． | 17 | $1]$ | 05 | 22 |
| Total＝ | 14.95 | 577 | －87 | 550 |
| P！－rctant |  | $\because$ ¢－－\％ |  | 55.720 |
| ？1．ACK AA＇S |  |  |  |  |
| Y．ILEOURN | 126 | 10 | 31 | 9 |
| HCMLES | 12 | 34 | 3 | ？ |
| ПᄀTH STFEET | $\cdots 16$ | $\cdots 7$ | ＋．2 | こた |
| 二LST STREET | 54.5 | 54 | 41 | $\therefore$ |
| FALMER | ！「！ | 30 | 14 | 5 |
| STEFERT | 2－7\％ | ：36 | 3 | 1.3 |
| CLEMENS | － | 20 | ？ | $!5$ |
| －4TH STREET | 75 | 1： | 21 | 1 |
| SILVER SPRTNG | －4．4 | ！ヶ－ | 2 | 万 |
| CLARK | 1：03 | 2．013 | －1 | $\because$ |
| EERGER | 405 | 43 | $\bigcirc$ | $\therefore$ |
| 3RI？WH | －5 | －17 | － | 3 |

## Tale :i-i5




| ATTENDANCE AREA | \# Blacks EEHT MLIT | \# BLACKS <br> SENT TO <br> SPECIALTY <br> SCHOMLS | \# WHITES EENT IUT | \# WHITES SENT TO <br> SPFCIIALTY SCHODLS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FRANKLIN | 367 | $\dagger 2$ | 10 | 4 |
| GARDEN HIMMES | 4.75 | 44 | 7 | $1]$ |
| AJJEP AVE. | 1065 | 137 | 21 | 11 |
| 2OTH STREET | 447 | 55 | 2 | 0 |
| LEE | 510 | 110 | 4 | 1 |
| green bay ave. | $2: 42$ | 35 | 4 | 10 |
| $=. L . P H I L L I P$ | 177 | 15 | 1 | $\square$ |
| LAFOLLETTE | 572 | $5 \cdot 7$ | 7 | 2 |
| ITH STREET | 274 | 55 | 1 | 1 |
| KEEFE AVE. | :80 | 34 | 13 | 0 |
| HISPKINS | 705 | 207 | F | 3 |
| Total: | 10305 | $1.5 ヶ 5$ | 427 | 1.76 |
| Percerit: |  | 15.47\% |  | 41.22\% |
| HISPANLC AA'S |  |  |  |  |
| KAGEL | 1 | 0 | 71 | 15 |
| ALLEN FIELD | 2 | 0 | 135 | 12 |
| VIEAU | 1 | $\bigcirc$ | 11 | 1 |
| rotal: | 4 | 0 | :77 | 23 |
| Percent: |  | $0.00 \%$ |  | 15.62\% |
| Grand Total: | 12..13 | 2037 | 4575 | 1907 |
| Fercent: |  | 16.35\% |  | $41.72 \%$ |

Table A-15
 19E2

| SCHoml | \# BLACKS SENT OUT | \# BLACKS SENT TO SPECIALTY SCHOOLS | \# WHITES SENT IUT | \# WHITES SENT TO SPECTALTY SCHOMLS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WHITE AA'S |  |  |  |  |
| MANITOBA | 0 | 0 | 35 | 20 |
| CLEMENT AVE. | $1]$ | 0 | $2 \cdot$ | J |
| WHITTIER | 0 | 0 | 55 | 4 |
| BURBANK | 0 | 0 | 16 | 7 |
| RLAINE | 0 | 0 | 63 | 30 |
| BURDICK | 1 | 13 | 15 | 1 |
| ALCOTT | 17 | $\square$ | 26 | 4 |
| FATRVIEW | 0 | 0 | 54 | 40 |
| WHITMAN | 0 | 0 | 13 | $\checkmark$ |
| COOPER | 1. | $1)$ | 26 | 5 |
| GREENFIELD | 0 | 0 | 30 | 15 |
| SBTH STREET | i) | i) | 20 | - 7 |
| OKLAHOMA AVE. | $1]$ | 0 | 70 | 12 |
| VICTORY | J | 10 | J. | 13 |
| 7ETH STREET | 0 | $\square$ | 13 | J |
| s7TH STREET | . 3 | 0 | 27 | 3 |
| FERNWOOD | i) | $\square$ | 21 | 4 |
| TIPPECANOE | : | 1 | 1.5 | 1 |
| MITCHELL | . | 0 | 124 | 34 |
| ISRANT | 1) | 1 | 41 | 12 |
| DOVER | : | 0 | 125 | 34 |
| CURTIN | 1) | 1 | 2 | a |
| GARLAND | : | 1 | $5 \%$ | 13 |
| LOWELL | 11 | $\square$ | 23 | 7 |
| LIACOLN AVE. | : | 1 | 75 | 27 |
| TROWBRIDGE | \% | 0 | 46 | 16 |
| GlST STREET | 0 | 0 | 71 | 47 |
| HAYES | 11 | 0 | - 6 | $1: 3$ |
| DOERFLER | $\because$ | 2 | 50 | 12 |
| PILEY | $\vdots$ | 1. | 22 | 4 |
| HUMBOLDT PARK | 5 | 0 | 22 | 1 |
| -STH STREET |  | $1]$ | 22 | \% |
| L, INGFELLOW | $\cdots$ | 2 | 14: | 47 |
| MiTRGANDAL.E | $\because$ | 5 | 15 | 5 |
| HARTFITRD AVE. | $\because$ | 2 | 175 | $1 \approx 5$ |
| MARYLAIND AVE. | 7 | 2 | 104 | 8 |
| EGODRICH | 4 | 2 | 29 | 4 |
| BRUISE | 2 | 0 | 11 | 2 |
| linantosa Dr. | $\square$ | 0 | $2 \cdot$ | 10 |
| NEESKARA | 16 | 6 | 125 | 101 |
| BRYANT | 2 | $1)$ | 37 | 11 |
| PARKVIEN | 3 | $\cdots$ | 25 | 15 |
| SRAFADVIEW | $\stackrel{ }{*}$ | 1 | 14 | 2 |
| ENGLEEURG | - 1 | . 5 | 25 | 5 |
| 「RANVILLE CT. | 11 | 1 | 37 | 7 |
| EMERSON | 10 | ? | 24 | 3 |
| STIAART | $?$ | 1 | 24 | 7 |
| DASS | $\therefore$ | 2 | 32 | $!2$ |

Table $1-15$


| シCincoul | \# BLACKS. SENT OUT | \# BLACKS 'SElHTO TO SPECIALTY SCHMOLS | \# !UHITES SENT OUT | \# WHITES <br> SENT TO <br> SPEETALTY <br> SCHOOLS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| THOREAU | 10 | ? | 23 |  |
| IRVING | 12 | 5 | 31 |  |
| HAPPY HILL | 22 | 5 | 43 | 12 |
| BARTON | $\cdot 7$ | 1 | 2.5 | 12 |
| LANCASTER | 2s | 7 | 0.8 | 24 |
| 65TH STREET | 11 | 5 | 53 | 5 |
| MAPI.E TREE | 23 | $\bigcirc$ | 39 | 10 |
| STijFy | . 3 | 7 | 37 | 13 |
| BROWNING | 15 | $t$ | 0 | 13 |
| HAWTHORNE | 13 | 3. | 48 | 115 |
| HAMPTIN | J1 | 3 | 17 | 10 |
| CARLETIN | 12.7 | 14 | 125 | 4.7 |
| FPATNEY | $5 \%$ | 5 | 51 | 4 |
| To inl: | 520 | 110 | 2003 | 1.129 |
| Percerit. |  | 21. $15 \%$ | a.os |  |
| integrated an's |  |  |  |  |
| HI-MOUPT RLVD. | 152 | 3.3 | 174 | 141 |
| SHERMAN | 241 | 10.5 | 225 | 17:3 |
| PIERCE | 172 | 5 | 104 | 26 |
| KLUGE | :33 | 10 | $\bigcirc 1$ | 14 |
| SJRD STREET | 224 | 112 | 122 | 8 |
| WISCONSIN AVE. | 8 | 17 | 4E | 14 |
| CIHGGRESS | 76 | 24 | J4 | G |
| FOREST HOME AVE. | 1 | 10 | 30 | 14 |
| Total: | 1001 | 20E | :47 | 48 |
| Percent: |  | 30.77\% | -47 | 57.02\% |
| BLACK AA'S |  |  |  |  |
| 35TH STREET | 20e: | 1.7 | \% | 90 |
| J7TH STREET | 377 | 55 | -1 | 41 |
| KILBGIJRN | 15.7 | 15 | 30 | - |
| Holl mes | 1\%\% | 32 | 35 | 14 |
| -1GT STREET | $55 \%$ | 57 | . 5 | 12 |
| CLEMENS | 1.5 | 25 | 310 | 15 |
| 27TH STREET | 905 | 983 | 56 | -0 |
| SIEFERT | $4: 3$ | 7 | 27 | 1.4 |
| PALMER | $1 \%$ | ? 5 | 12 | $\underline{1}$ |
| 2.th etreet | 41 | 12 | 27 | 15 |
| STLVER SPRING | 74 | 11 | 4 | 0 |
| OARK | 1410 | 2? | 73 | 41 |
| ERGGER | 507 | -i | 3 | 1 |
| AJER AVE. | 1121 | 140 | 22 | 12 |
| BROWN | 243 | 7 | 4 | 12 |
| ImRDEN HOMES | . 45.5 | 52 | 7 | 0 |
| CRANKLIN | T6e | 71 | : | , |
| iREEN gay ave. | 206 | 47 | 2 | 10 |
| EE | 151 | 10.4 | $\checkmark$ | 1 |
| AFMLLETTF. | 5.50 | 57 | , | n |

Table i-is



| SCHith | \# BLACRS SENT MUTT | $\begin{aligned} & \text { \% BLACKS } \\ & \text { SENT TG } \\ & \text { SPECIALTY } \\ & \text { SCHOOLS } \end{aligned}$ | \# : WHITES EENT OUT | म WHITES sent To SPECIALTY SCHOMLS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| E.L. PHILLIP | 34 | 7 | 0 | - |
| COTH STREET | 4.34 | 3 E | 0 | 0 |
| HOPKINS ST. | 813 | 198 | 5 | 4 |
| $\cdots$ TH STREET | 235 | 4.7 | 2 | 4 |
| KEEFE AVE. | 279 | 3. | 2 | 0 |
| Total: | 10437 | 1-01 | 50 | 244 |
| Percent.: |  | 15.34\% |  | 41.36\% |
| HISPANIC AA'S |  |  |  |  |
| ALLEN FIELD | J | 0 | 105 | 13 |
| KAGEL | 1 | 13 | 71 | 13 |
| VIEAU | 1 | 0 | 12 | 0 |
| Total: | 5 | 0 | 1:39 | 26 |
| Percerit: |  | 0.00\% |  | $13.83 \approx$ |
| Grand Total: Overall Percent: | 11965 | 2017 | 1.53. |  |
|  |  | $16.37 \%$ |  | $\pm 1.52 \%$ |



Table ：1－15


| 1：30 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ATTENDANCE | \＃BLACKS | \＃BLACKS SENT TO | \＃WHITES | \＃WHITES SENT TO |
| AREA | SENT OUT | SPECIALTY <br> SCHOOLS | SENT OUT | SPECIALTY |
| WHITE AA＇S SEHMNS |  |  |  |  |
| FRITSCHE | 0 | 0 | 20 | 1 |
| AUDUBIDN | 1 | 0 | 53 | 10 |
| 8ELL | 0 | 0 | 10 | 2 |
| WALKER | 3 | 1 | 162 | 41 |
| SHOLES | 1 | 0 | 36 | 22 |
| BURRRDUGHS | 4 | 1 | 23 | 5 |
| MORSE | ： | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| WRIGHT | 37 | 3 | 31 | 12 |
| WEBSTER | 24 | 2 | こJ | 17 |
| MUIR | が | J | 41 | － |
| Total： | 140 | 9 | 447 | 127 |
| Percent： |  | $6.10 \%$ |  | 23．${ }^{\text {any }}$ |
| INTEGRATED（WHITE／ HISPANIC） |  |  |  |  |
| KOSCIUSZKO | 0 | 0 | 47 | 17 |
| Percent： |  | $0.00 \%$ |  | 56．17\％ |
| BLACK AA＇S |  |  |  |  |
| EDISIN | 2？1 | 15 | 45 | 17 |
| PARKMAN | 10.3 .2 | 95 | 17 | 4 |
| ETEUBEN | 0.55 | ：4 | 106 | 51 |
| ROOSEVELT | 3¢6 | ． 7.5 | 70 | 30 |
| FULTON | \％ 00 | 0 | 11 | 2 |
| Total： | Sm05 | 349 | 247 | 104 |
| Percent： |  | ${ }^{7}$ ． $6.0 \%$ |  | 41．77\％ |
| Grand Total： | 3751 | $\begin{gathered} 353 \\ 0.54 \% \end{gathered}$ | 745 | 24：3 |
| overall Percent．： |  |  |  | 33．29\％ |

## Zabip A-ió

Muber af Midie Schoni Stwaents sent $=0$ Soeciattr Schonis. 1979-1082

| ATTENDANCE | \# Bl.ACKS | \# 日LACKS sent to | \% WHITES | \# WHITES SENT TO |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AfEA | SENT OUT | SPECIALTY | SENT UUT | SPECIALTY |
|  |  | SCHOOLS |  | SCHOOLS |
| WHITE AA'S |  |  |  |  |
| 3EL: | 0 | 0 | 10 | 2 |
| FRITSCHE | 0 | 0 | 22 | 13 |
| WALKER | 3 | 0 | 144 | 35 |
| AUDUBON | 2 | 2 | 53 | 7 |
| SHOLES | J | 0 | 32 | 14 |
| BURRROUGHS | 13 | 1 | 26 | 13 |
| MORSE | 7 | 0 | 37 | 7 |
| WEBSTER | 34 | 3 | 24 | $\theta$ |
| WRIGHT | 4.7 | 2 | 26 | 11 |
| MUIR | 33 | 2 | 37 | 5 |
| Total: | 104 | 10 | 411 | 113 |
| Percent: |  | 6.10\% |  | $\because 7.4 \%$ |
| integrated (White; HISPANIC) |  |  |  |  |
| KOSCIUSZKO | 1 | 0 | 41 | 10 |
| Percent: |  | 0.00\% |  | 24.39\% |
| BLACK AA'S |  |  |  |  |
| STEUBEN | $\cdots$ | 78 | 107 | 61 |
| EDISON | Jns | 13 | 42 | 15 |
| RUOSEVELT | 918 | 58 | 7:3 | 31 |
| FIJLTON | ¢53 | 74 | 7 | 3 |
| DARKMAN | 966 | 95 | 12 | 2 |
| Total: | 34:36 | 343 | 24:3 | 112 |
| Percent: |  | '3.84\% |  | $45.16 \%$ |
| Granc Total: Qverall Percerit: | 36.51 | $\begin{aligned} & .55 .3 \\ & 7.0 .7 \% \end{aligned}$ | 700 | $\begin{array}{r} 255 \\ 3.57 \% \end{array}$ |

Table A-í
Yumor of Middle Schoni Students Sant 00 Sopeigloy Echools, i970-i98?


Table A-17



Table A－： 7


| ATTENDANCE AREA |  | \＃BLACKS |  | \＃WHITES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | \＃blacks | SENT TO | \＃WHITES | SENT TO |
|  | SENT OUT | SPECIALTY | SENT OUT | SPECIALTY |
|  |  | SCHOOLS |  | SCHOMLS |
| WHITE AA＇S |  |  |  |  |
| HAMILTON | 0 | 0 | 172 | 127 |
| BAY VIEW | 0 | 0 | 339 | 264 |
| SOUTH DIVISION | 4 | 2 | B71 | 392 |
| PULASKI | 3 | 0 | 624 | 374 |
| MARSHALL | 75 | 29 | 231 | 138 |
| VINCENT | Sn | 32 | コこコ | 57 |
| MADISON | 08 | 54 | 436 | 107 |
| Total： | $25 \%$ | 177 | 2306 | 1470 |
| Percent： |  | スア サ\％ |  | 52．71\％ |
| ITTEGRATED AA＇S |  |  |  |  |
| RIVERSIDE | 305 | 7 | － | 250 |
| CUSTER | 7－5 | 2.11 | 273 | 131 |
| Total： | 11.4 | 21.7 | 55 | 351 |
| Percent： |  | 26．72\％ |  | mi3． $16 \%$ |
| BLACK AA＇S |  |  |  |  |
| IWASHINGTON | 2254 | 475 | ：37 | 891 |
| WEST EIVISION | 747 | 15.5 | ［－1］ | 123 |
| NORTH DIVISİN | $\because 469$ | 512 | 29 | 10 |
| Total： | 5470 | 1140 | 10．5\％ | 31\％ |
| Percerit： |  | 20．34\％ |  | $77.50 \%$ |
| Grand Total： | $9 \cdot 20$ | $1.5 .5 \%$ | 4421 | 26.7 .7 |
| nverall Percent |  | 22． $2 \% \%$ |  | 60．60\％ |

Table a-17


Tiable A-!: Continued
Number of High School Students Sent To Specialty Schools. 1979-1082

| 1:301 |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ATTENDANCE AREA | \# BLACKS | \# BLACKS |  | \# WHITES |  |
|  |  | SENT TD | \# WHITES | SENT TO |  |
|  | SENT GUT | SPECIALTY | SENT OUT | SPECIALTY |  |
|  |  | SCHOOLS |  | SCHOOLS |  |
| HAMILTUN |  |  |  |  |  |
| HAMILTUN | 1 | 0 | 136 | 125 |  |
| BAY VIEW | 1 | 0 | 360 | 236 |  |
| GOUTH DIVISION | 5 | 1 | 782 | 263 |  |
| PULASKI | 5 | 0 | 713 | 570 |  |
| MARSHALL | -8 | 32 | 220 | 147 |  |
| VINCENT | 74 | 35 | 159 | 40 |  |
| MADISON | 193 | 41 | 439 | 107 |  |
| Total. | 377 | $10 \%$ | 2esa | 1317 |  |
| Percerit. |  | 20.91\% |  | 46.08\% |  |
| INTEGRATED AA'S |  |  |  |  |  |
| RIVERSIDE | 419 | 84 | 340 | 283 |  |
| COUSTER | . 200 | 267 | 236 | 124 |  |
| Total: | $135 \%$ | 351 | 9.26 | 407 |  |
| Percent: |  | 25.335 |  | 65.027 |  |
| BLACK AA'S |  |  |  |  |  |
| WASHINGTON | 2537 | 512 | 3フ6 | 574 |  |
| WEST DIVISION | 58 | $1 \times 8$ | 210 | 130 |  |
| NORTH DIVISION | 25:7 | 65 | 23 | 9 |  |
| Total: | 6024 | 1315 | 1107 | 712 |  |
| Percerit: |  | 21.03\% |  | $04.20 \%$ |  |
| Srand Total: | 7760 | 1775 | $45 * 3$ | 2435 |  |
| Percerit: |  | 22.67\% |  | 5Ј.04\% |  |

Tabla $4-17$
Sumber of Hiph jehooi Students Sant oo Speriaity Schonis. 1970-i982


## Appendix B*

North Division and the Plan to Turn it into a Medical Specially School

North Division High School was built in 1903. Between the years of 1955 and 1959, North changed from being a predominantly white school to one that was predominantly black.

The black community began to petition the Board in the 1960's to build a new school. Finally, after years of discussion and debate, the Milwaukee School Board decided to build a new North Division high school on the site of the old building. The school was finally finished in time for the 1978-79 school year. The school, in accordance with a decision made by the Board in April of 1976 , was to open as a racially balanced school.

In September of 1978, the new building was opened as an attendance area school with a medical specialty as a part of the program. The school ended up being 98 percent black, as few whites volunteered to enroll at North Division. Although the Board claimed it wanted North to be "racially balanced", they did nothing to force whites to enroll there and they sent black students from King (another black school that had been closed and reopened as a college specialty school) to North.

In May of 1979 , the School Board made a decision to close North Division as an attendance area school at the end of the 1979-80 school year and reopen the school as a city-wide health

[^17]and science technology school for the $1980-81$ school yeer for grades 9 and 10, adding grade 11 in 1981-82, and grade 12 in 1982-83. To do this, several steps were to be taken:

1. No new full-time students were to be admitted to North for the 1979-80 school year.
2. At the end of the 1979-80 school year, all remaining students at North were to be transfersed out of North to school where they would enhance "racial balance".
3. A committee was created by the School Board to develop the educational plan for the new school. Although the committee was supposed to have included representatives of North Division staff, students, parents, etc., the committee in fact included no representatives from either of these groups.

There were student protests (e.g., students walked out of North Division) and a protest from the community at a hearing called by the Board after they had reached their decision. This hearing was held on Tuesday night, May 8, 1979. Based on this strong reaction against the plan, the school administration asked a group of parents, students, staff, alumni, and interested community groups to come up with an alternative plan. A committee met and formulated a plan which incorporated the following basic elements:

1. North Division should remain a comprehensive high
school with an expanded medical specialty and technical specialty.
2. In accordance with the consent decree, the courtapproved settlement of the Milwaukee Desegregation suit reached in 1979 , North should be an integrated school, but a predominantly black one (60 percent black/40 percent white).
3. All students presently enrolled at North Division will remain and be allowed to graduate from North Division.
4. Supportive Services Programs should be developed to prepare students to become a part of the medical and technical specialties.

The School Board held an official meeting on May 29 which community members were allowed to attend but not participate. At that meeting the Board, without explanation, refused to consider the alternative plan offered by the community and gave final approval to their initial plan. As a result of this action, the Coalition to Save North Division (CSND) was organized.

The Coalition was opposed to the School Board's plan for several reasons:

1. This plan was conceived and adopted with ebsolutely no consultation with students, teachers, parents, or community groups who were involved with North Division. This was done in spite of the Board's knowledge of the intense concern of the black community about North Division.
2. The burder of the desegregation process was once again being borne by black people. Black children were being forced out. Whites were being force to do nothing. Blacks were being forced--whites were being "attracted".
3. The black community felt that there ws an underlying assumption made by the Board that black institutions could not be expected to achieve academic excellence.
4. After years of struggle, the black community had a right to use that facility for its children.

The Coalition to Save North Division was made up of the same groups of people that developed the community's alternative plan. They began to meet weekly to plan strategies designed to get the School Board to change its decision. The Coalition carried out a number of activities:

1. They were able to get one of the Black School Board members (a prime supporter of the plan) to debate the issue on TV. This helped to publicize the issue and to clarify the basis for the community's opposition to the plan.
2. The Coalition led a petition drive asking people to indicate their support for the community's alternative plan. Over 10,000 signatures were gathered on this petition. Nearly 9,000 of these signatures were presented to a committee of the Milwaukee School Board.
3. The Coalition sponsored a community rally on the football field at North Division. More than 500 people attended
the rally.
4. The Coalition organized a march and rally on the evening of the August 1979 School Board meeting. Approximately 400 people participated in the march from the Martin Luther King Center to the School Administration building, where they were joined by another 100 people for a spirited rally against the Board's plan. The participants then attended the meeting where once again the Board refused to reconsider its plan.
5. Coalition members met with the editorial board of the Milwaukee Journal and the Milwaukee Sentinel. These meetings resulted in the two newspapers changing their editorial stance from supporting the Board's plan to calling for the Board to review its action. The Journal called for the Board to hold off implementing the plan for a year to allow for further study. The Sentinel called for the Board to allow the students who were currently at North Division to graduate from the school.
6. The Coalition filed a formal complaint with the Monitoring Board (a lay board created by the Federal judge to oversee the implementation of the out-of-court settlement that was directing the school desegregation process in Milwaukee). Ultimately, this Board agreed with the position of the CSND that the School Board's actions had placed an unfair burden upon the black community. As a result, a formal hearing was set up before the Federal magistrate to hear the case.

The Coalition to Save North Division, through its attorneys, filed a formal complaint with Federal Magistrate Ruth LaFave.

The complaint (1979) made a number of allegations about the School Board's actions with respect to North Division. The main point made was that,
"The School Board/Administration (was) in violation of the court order (the 1978 order) because its desegregation plan for North Division (was) discriminatory in that it (placed) a disproportionate burden on black students without a valid, non-racial reason when less burdensome alternatives existed." The Magistrate scheduled an official hearing to determine the validity of the Coalition's complaint against the School Board. Throughout the period that the hearing was being conducted, Coalition members continued to meet with School Board members to pursue an out-of-court settlement. These discussions culminated in an agreement being reached on May 1,1980 to abolish the Board's original plan. In its place there was an agreement between the School Board and the CSND provided for the following:
(a) North Division would be allowed to remain an attendance area school with a career specialty.
(b) The enrollment at North Division would be 60 percent black and 40 percent white.
(c) A School-Community committee made up of representatives from the Coalition to Save North Division, the North Division Community, teachers,
administrators, and students, would oversee the development, implementation, and evaluation of the educational program.
(d) All of the students enrolled at North Division would be allowed to remain and graduate from North Division.

## References

## Books

Anderson, H., \& Olson, F. (1981). Milwaukee: At the gathering of the waters. Tulsa: Continental Heritage Press.

Ausubel, D. (1963). Ego development among segregated Negro children. In M. M. Grossack (Ed.), Mental health and segregation (pp. 33-40). New York: Spring "Publishing Company.

Banks, R., \& Di Pasquale, M. E. (1969). A study of the educational effectiveness of integration. New York: Buffalo Public Schools.

Berelson, B., \& Steiner, G. (1964). Human behavior: An inventory of scientific findings. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.

Carter, R. (1980). A reassessment of Brown v. Board. In D. Bell (Ed.), Shades of Brown (pp. 20-29). New York: Teachers College Press.

Clark, K. (1972). A possible reality: A design for the attainment of high academic achievement Eor inner-city students. New York: Emerson Hall.

Clark, K. (1972). Cultural deprivation theories: Their social and psychological implications. In L. Plotkin (Ed.), The educetionally deprived: The potential for change (pp. 1-12). New York: Metropolitan Applied Research Center.

Deutsch, M. (1967). The disadvantaged child and the learning process. In M. Deutsch (Ed.), The disadvantaged child: Selected papers of Martin Deutsch and associates (pp. 40-57). New York: Basic Books.

Edmonds, R. (1980). Effective education for minority pupils: Brown confounded or confirmed. In D. Bell (Ed.), Shades of Brown (pp. 108-123). New York: Teachers College Press.

Eisenberger, K., \& Keough, W. (1974). Declining enrollment: What to do. In AASA executive handbook series (Vol. 2). Virginia: American Association of School Administrators.

Frazier, E. F. (1949). The Negro in the United States. New York: The MacMillian Company.

James, D. (1973). Bunkerism in Carnarsie: Out of the family and into the street. In N. Mills (Ed.), The Great School Controversy (pp. 239-232). New York: Teachers College, Columbia University.

Jones, L. (1979). From Brown to Boston: Desegregation in education 1954-1974. New Jersey: Scarecrow Press.

Kluger, R. (1976). Simple Justice. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Lightfoot, S. (1980). Families as educators: The forgotten principles of Brown. In D. Bell (Ed.), Shades of Brown (pp. 108-123). New York: Teachers College Press.

Myrdal, G. (1944). An American dilemma. New York: Harper and Brothers.

St. John, N. (1975). School desegregation outcomes for children. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Summerfield, H. (1971). The neighborhood-based politics of education. Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.

Taylor, W. (1978). The Dallas story. In N. Estes, \& D. Waldrip (Ed.), Magnet schools: Legal and practical implications (pp. 123-130). New Jersey: New Century Education Corporation.

## Doctoral Dissertations

Vorlop, F. C. (1970). Equal opportunity and the politics of education in Milwaukee. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison).

## Eric Documents

Annotated bibliography and summaries of reference materials. (1977). In School desegregation/integration notebook. (Eric Document Reproduction Service No. ED 152 905)

Bottomly, F. (1979). Magnets: Promises and cautions. In Magnet schools for desegregation. (Eric Document Reproduction Service No. ED 192 398)

Broh, C. A., \& Trent, W. (1981). Assessment of current knowledge about the effectiveness of school desegregation strategies Vol. VI: A review of qualitative literature and expert opinion. Washington, D.C. (Eric Document Reproduction Service No. ED 212 724)

Coleman, J. S., Kelly, S. D., \& Moore, J. A. (1975, August). Trends in school segregation: 1968-1973. (Report No. 722-03-01) Washington, D. C.: The Urban Institute. (Eric Document Reproduction Service No. ED 117 252)

Coleman, J. S. (1966). Equality of educational opportunity. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. (Eric Document Reproduction Service No. ED 012 275)

Rice, D. (1979). A reporter looks at magnet schools. In Magnet schools for desegregation. (Eric Document Reproduction Service No. ED 182 398)

Government Documents and Reports
Coleman, J. (1975). School desegregation and the loss of whites from large central-city school districts. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Commission on Civil Rights.

Report of the advisory committee on racial balance and education. (1966). Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
U. S. Commission on Civil Rights. (1972). Your child and busing. (Clearinghouse Publication No. 12). Washington, D. C.

Weinberg, M. (1977). Minority students: A reseaxch appraisal (U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Institute of Education Publication). Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.

Legal Documents
Armstrong v. $0^{\prime}$ Connell, 416 F. Supp. 1078 (E. D. Wisconsin 1972).
Brown et al v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).

Craig Amos and Jeffrey Amos et al v. Board of School Directors City of Milwaukee, 408 F. Supp. 765 (E. D. Wisconsin 1976).

```
Swann et al v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education et al,
    401 U. S. 1 (1971).
    Milwaukee Public School System
        Documents, Reports, and Correspondence
A five-year school building and future sites program 1966-1970
    (Jan. 12, 1965). Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Board of School
    Directors.
A six-year building and sites program 1970-1975 (September 2,
    1969). Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Board of School Directors.
A six-year building and sites program 1973-1978 (May 19, 1972).
    Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Board of School Directors.
An Array of Alternatives (1975).
Comprehensive Plan for Increasing Educational Opportunities and
    Improving Racial Balance in Milwaukee Public Schools (December
    8, 1976).
Enrollment by Ethnic Categories and Schools (October 1, 1974).
Enrollment by Ethnic Categories and Schools (October 15, 1975).
Enrollment by Ethnic Categories and Schools (September 17: 1976).
Enrollment by Ethnic Categories and Schools(September 16, 1977).
Enrollment by Ethnic Categories and Schools (September 15, 1978).
Lawrence, Robert J. Administrative Assistant to the Deputy
    Superintendent, MPS. Letter to author of this study, March 9,
    1985.
1981-1983 Roster (1982). Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Public
    Information/Community Relations MPS.
Official Fall Enrollment Report (September 30, 1976).
Official Fall Enrollment Report (September 16, 1977).
Official Fall Enrollment Report (September 15, 1978).
Official Fall Enrollment Report (September 21, 1979).
Official Fall Enrollment Report (September 19, 1980).
```

```
Official Fall Enrollment Report (September 18, 1981).
Official Fall Enrollment Report (September 17, 1982).
Reductica in Sites and School Capacity 1975-1982.
School Enrollment by Receiving School (September 21, 1979).
School Enrollment by Receiving School (September 19, 1980)
School Enrollment by Receiving School (September 19, 1981).
School Enrollment by Receiving School (September 17, 1982).
School Enrollment by Sending Attendance Area (September 21, 1979) .
School Enrollment by Sending Attendance Area (September 19, 1980).
School Enrollment by Sending Attendance Area (September 18, 1981).
School Enrollment by Sending Attendance Area (September 17, 1982) .
```


## Newspapers

Courts scored as going too far in school integration. (1975, May 29). Los Angeles Times, part 1, p. 10 cols. 1-4, p. 11 cols. 1-4.

Desegregation architect unhappy with overall results. (1975, May i8). Boston Globe, p. 8 cols. 1-8, p. 9 cols. 5-7.

## Periodicals and Reports

Altevogt, B., \& Nusbaumer, M. (1978, July-August). Black parents and desegregation in Fort Wayne. Integrated Education, 16 (4), 31-34.

Armor, D. (1972, Summer). The evidence on busing. The Public Interest, (28), 90-117.

Arnez, N. (1978, Winter). Implementation of desegregation as a discriminatory process. The Journal of Negro Education, 47 (1.), 28-45.

Banks, J. (1972, December). The destruction of black schools: An American tragedy. Educational Leadership, 30 (3), 270-272.

Barr, R. (1982, January). Magnet schools, an attractive alternative. Principal, 61 (3), 37-40.

Bednarek, D. (1977, November-December). Milwaukee. Integrated Education, 15 (90), 36-37.

Bell, D. (1975, Spring). Waiting on the promise of Brown. Law and Contemporary Problems, 39 (2), 340-375.

Berger, M. (1983, February). Why communities protest school closings. Education and Urban Society, 15 (2), 149-163.

Blackman, A. (1954, August-September). Planning and the neighborhood school. Integrated Education, 2 (4), 49-56.

Boyd, W. (1979, May). Educational policy making in declining suburban school districts. Education and Urban Society, 11 (3), 333-366.

Busing: An American dilemma. (1972, March 13). Newsweek, pp. 20-24.

Colton, D., \& Frelich, A. (1979, May). Enrollment decline and school closings in a large city. Education and Urban Society 11 (3) , 396-417.

Cronin, J. (1977, January-February). City school desegregation and the creative use of enrollment decline. Integrated Education, 15 (1), 10-12.

Derian, P. (1971, August 3). White parents' fears. Inequality in Education, (11), 22-23.

Deutscher, M., \& Chin, I. (1948, October). The psychological effects of enforced segregation: A survey of social science opinion. The Journal of Psychology, 26, 259-287.

Divoky, D. (1979,0ctober). Burden of the seventies: The management of decline. Phi Delta Kappan. 6 (2),87-91.

DuBois, W. E. B. (1935, July). Does the Negro need separate schools? The Journal of Negro Education, 4 (3), 328-335.

Durhaw, J. (1973, Summer). Sense and nonsense about busing. The Journal of Negro Education, 42 (3), 323-335.

Ellis, R. (1971, November). The feasibility of public school desegregation. School and Society, 99 (2336), 433-436.

Featherstone, J. (1976, January 23). Busing the powerless. The New Republic, 174 (4), 11-17.

Glazer, N. (1972, March) : Is busing necessary? Commentary, 53 (3), 39-52.

Goodman, W. (1975, August). Integration, yes: Busing, no. New York Times Magazine, 24, 10-11, 42, 46, 48.

Green, R., Smith E., \& Schweitzer, J. (1972, May). Phi Delta Kappan, 53 (9), 543-546.

Gunining, R. (1972, September-October). Busing versus the neighborhood school. The Urban Review, 6 (1), 2-5.

Hamilton, C. (1968, Fail). Race and education: A search for legitimacy. Harvard Educational Review, 38 (4), 669-684.

Harris, I. (1983, Fall). Criteria for evaluating school desegregation in Milwaukee. The Journal of Negro Education, 52 (4), 423-435.

Iannaccone, L. (1979, May). The management of decline, implications for our knowledge in the politics of education. Education and Urban Society, 11 (3), 418-430.

Jencks, C. (1972, November 19). Busing--the Supreme Court goes North. New York Times Magazine, section 6, pp. 41, 119, 120121, 125, 127.

Killian, L. M., \& Grigg, C. M. (1965, Summer). Community resistance to and acceptance of desegregation. The Journal of Negro Education, 34 (3), 268-277.

Kriss, R. (1972, March 11). The split-level presidency. Saturday Review, 32.

McMillian, C. (1977, November). Magnet education in Milwaukee. Phi Delta Kappan, 59 (3), 158-163.

Marty, M. (1973, July 18-25). The real issue in the busing controversy. Christian Century, 90 (27), 751-755.

Note: Merging urban and suburban school systems. (1972, May). Georgetown Law Journal, 60 (5), 1279-1307.

Orfield, G. (1979, Autumn). Research, politics and the antibusing debate. Law and Contemporary Problems, 42 (4), 148173.

Ornstein, A. (1971, November). The myths of liberalism and school integration. School and Society, 99 (2336), 436-438.

Pettigrew, T. (1972, September-0ctober). School research and the busing issue. The Urban Review, 6 (1), 24-25.

Pettigrew, T. \& Green, R. (1976, February). School desegregation in large cities: A critique of the Coleman 'white flight' thesis. Harvard Educational Review, 46 (1), 1-53.

Poussaint, A., \& Brown, T. L. (1976, May). School desegregation: A synonym for racial equality. School Review, 84 (3), 326336.

Power, J. (1979, September-October). Magnet schools, are they the answer? Today's Education, 68 (3),68-70.

Quinn, L. (1983, March 28). Background on Plan to Close Ninth, Brown, and Roosevelt Schools. Paper developed for attachment to the Coalition to Save Our Schools complaint to the Monitoring Board of the United States District Court.

Quotation Marks: Busing and forced integration. (1972, September-0; tiber). The Urban Review, 6 (12), 41.

Scott, H. (1983, February). Desegregation in Nashville: Conflicts and contradictions in preserving schools in the black community. Education and Urban Society, 15 (2), 235244.

Shakeshaft, C., \& Gardner, D. (1983, March). Declining to close schools: Alternatives for coping with enrollment decline. Phi Delta Kappan, 64 (7),492-496.

Smith, P. (1977, November-December). Voluntary participation and public opinion in Milwaukee school desegregation. Integrated Education, 15 (6), 88-91.

Thomas, M. D. (1980, November). Administrative leadership in school closures. NASSP Bulletin, 64 (439), 21-26.

Trombley, W. (1977, November-December). Magnet schools costly in St. Louis. Integrated Education, 15 (6), 97-99.

Wasserman, M. (1972, September-October). Busing as a 'cover issue', a radical view. The Urban Review, $\underline{6}$ (1), 6-10.

White House panel on education. (1966, February-March). Integrated Education, 4 (1), 16-21.

Wiicox, P. (1970, January-February). Integration or separatism in education: K-12. Integrated Education, 7 (1), 23-32.

Zwerdling, D. (1971, October 23). White militance in Michigan: Block those buses. The New Republic, 165 (17), 14-17.

## Biographical Notes

Name: Howard L. Fuller
Date of Birth: January 14, 1941
Place of Birth: Shreveport, Louisiana USA

Academic Degrees Received
Bachelor of Science, Carroll College, 1962
Master of Social Administration, Western Reserve University, 1964


[^0]:    3. The higher achievement of all racial and ethnic groups in schools with greater proportions of white students is largely, perhaps wholly, related to effects associated with the student body's educational background and aspirations rather than with better facilities and curriculum.
    4. . . . average test performance (for Negroes)
    increases as the proportion of white classmates increases . . . .
    5. Those students who first entered desegregated schools in the early grades do generally show slightly higher average scores than the students who first come to desegregated schools in later grades" (p.107). In Buffalo, New York, two researchers, Banks and Di Pasquale (1969) found that black students did much better academically when they were bused to a formerly all white school than did those black students who remained at the all black school.

    There were also studies that showed no significant increase in achievement level for black students. Meyer Weinberg (1977) discussed a study by Charles Lee Evans (1969) that showed, "Black students in nonsegregated schools who scored lowest on a test of mental ability also gained more on achievement than peers in segregated schools. Otherwise, Black students in nonsegregated schools did not even match the achievement levels of peers in segregated schools" (p. 116).

    The conclusion, though, that seemed to best capture the

[^1]:    ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Integrated between white and Hispanic.

[^2]:    Schools and Special Program Schools included.
    
    Note.

[^3]:    Between 1979 and 1982, at the elementary level the ratio of whites to blacks attending in their own attendance areas fluctuated around 1.5:1. At the middle and high school levels for this same period the ratio is consistently above 2:1, with the highest ratio (2.26:1) occurring at the middle school level in 1979.

[^4]:    desegregation.
    ${ }^{4}$ Although Coleman was not the sole author of the original paper, he became the spokesperson for the paper, and he also began to speak out against school desegregation using the paper as a basis for his views.
    ${ }^{5}$ The footnote being referred to was footnote No. 11 and the social science literature she cited was K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Mid Century White House Conference on Children and Youth), 1950; Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), C. VI; Deuscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A.Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J Psychol., 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregotion Under Conditions of Equal Facilities? 3 Int. J. opinion and attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 1949), 4448; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681, and see generally Myrdal, An American Dilema (19.49). [Copied exactly as it appears in the Decision].
    ${ }^{6}$ Wisconsin Statute 121.85, passed into law in March of 1976 by the State Legislature, provided funds for fiscal incentives for pupil transfers which promote racial balance within the city of Milwaukee (intradistrict), and between Milwaukee and the surrounding districts (interdistrict).

[^5]:    Note. Specialty Schools and Special Program Schools have no attendance areas so the number of students sent in is equal to the total number attending.

[^6]:    Note. Specialty Schools and Special program the number of students sent in $i$ qual to the tal number attending.

[^7]:    Note. Specialty Schools and Special Program Schools have no attendance attending.

[^8]:    Note. Specialty Schools and Special Program Schools have no attendance areas so the number of students sent in is equal to the total number attending.

[^9]:    SFECIALTY SCHOOLS
    BTH STREET BTH STREET
    ROEINSON

[^10]:    SFECIALTY SCHOOLS
    BTH STFEET
    FOEINSON

[^11]:    WASHINGTON WEST DIVISION
    NOFITH DIVISION
    school

[^12]:    WHITE AA＇S GAY VIEW
    SOUTH DIVISION SOUTH DIVISION
    FULASK：
    MAFSHAL． MAFSHALL
    VINCENT INTEGRATED AA＇S
    FIVERSIDE
    CUSTEF BLACI：AA•S
    WASHINGTON
    WEST DIVIGION
    NOFTH DIVISION

[^13]:    Tatie A－13
    High sichools．196： GCHGOL

    $$
    \begin{aligned}
    & \text { WHITE AA } \\
    & \text { HAMII TON }
    \end{aligned}
    $$

    $$
    \begin{aligned}
    & \text { WHITE AA'S } \\
    & \text { HAMII TON } \\
    & \text { BAY VIEW }
    \end{aligned}
    $$

    STUTH DIVISION
    IIRFSHALL
    VINGE．NT integkated af：s fiverside
    custefi

    El．act an＇s
    WASHINGTON
    WEST DIVISION
    NOFTH EIVISION

[^14]:    Note. Specialty Schools and Special Program Schools have no attendance areas so the number of students sent in is equal to the total number attending.

[^15]:    Note. Special.ty Schools and Special Program Schools have no attendance
    areas so the number of students sent in is equal to the total number attending.

[^16]:    areas so the number of students sent in is equal to the total number attending.

[^17]:    *Reprinted from Coalition to Save North Division High School Newsletter, Enough is Enough (publication not dated).

